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3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). The Utah
Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court pursuant to an order dated November 16,
2011 and filed on November 17,2011. R. 946-7.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court commit reversible error in granting summary judgment to
Defendants on the ground that Defendants' negligence was not a proximate cause of
Plaintiffs damages? More specifically, was the chain of causation from Defendants'
negligence to Plaintiffs damages broken by an intervening cause of Plaintiff s actions?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the summary judgment procedure is "considered a drastic remedy requiring
strict compliance with the rule authorizing it," Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P. 2d 1178,1181 (Utah
1993), the contentions of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must be
considered in a light most advantageous to him "and all doubts resolved in favor of
permitting him to go to trial. The motion can only be granted when, viewing the matter that
way, no right to recovery could be established." Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17
Utah 2d 420, 413 P. 2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966). Only when it appears that "upon any view
taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail.. .is
the court justified in refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his evidence and
attempting to persuade the fact trier to his views." Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P. 2d
191,193 (Utah 1975).
1
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Any doubts should be resolved in allowing the nonmoving party "the opportunity of
at least attempting to prove his right to recover." Durham v. Margetts, 571 P. 2d 1332,1334
(Utah 1977). "A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment
motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, viewing the facts
and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379, 385 (Utah 2002)
(citation, quotations, and parenthetical omitted).
"[BJecause negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts,
which is properly done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment is appropriate in
negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Price v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers,
Inc., 252 P.3d 365, 367 (Ut. Ct. App. 2011) (citation and quotations omitted). A trial court
is precluded from granting summary judgment "if the facts shown by the evidence on a
summary judgment motion support more than one plausible but conflicting inference on a
pivotal issue in the case... particularly if the issue turns on credibility or if the inference is
dependent upon subjective feelings or intent." Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardick,
2008 UT 15, % 19, 179 P. 3d 786. (emphasis in the original)
When reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, this Court will "not defer
to the trial court's conclusion that facts are undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported
by those facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Felding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Ut. Ct. App.
1996) (citation and quotations omitted). This Court will "therefore review the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for correctness." Id. (citation omitted). See also, WolfMountain
2
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Resorts, LC v. ASC Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 425 1f 8 (appellate court reviews trial court's
'legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment' for
correctness...)(citation omitted).
ISSUE PRESERVATION
Defendants' Motion, and then Renewed Motion, for Summary Judgment were fully
briefed by Defendants and were opposed by Plaintiff. R. 210-402,403-405,414-416,417667,668-904,908-921.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Neil Breton ("Plaintiff or "Neil"), along with his brother and two sisters,
were co-trustees of the Testamentary Grandchildren's Trust (the "GC Trust") of Saul Breton,
their father, who died in the mid-1980's. The GC Trust was established but not funded in
his will. The co-trustees had to resolve financial issues left by Saul Breton at the time of his
death, and funded the Trust with certain assets from Saul Breton's businesses. For a variety
of reasons, by the mid-1990's, the GC Trust was essentially without assets. Also during
these years, there were intra-family disputes, including between the Plaintiff and his sister
and brother-in-law, Rhonda and Mark Slater. In late Summer 2004, the Plaintiff, urged on
by his sister Jana Hadany, attempted to end the family enmity. Plaintiff had set aside
approximately $3 50,000 of his own money in an attempt to fulfill the wishes of his father and
provide some money to each of the (by now) fifteen grandchildren, including the three sons
of Rhonda and Mark Slater: Breton, Jordan, and Hayden (the "Slater Boys"). Plaintiff
retained the Defendants to create a "Plan" whereby he could make gifts to the fifteen
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

grandchildren/Trust beneficiaries out of his personal funds and at the same time try to resolve
outstanding family issues. Plaintiff specifically told the Defendants that this needed to be
a "all or nothing" Plan; in other words, unless all fifteen of the grandchildren agreed to the
Plan, the Plan could not go forward. The Defendants drafted and sent to each of the
beneficiaries a document entitled "Receipt and Release, Consent to Termination of the Trust
by Sworn Statement" ("Receipt and Release"), in which each beneficiary agreed to accept
$24,000 in return for releasing any potential claims the beneficiary thought he or she may
have against the GC Trust and any of the co-trustees, and also agreed to release his or her
interest in the GC Trust and allow the GC Trust to be terminated. However, the language in
that document as drafted by the Defendants was not clear that if not all beneficiaries signed,
there would be no deal.
Twelve of the fifteen grandchildren agreed to sign a Receipt and Release and to
receive a $24,000 payment each, but the Slater Boys initially held off. For several months,
from December 2004 into mid-September of 2005, they repeatedly gave excuses to the
Plaintiff (and to his brother and fellow co-trustee Willie Breton) that they were still thinking
about the proposal, they thought they'd agree to it, they needed more information, they
needed additional copies of the Plan documents.
Meanwhile, in or about February of 2005, while waiting for the Slater Boys to make
up their minds, having told the Defendants that 12 of the 15 beneficiaries had agreed to the
Plan and that they wanted to pay each of them the $24,000, and having not been advised by
the Defendants against any distribution to most but not all of the beneficiaries, the Plaintiff
4
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distributed those funds to, and received signed releases from, the twelve non-Slater Boys
beneficiaries. The Plaintiff held in reserve the $72,000 for the Slater Boys, hoping that an
ongoing dialogue between them and Willie Breton would lead to their agreeing to the Plan.
In July and August emails from Breton Slater to Willie Breton, Breton Slater said that
he and his brothers had decided to accept the Plan. But then, in mid-September 2005, the
Slater Boys rejected the proposed Plan, unless they were each paid almost three times as
much as each of the other beneficiaries had been paid. The Plaintiff rejected that proposal.
In late June, 2007, the Slater Boys sued Neil and Willie Breton in California, claiming
breach of fiduciary duties and mismanagement of the GC Trust (they did not sue their mother
or aunt, both of whom had been co-trustees of the Trust), asking for millions of dollars.
Ultimately, the Plaintiff settled that litigation for a fraction of what the Slater Boys claimed,
but still incurred approximately $900,000 in fees, costs, and settlement payments.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff sued the Defendants for legal malpractice. After extensive fact
discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the sole issue of causation.
Defendants argued that their negligence was not a proximate cause of Plaintiffs
damages, under four different theories. The Trial Court rejected three of the four theories,
but agreed with Defendants that as a matter of law, Plaintiffs distribution of monies and
obtaining releases from all of the beneficiaries except the Slater Boys, knowing that the
Slater Boys could still sue him, broke the chain of causation from Defendants' negligence
and was an independent and intervening cause of Plaintiff s damages.

5
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1
I.

The Underlying Case
L

In 1981, Saul Breton executed his will, in which he purported to give the

Trustee, in trust, $1,000,000.00 that would be held for the benefit of his grandchildren. The
assets to fund this trust were undesignated in his will. R. 705. Saul's four children (Neil,
Willie, Rhonda, and Jana) were named as co-trustees of the GC Trust. R. 474.
2.

At the time of Saul Breton's death, his estate had no cash, the assets that

existed were not readily marketable, and the estate had a negative net worth. R. 711 at p.
158; R. 817. The four co-trustees, following approval in 1986 by the California probate
court, R. 792-814, distributed assets of stock, a small amount of cash, and various
receivables and unsecured promissory notes to the GC Trust. Due to unforeseen market
conditions in real estate and the apparel industry (Breton Industries' principal business), the
large majority of the value of these assets was lost. R. 816-818.
3.

During the 1990's and into 2000 and beyond, the companies founded by Saul

Breton, including Breton Industries, were caught up in years of litigation. Some of that
litigation involved Rhonda Breton Slater and her husband, Mark Slater, the parents of the

1

Even though the Trial Court granted Defendants summary judgment on a very
narrow issue, Plaintiffs Statement of Facts is lengthy in order for this Court to
understand the context of the Trial Court's ruling, and also to understand the significant
amount of genuine issues of material fact that not only led to the Trial Court denying the
majority of Defendants' arguments, but which Plaintiff asserts shows why the Trial
Court's ruling is in error.
6
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Slater Boys. R. 723-24 at pgs. 303-07. During that time period, Neil Breton, having
purchased a judgment against Rhonda and Mark Slater, nonjudicially foreclosed on their
house. After giving them every opportunity to pay the judgment and retain their house, Neil
was rebuffed by the Slaters and he successfully completed the foreclosure. R. 706 at pgs.
81-83.
4.

In 1998, the oldest Slater Boy, Breton Slater, graduated from high school and

sent a letter to three of the four co-Trustees of the GC Trust (his mother Rhonda had resigned
her co-trustee position in 1993), asking about whether there were Trust funds available for
his use for college, and asked for an accounting of the GC Trust. R. 442. That led to
correspondence between him and Neil Breton, including a letter from Neil outlining the
history of the assets in the GC Trust and their decline. R. 816-818. Breton did not think that
what Neil provided was a sufficient accounting, R. 444 f 13, but he did nothing further to
obtain documentation or a more complete accounting from 1998 until he met with his uncle,
Mike Rosson, in or about 2006 to discuss his concerns.. During those eight years he did not
ask his mother, a former co-trustee, about the GC assets or for an accounting; he did not
follow up with Neil Breton or any of the other co-trustees; and he did not consult with any
attorney or accountant. R. 729, 731-2, 736 at pgs. 52, 62-5, 86-7.
5.

Notwithstanding that lack of information. Breton Slater concluded that the co-

trustees had mismanaged the GC Trust, breached their fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries,
and hid their malfeasance from the beneficiaries. R. 444 f 11.

7
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6.

In 2004, Neil retained the Defendants to advise him with respect to his role as

co-trustee of the GC Trust and his desire to make gifts from his personal funds to the
beneficiaries of the GC Trust, while resolving any outstanding issues and resolving any
potential claims of those beneficiaries against the co-trustees of the Trust, and causing the
termination of the GC Trust. R. 3 f 6. Neil decided to consult with the Defendants because
he was being pressured by his brother Willie and sister Jana, on behalf of their mother, to try
to obtain a global resolution of what had become bitter family issues. R. 708-09 at pgs. 120126.
7.

During his initial telephone conference with Defendant Hal S wenson, Neil told

Swenson about the lengthy history of bad feelings between him and the Slater parents, the
background of the family business litigation, the lack of value of the GC Trust, and how Neil,
his brother Willie, and his sister Jana hoped, through the advice and work of the Defendants,
to effect a global resolution of the family disputes and to fulfill the intent of his father Saul
to have the (now) 15 grandchildren receive some money. R. 712-13 at pgs. 185-88; R. 773
at pgs. 22-23.
8.

Neil provided to Defendants various documents relating to the GC Trust,

including his father's will. Neil also provided information and documents to Defendants
clearly demonstrating the family business litigation and the bitter feelings between Neil and
his sister Rhonda Slater and her children, the Slater Boys. R. 3-4 % 7.

8
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9.

Defendants drafted various documents and correspondence and sent a set of

each to the co-trustees and the 15 beneficiaries of the GC Trust. The key document was
titled "Receipt and Release, Consent to Termination of the Trust by Sworn Statement," in
which each beneficiary was offered $24,000 in return for the beneficiary acknowledging
"that the proposed payment of $24,000 from Neil Breton will be in full payment and
satisfaction of the undersigned's interest in the Grandchildren's Trust." The Receipt and
Release included a release of "Neil Breton, Jana Breton and William Breton, as Trustees of
the Grandchildren's Trust, from any and all liability in connection with the undersigned's
interest in the Grandchildren's Trust." R. 4 ^[s 9-11; R. 505-06; Addendum 6 (exemplar
of Receipt and Release).
10.

A letter dated December 10, 2004, drafted by Defendants, from Plaintiff and

his brother William Breton to each of the co-trustees and their children, discussed the loss
of the GC Trust assets and stated in pertinent part, "this letter will... propose a distribution
of assets presently held outside of the testamentary trust that benefits Saul's grandchildren
. . . Each payment would be conditioned upon each child and each grandchild (or such
grandchild's legal guardian if under age 18) agreeing to the tennination of the
Grandchildren's Trust and waiving claims against the Trustees of the Grandchildren's Trust."
R. 501-03. (emphasis supplied).
11.

The Defendants drafted these documents with input from Neil and his brother

Willie, but Neil relied upon Defendants to craft these legal documents and attendant

9
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correspondence with the most important goal of all in mind: to protect the three co-trustees,
Neil, Willie, and Jana, from any subsequent litigation. He wanted this plan to be an "all or
nothing" Plan; either all beneficiaries would get payments and all would release the cotrustees, or none would get payments. R. 712-14 at pgs. 186-88,208-09. Defendants knew
that the Plan had to be "all or nothing." R. 712-13 at pgs. 187-188; Addendum 5.
Swenson and his associate Matt Wiese knew Neil relied on their expertise. R. 774 at p. 27,
777 at p. 72; R. 781 at p. 66.
12.

The Plan Defendants devised and implemented in response to Neil's stated

desire to implement a gifting plan for the beneficiaries of the GC Trust and the resolution of
outstanding issues between the Slaters and the Bretons was contrary to California law and
the Receipts and Releases violated the spendthrift provisions of the GC Trust, subjecting the
grandchildren who executed those documents to claims that they violated the no-contest
clause of the GC Trust. R. 5-6 f 16.
13.

In 2004, there were 15 beneficiaries of the GC Trust, limiting any potential

recovery by the Slater Boys to 3/15 of the recovery for the GC Trust as a result of any
litigation. The Receipt and Release documents sent to the 15 beneficiaries had the effect of
purporting to eliminate the interests of each of the beneficiaries of the GC Trust who
executed a Receipt and Release, ostensibly leaving as beneficiaries only those who refused
to release the co-trustees and who refused the payment by Neil. R. 6 % 17.

10
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14.

Twelve of the beneficiaries signed the Receipts and Releases; the three Slater

Boys did not, but indicated in June and July 2005 that they were going to sign, R. 823-824.
However, on September 14,2005, they emailed Willie Breton that they refused to sign unless
each of them received $66,666.66. R. 825.
15.

The execution of the Receipts and Releases by less than all of the beneficiaries

appeared to leave the Slater Boys as the only remaining beneficiaries of the GC Trust. After
the other 12 Receipts and Releases were signed, the Slater Boys believed, R. 735 at p. 82,
and then claimed in their subsequent lawsuit against Neil and Willie Breton, that they were
the sole beneficiaries of the GC Trust. R. 870 at (X), R. 877 at (II).
16.

In or about February, 2005, Neil, his brother William, and his sister Jana were

interested in distributing the $24,000 each to the twelve beneficiaries who signed the
Receipts and Releases. The Defendants knew that, and knew that only twelve of the fifteen
grandchildren had signed the Receipts and Releases at that point, but the Plaintiff "never got
any advice from my lawyers not to distribute any money until we had everybody's
signatures.'' R. 713 at p. 190, R. 721 at pgs. 269-70; Addendum 5. Defendant Swenson
did not think that was a critical issue. R. 775 at p. 53.
17.

In February, 2005, the three co-trustees distributed $24,000 each to the twelve

beneficiaries who had signed their Receipt and Release documents. Neil held the $24,000
each earmarked for the Slater Boys, who were engaged in dialogue with Willie Breton about
whether they would agree to the Plan. R. 716-718 at pgs. 238-248. The Plaintiff "had a

11
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strong indication that everyone was signing." R. 713 at p. 190. Neil was prepared to hold
the Slater Boys' dollars "indefinitely." R. 718-19 at pgs. 251-2; Addendum 5. In July and
in August, 2005, Breton Slater emailed Willie Breton, saying in each email that he and his
brothers had decided to agree to the Plan and would sign the Receipts and Releases. R. 823824. Then, in a September 14, 2005 email, he said the Slater Boys would not sign unless
they were paid $66,666.66 each. R. 825.
18.

In or about the summer or fall of 2006, Mike Rosson, the Slater Boys' uncle

and Rhonda Slater's brother-in-law, told the Slater Boys that he would pay for a consult with
a lawyer about potential claims against Neil and Willie Breton, directed them to the
California counsel who they then retained, and paid for those lawyers during the subsequent
California litigation. R. 746-748 at pgs. 112-14,117 and 130.
19.

In June 2007, the Slater Boys' California counsel filed a Petition against Neil

and Willie Breton, in the Superior Court for the State of California. The claims of GC Trust
mismanagement concerned three or four actions approved by all four co-trustees, including
their mother Rhonda, and all of those actions predated 1994. R. 710 at p.140; 864-5 at %s
14-17.
20.

The litigation was hotly disputed and ultimately settled in January 2009. Neil

Breton ultimately paid a settlement figure of $225,000.00. R. 564. The Slater Boys'
attorneys fees and costs were paid by Rosson, totaling approximately $337,300. R. 748 at
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p. 130. The Slater Boys had alleged in their March 26, 2007 demand letter to the Bretons
that the value of their claims exceeded $4 million, then doubled per statute. R. 899.
21.

At the time the Slater Boys retained California counsel in or about October,

2006, they and their uncle Mike Rosson knew that the other twelve beneficiaries had signed
Receipts and Releases. R. 747 at p. 117. The Slater Boys believed, as of the filing of their
June 27,2007 Petition, and October 26,2007 First Amended Petition, that the three of them
together held 100% interest in the GC Trust. R. 870 at (X); R. 876 at (I)(2).
II.

This Case
22.

Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment focused solely on

causation. Accordingly, for purposes of their Motion, Defendants admitted negligence and
damages. R. 417-419.
23.

Defendants argued that Neil failed to fulfill the causation element of his

professional negligence claims for several reasons: (1) the Slater Boys did not sue him
because Defendants' negligence in creating the plan and drafting the plan documents gave
the Slater Boys an economic incentive to sue him, R. 430-432; (2) Neil's own actions,
including that he failed to inform the Defendants of the California lawsuit or that
Defendants' actions were the cause of that lawsuit, and that he gave Defendants no
opportunity to participate in that lawsuit or otherwise provide input to Neil in that regard,
were an intervening cause of his damages, R. 434; (3) Neil's actions as a co-trustee
predating his retention of the Defendants was the cause of the Slater Boys suing him and
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causing his damages; and (4) Neil's (and his co-trustees') decision to pay $24,000 each to
the twelve other beneficiaries knowing that he did not have executed Receipts and Releases
from the Slater Boys, and knowing that the Slater Boys retained their ability to sue him, was
an intervening cause of Neil's claimed damages. R. 433-434 .
24.

In opposition, Neil raised and argued genuine issues of material fact as to all

of Defendants'arguments. R. 668-699.
III.

The Trial Court's Ruling
25.

At the start of the hearing on Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary

Judgment on July 27, 2011, the Court told the parties that his preliminary view was that the
Defendants had three causation arguments: (1) Neil's economic incentive theory of causation
failed as a matter of law; (2) any chain of causation was broken by Neil's decision to
distribute funds to the twelve beneficiaries without having received releases from the Slater
Boys, and (3) Neil's alleged breaches of fiduciary duties as a co-trustee prior to his retention
of the Defendants were the sole cause of his damages. R. 948 at 2. The Court; then told the
parties that "I think that there are reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts that
would preclude summary judgment in this case..." R. 948 at 3. The parties then made their
arguments. R. 948 at 4-51.
26.

At the end of argument, the Court allowed the Defendants to deliver to him

additional deposition transcript citations and copies of certain cases, and gave Neil a chance
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to respond. The Court then asked counsel to return on August 1,2011 for his ruling. R. 948
at 50-53.
27.

The parties provided additional materials and argument to the Court.

Addendum 4, 52.
28.

At the August 1 hearing, the Court reiterated Defendants' arguments and stated

that he still believed that summary judgment was not appropriate as to all of Defendants'
arguments, except one: that Neil's payment of the $24,000 to each of the twelve beneficiaries
before obtaining executed Receipts and Releases from the Slater Boys broke the chain of
causation as an intervening cause. The Court had changed his mind: "I'm going to grant the
motion for summary judgment on that one ground." R. 949 at 2-4,10.
29.

The Court came to this conclusion based on how the Court interpreted Neil's

opposition to Defendants' "intervening cause" argument:
What he's really saying is that he should have been told that if he didn't get
releases from all 15 then he was exposed to the possibility of a lawsuit from
the Slater brothers. And I guess the problem that I have with that from a
causation standpoint is that he seems to concede that he already knows that,
and how can the lack of that advice be the cause of the injury if he already
knew what he would like to have been advised of...So it really comes down to
what was caused by the failure to specifically advise Mr. Breton that if you
don't get all 15 to sign you're still at risk, and you distribute to the 12 you're

2

The materials in Addendum 4 and 5 are part of the Record on Appeal, but
apparently the Trial Court did not include them as part of the Record, so Plaintiff has
added them, as they were produced to the Trial Court, to his Addendum.
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still at risk for being sued by the other three. And I think that it's so clear in
anybody's mind that he was still at risk to be sued by the other three that the
failure to tell him that was not the cause of what happened.
R. 949 at 4-5, 7.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should find that the Trial Court erred in granting Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether
Defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of Neil's damages, that is, whether Neil's
payment of $24,000 to each of the twelve beneficiaries who signed the Receipt and Release,
was an intervening cause that freed Defendants from the consequences of their malpractice.
This Court should determine that the Trial Court erred when it usurped the jury's fact-finding
role, determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to this alleged
intervening cause, and granted Defendants summary judgment on this one narrow ground.
In this case, and for purposes of Defendants' underlying Motion for Summary
Judgment, it was assumed that the Receipt and Release documents crafted by Defendants did
not create an "all or nothing" Plan, in which all 15 beneficiaries had to sign a Receipt and
Release document (and get paid $24,000 each) or the Plan would not be effective. It was
further assumed that Defendants' failure to so craft those documents was malpractice. It is
undisputed that the Defendants, Hal Swenson in particular, did not advise Neil that he needed
to obtain all 15 beneficiaries' signatures on Receipts and Releases before distributing any
funds to any of the beneficiaries, and that Defendant Swenson did not think that was a critical
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issue. In fact, because he did not so advise Neil, and those payments went forward to 12 of
the 15 beneficiaries, the Slater Boys believed they then held 100% interest in the GC Trust,
and that was the economic incentive for them to sue Neil.
Whether or not Neil knew that if he did not obtain signed Receipts and Releases from
the Slater Boys, they had the ability to sue him if they chose, is not the relevant issue. What
is relevant, and what shows the unbroken causation chain, is this: (1) when he sought their
advice, Defendants did not advise Neil to NOT make any distributions until he had
agreements from all 15 beneficiaries that they would each sign the documents; (2) their
failure to so advise him was malpractice; (3) since he wasn't so advised, Neil went forward
with the payments to the 12, and receiving their signed Receipts and Releases; (4) which led
the Slater Boys to think they held 100% interest in the GC Trust; (5) which gave them the
economic incentive to sue Neil.
Neil's payment of $24,000 each to the 12 beneficiaries, after not being told he should
not do so, was not an intervening cause of his subsequent damages suffered as a result of the
Slater Boys' lawsuit. Neil's payments, after not being advised against it by the Defendants,
was reasonably foreseeable by the Defendants. At the very least, the record before the Trial
Court reflects a genuine issue of material fact "on whether a sufficient intervening cause
broke the thread of causation between defendant's" malpractice and Neil's damages.
Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1293 (Ut. Ct. App 1996). Therefore,
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the Court should determine that the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment to the
Defendants on the ground of intervening cause.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
THAT A SUFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE BROKE THE CHAIN OF
CAUSATION BETWEEN DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE AND
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES.
A.

Legal Standard for Causation in a Legal Malpractice Case

Utah courts have long recognized that proximate cause is usually an issue for the jury
to decide. See, e.g, McCorvey v. UDOT, 868 P.2d41,45 (Utah 1993). "Proximate cause is
usually a factual issue and in most circumstances will not be resolved as a matter of law."
Unigardlns. Co. v. City ofLaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Utah 1984). "...[I]t is the
province of the jury...to determine whether the causation theory is fatally attenuated."
Butter field v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). To demonstrate causation in a legal
malpractice case, "the client is required to show that "absent the conduct complained of...the
client would have benefitted." Iacono v. Hicken, 2011 UT App 3 77, Tf 31 (citing Christensen
& Jensen, PC v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, f 26, 194 P.3d 931. The defendant caused
the plaintiffs damages " if its conduct was 'a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.'"
Griswoldv. Snow Christensen & Martineau, 2010 WL 4180597 (D.Utah) *3 (citing Rest.
(Second) Torts §431).
In Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein and Fielding, 909 P. 2d 1283 (Ut Ct. App. 1996), the Utah
Court of Appeals scrutinized the causation element in legal malpractice cases. While noting
18
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that causation cannot be proved based upon speculation or conjecture, the Court did explain
that causation is, as an element in a cause of action, highly fact-sensitive:
Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law..." "Proximate
cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment appropriate..." In
other words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the element of causation
on summary judgment.
Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any cause of action... To
establish causation, Plaintiffs must persuade a fact finder that their injury was
a natural result of the Defendant's breach. Plaintiffs therefore must spin
together myriad facts into a durable thread that reasonably connects
Defendant's breach to Plaintiffs injury. Utah courts have recognized that
"[f]act-sensitve cases... do not lend themselves to a determination of summary
judgment." (All citations omitted) Id. at 1291-1292.

B.

Intervening Cause

"An intervening cause is an independent event, not reasonably foreseeable, that
completely breaks the connection between fault and damages." Steffensen v. Smith's
Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 487-8 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). And "Utah courts have
always recognized the fact-intensive nature of intervening cause inquiries." Kilpatrickv.
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1293 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996)(emphasis in
original)(citations omitted).
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C.

There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether NeiPs payment of
$24,000 each to 12 beneficiaries broke the chain of causation between
Defendants' negligence and NeiPs damages.

Plaintiffs causation theory in this case has been that but for the malpractice of the
Defendants in the devising and drafting of the Plan documents, in particular the Receipts and
Releases, and lack of advice to Plaintiff that he should not pay any of the beneficiaries the
$24,000 each until ALL of them agreed to the Plan, Plaintiff never would have been sued by
the Slater Boys and would not have suffered the damages he did. The facts set forth above
support the basis for Plaintiffs "economic incentive" argument, or at the very least raise a
genuine issue of material fact: the Slater Boys waited years before suing the Plaintiff, until
after they believed that they held 100% interest in the GC Trust, such that suing for alleged
mismanagement damages would redound entirely to their benefit; their share would be 100%,
not merely 3/15 of 100%. The Trial Court agreed. R. 948 at p. 49.
As set forth above in 116, Defendants were aware that not all of the beneficiaries had
agreed to the Plan, and were aware that Neil and his siblings wanted to distribute the $24,000
payments to the 12 beneficiaries who had agreed to the Plan. But the Defendants, not
thinking this was a critical issue, failed to advise Neil that he should not distribute any money
to any beneficiaries until all beneficiaries agreed to the Plan. That malpractice, along with
Defendants' malpractice in drafting the Receipts and Releases in a way that did not make it
clear that it was an "all or nothing" Plan, caused the Slater Boys to believe that the other 12
beneficiaries had given up their respective interests in the GC Trust and now the Slater Boys
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held 100% interest. That in turn gave them the economic incentive to proceed with a lawsuit
against Neil.
The Trial Court ruled that, given the factual background articulated by the parties in
their respective memoranda in support of and in opposition to Defendants' Renewed Motion
for Summary Judgment, there were reasonable inferences that could be drawn to support
Plaintiffs economic incentive causation argument:
It's a reasonable inference that the reason that the case was brought in 2007 is
because the other 12 people released their claims. I understand you [defense
counsel] disagree with all this, but this is a reasonable inference that it's based
on-it was influenced, at least to some degree, by the fact that the 12 had given
up their claims, and so it opened up the possibility of recovering the entire
amount of the trust or the entire claim of breach of fiduciary duty rather than
just 3/15 of it.
R. 948 at p. 49.
What appeared to convince the Trial Court of an intervening cause to break the chain
of causation between Defendants' negligence and Plaintiffs damages was the fact that Neil
understood that if someone, like the Slater Boys, did not sign a release of claims, then that
person could, if they chose, sue him at some point. The Trial Court thought that Neil's
argument was that the Defendants should have advised him of this. The Trial Court
misconstrued Neil's argument, which Neil's counsel (unsuccessfully) tried to clear up at the
August 1, 2011 hearing. The Trial Court thought advising Neil about the general law on
releases, and advising Neil that he should not distribute any money to any beneficiary until
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all had agreed to the Plan, were the same thing. R. 949 at p. 9,1.16-18. But it is not the
same thing.
The Defendants were told by Neil, during their first encounters when their
representation of Neil began, that the Plan had to be devised as an "all or nothing" Plan.
Unless all 15 beneficiaries agreed to it, it would not be effective. That was Defendants'
directive as they crafted the Plan, as they drafted the documents that memorialized the Plan,
as they drafted the cover letters to the beneficiaries, as they continued to advise Neil as he
waited to hear back from the 15 beneficiaries, and as Neil considered making the $24,000
payments to those beneficiaries who had agreed to the Plan. Defendants' malpractice at each
step of that process, including failing to advise Neil to riot make any payments until all 15
had agreed to the Plan, was an unbroken chain of causation; it caused the Slater Boys to
believe that they held 100% interest in the GC Trust, providing them with the economic
incentive to sue Neil, causing his damages.
The Defendants argued to the Trial Court (and provided a copy with their post-hearing
materials, see Addendum 4) that Earline v. Barker, 912 P.2d433 (Utah 1996), compellingly
supported their argument that NeiPs payment to 12 of the 15 beneficiaries, without the Slater
Boys releasing their claims against him, was an intervening cause that broke the chain of
causation. However, that case is factually distinguishable from this case, because in that case
there was no issue of a failure on the part of Harline's counsel to advise him of appropriate
legal action (in that case, amending Harline's bankruptcy schedules). Indeed, the facts were
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opposite; Harline admitted that his counsel advised him to amend his schedules and he chose
not to. Id. at 445-6, andfnl4. To the extent that the Trial Court relied on Harline to support
its award of summary judgment, R. 934, that was error.
The very same facts and reasonable inferences that were the basis for the Trial Court's
rejection of Defendants' other causation arguments, especially with regard to Plaintiffs
economic incentive causation argument, underlie Plaintiffs argument that his payments to
12 of the 15 beneficiaries occurred only because he was not advised, as he should have been
by his counsel, to not make those payments. It was not an independent decision, it was not
an intervening cause which broke the chain of causation from Defendants' negligence to
Plaintiffs damages. The Trial Court erred in so determining as a matter of law, and erred in
granting summary judgment to the Defendants on that ground.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, and because there are genuine issues of material fact
regarding whether the payment of $24,000 each to 12 of the 15 GC Trust beneficiaries was
an intervening cause, breaking the chain of causation between Defendants' negligence and
Plaintiffs damages, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter an order reversing the
Trial Court's ruling awarding summary judgment to the Defendants, and remanding this case
for a trial on the merits.
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ADDENDUM
1.

Order Granting Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing
Case with Prejudice R. 932-935

2.

Transcript of July 27, 2011 hearing on Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment R. 948

3.

Transcript of Court's August 1,2011 Ruling R. 949

4.

Cover letter and materials provided by Defendants to the Court after July 27, 2011
hearing

5.

Cover letters and materials provided by Plaintiff to the Court after July 27, 2011
hearing in response to those provided by Defendants to the Court

6.

Receipt and Release exemplar
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
, NEIL BRETON, ah individual,
Plaintiff,
• vs.
. CLYDE, SNOW & SESSIONS, a Utah
.professional corporation, and HAL.
SWENSON, an individual,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE
Case No. 090919546
Judge Anthony Quinn

Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court oil Defendants; Clyde, Snow & Sessions' and Hal
Swenson's (collectively "Defendants") Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants
filed the motion and supporting memorandum on May 12, 2011. Plaintiff Neil Breton
("Plaintiff') filed a memorandum in opposition on June 2, 2011. Defendants filed a reply
memorandum on July 1, 2011. On July 27, 2011, the Court heard oral argument on the motion •
and took the matter under advisement The Court also held a hearing on August 1,2011.
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Having considered the memoranda and oral arguments related to this motion, the Court
now GRANTS Defendants'Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, acting as Plaintiff's attorneys, prepared release
documents to be signed by 15 individuals who were beneficiaries of a trust of which Plaintiff
was a co-trustee. Twelve of the 15 beneficiaries signed the releases and, as consideration for the
releases, Plaintiff paid $24,000 to each of the 12 signing beneficiaries. Plaintiff paid no
•consideration to the three beneficiaries (the Slater Brothers) who refused to sign the releases.
The Slater Brothers subsequently sued Plaintiff for, among other things, alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty relating to management of the trust
Plaintiff alleges Defendants should have prepared releases that provided that no release
Would be effective unless and until all 15 beneficiaries signed a release, and that Defendants
should have advised him to not to pay the $24,000 to any beneficiary until all 15 had signed.
Plaintiff claims that, as a result of this alleged negligence, he suffered injury and damages in the
foiin of attorneys fees incurred to defend the Slater Brothers' lawsuit, together with additional
sums he paid to the Slater Brothers' to settle that lawsuit
The Court determines as a matter of law and undisputed fact that the alleged conduct on
the part of Defendants did not cause the alleged injury. Defendants could not possibly have
forced the Slater Brothers to sign the releases. Moreover, it is undisputed, based on Plaintiffs
own testimony, that Plaintiff was fully informed and aware, when he paid $24,000 to each of the
twelve beneficiaries who had signed releases, that the Slater Brothers had not signed any release
and were stillfceeto sue Plaintiff. Therefore, the alleged failure to advise Plaintiff of something
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he fully understood did not cause the alleged injury.

Plaintiffs own decision (made in

connection with his brother) to pay $24,000 to each of the signing beneficiaries without first
obtaining releases from the Slater Brothers was an independent and intervening cause of the
alleged injury. See, e.g., Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439, 446 (Utah 1996) (affirming
summary judgment in legal malpractice case and concluding that client's own decisions were
intervening cause of alleged injury).
For these reasons, and for the reasons stated on the record at the hearings on this motion,
* the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment: Plaintiffs

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
JElSENBERG & GILCHRIST

<

Jeffrey R. Oritt, Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I Hereby certify that on the /gj day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
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AND DISMISSING CASE WTTH PREJUDICE in Case No. 090919546, was served upon the
following parties by hand-delivery and by email to:
Jeffrey R. Oritt, Attorney
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST

••.•-•

•

215 South State Street, #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Email: joritt@bravtorilaw.com
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEDNESDAY, JULY 27,
12:57
P.M.

2011

* * *
P R O C E E D I N G S

* * *
T H E COURT: We're here today on a motion for
partial summary judgment as it relates to causation in this
case. Let me share with you some of my thoughts and then
give you a chance to respond.
The causation analysis really breaks down, as 1 see
it, to three separate issues. The first issue is whether,
based upon the record in this case and particularly the
affidavits of the Slater brothers, does the economic
incentive theory of causation fail as a matter of law.
Secondly, was any chain of causation broken by Mr. Breton's
decision to distribute the funds to the 12 beneficiaries that
elected to sign releases prior to receiving releases from the
Slater brothers. And, finally, was Mr. Breton's losses
solely caused by his breach of duty as a trustee prior to the
engagement of Clyde Snow & Sessions. I'll talk a little bit
about each of those issues.
1 think the one that has received the most
attention in the briefing is this idea that the Slater
brothers' affidavits which protest that the decision of the
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and it's pretty obvious that the upside is greater if you
have at least a claim to the entire trust rather than just
3/15 of the trust.
Secondly, as a simple historical, chronological
matter, this case -- the case in California was not brought
until after the attempt to reach a global settlement and
after 12 of the beneficiaries had signed off on the release,
which 1 think gives rise to a reasonable inference that there
was some cause and effect there. It's not absolutely certain
by any means, but 1 think it's reasonable to draw the
inference that the fact that 12 of the beneficiaries had
signed off on the release was a factor in the case being
brought.
Of course, on the other side is the absolute
protestations from Mr. Wilson and from the Slater brothers
that this had nothing to do with their decision to bring the
case. Again, i think that there's a reasonable inference
that can be drawn that they're pretty interested in making
Mr. Breton's life miserable. There's a history of animosity
between these parties that casts some doubt. Of course, we
don't decide credibility on summary judgment, but 1 think it
would be unwise to completely accept those affidavits without
taking that into account in some fashion.
And so what it really comes down to is, are the
inferences which 1 articulated are they speculation, as
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4

1 suggests in the reply brief filed by the defendant, or are
other 12 beneficiaries to sign releases had nothing
2 they reasonable inferences, and 1 sort of tend to come down
whatsoever to do with their decision to file suit in 1 think
3 that they're reasonable inferences.
it was the year 2007. 1 analyzed this with the help of two
4
The second issue is does the fact that Mr. Breton
legal principles. First of all, the first legal principle is
5 elected to distribute funds to the 12 beneficiaries and
the causation in negligence cases is considered to be highly
fact-dependent, and summary judgment is rarely appropriate on 6 accept their releases without getting the release from the
7 Slater brothers does that end up becoming, in fact, the cause
the issue of causation in negligence cases, only where it's
8 of the problem that ultimately occurred here.
absolutely clear. And, second, even where the facts are not
9
1 find this a little closer case because it's
in dispute, if conflicting reasonable inferences can be drawn
10 absolutely clear that Mr. Breton knew that he did not have
from the facts, then summary judgment isn't appropriate.
11 releases from all 15 at the time that he began that
There really aren't very many facts in dispute in
12 distribution. What is not clear is whether he--in a sense
this case. To the extent that there are questions of fact,
13
as 1 read the record, it sounds like he thought that he was
it comes from conflicting inferences that can be drawn from
14 going to get releases from the Slater brothers, and
those facts. It really comes down to whether or not those
15 ultimately did not get releases from the Slater brothers.
inferences are reasonable or not, and 1 think that that's
16
And it comes down to what he knew at that point in
where the dispute on this issue primarily lies.
17 time, whether he knew that distributing those funds would, in
1 think that there are reasonable inferences that
18 fact, make the all-or-nothing global settlement that he
can be drawn from the facts that would preclude summary
19 contemplated impossible, and it's just not clear to me from
judgment in this case, and among those inferences are, 1
20
the record that 1 can decide that as a matter of law.
think, number one, the fairly reasonable and obvious
21
And finally the issue of whether his own breaches
inference that the start of any litigation, including the
22 of duty as a trustee is the sole cause of what ultimately
litigation arising out of this trust that was brought by the
23 happened in this case. 1 think at the time that he went and
Slater brothers, there would have to be some cost-benefit
24 saw the lawyers at Clyde that he was aware, at least there
analysis undertaken. And one of the things that you consider
25 were being suggestions made, that he had breached his
in making that cost-benefit
analysis
is
what's
the
upside,
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fiduciary duty, and that's part of why he sought legal
1
advice. He was seeking protection from any possible claims,
2
and so I tend to discount that as being the sole cause in the
3
case.
4
So I guess after all that, I think that maybe
5
summary judgment isn't appropriate in this case. I think
6
that the defense has certainly pointed out that there's huge
7
obstacles to overcome in proving causation in this case, but
8
at least at this point I'm unconvinced that I can resolve
9
that as a matter of law. But I'll give you a chance to
10
change my mind, Mr. Wheeler.
11
MR. WHEELER: Thank you, Your Honor. That's all weL2
ask.
13
I agree with Your Honor that the facts here are
14
really not in dispute, at least those that are material. In
15
the response, plaintiff nitpicked some of the language and so
16
forth of our statement of facts, but nothing that really goes
17
to the heart of the issue.
18
And the issue here I think that Your Honor should
19
focus on is whether the plaintiff can produce admissible
20
evidence upon which a jury could conclude that but for the
21
work performed by the Clyde Snow lawyers the Slater lawsuit
22
would not have been filed. I mean, that's the real issue.
23
If the evidence is insufficient to prove that but for the
24
work performed by the Clyde Snow lawyers that the suit would I 25

got out of the car and was assisting other people in the
wreck area when other cars came and ran into the back of the
cars that had already been crashed. He found himself going
over the railing and was severely injured when he went over
the railing at the freeway.
He sued the drivers of the cars that ran into the
backs of the other cars during the snowstorm claiming that
they were negligent and that their negligence proximately
caused his injuries. Nobody saw what happened to him. He
could not remember what happened after his injuries. He
didn't know what happened to him. All he knew is he woke up
with injuries in the hospital.
The Court of Appeals first of all ruled that it is
appropriate for a lower court to grant summary judgment where
there's only speculation as to what happened, and in that
case the plaintiff relied solely upon the fact that he was
there in the accident -- at the accident scene. There were
cars running into other cars; that he was thrown over the
guardrail and was injured, and so he sued the drivers of the
cars that ran into the other cars. The Court of Appeals
affirmed a grant of summary judgment in that case on the
grounds that it was speculation to assume that these drivers,
simply because they were in a wreck and that he was a part of
that wreck, caused his injuries because there was no specific
eyewitness to what had happened.
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have been filed anyway, then I think summary judgment is
1
Now, he had, I think, as good an argument on
appropriate.
2 circumstantial evidence that these drivers caused his
I recognize, Your Honor, that there are cases that
3 injuries as the plaintiff in this case. He was at the scene.
hold that proximate cause is normally a jury question, but
4 There were accidents that the Court assumed that these
there are numerous cases -- and we've cited a lot of them -5 drivers were negligent that ran into the other cars, and yet
that hold to the contrary and have granted summary judgment
6 notwithstanding all of those circumstances that gave this
on proximate cause where, one, the evidence is so
7 plaintiff a significant argument that it had to be that
overwhelming on one side that no reasonable person could come| 8 negligence that caused his injuries, they affirmed summary
to a different conclusion, and on the other side where the
9 judgment.
evidence is so speculative that it would be pure speculation
10
Even closer in point, Your Honor, is the case
for a jury to consider the evidence and draw inferences as
11 Triesault versus the Greater Salt Lake Business District, and
the plaintiff wants them to. So those are the two extremes
12 I think this is one ~ and I think, Your Honor, I request
that the Utah Supreme Court has articulated that Your Honor
13 that you read these cases before you make a final decision
and any trial court viewing a motion for summary judgment
14 against this motion, if that is your inclination, because
must consider.
15 they are very instructive. In this case the plaintiff hired
We think that we fit into both of those, and I
16 a development company to assist them in the construction and
would like to focus on three cases that we've cited, Your
17 starting up of a movie theater in Spanish Fork. The
Honor, because I think they answer many of the questions that 18 development company assisted in getting small business loans
you have raised here. The first is Clark versus Farmers
19 and setting up the business and doing their studies and so
Insurance. We cited that in our brief. This is a case where
20 forth and so on. The movie theater was set up and became
the plaintiff was involved in a chain-reaction accident up in
21 profitable.
Farmington on the freeway where Mr. Clark was involved as a
22
Shortly thereafter, the same development company
passenger in one of the cars that was involved in this
23 was retained by a competitor movie theater who wanted to set
massive wreck during a snowstorm. He was unhurt initially
24 up a theater in Payson, ten miles away from the first
when the car he Digitized
was ridingbyintheimpacted
with
another
car.
He
25
and
assisted
that theater in setting up the Payson
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theater, after which immediately after the Payson theater
started up the theater in Spanish Fork became unprofitable.
It was in the same market -- the Court found it was
in the same market; that the impact, the lack of
profitability, came immediately after the opening of the
Payson theater. The plaintiff argued that these
circumstances - the circumstantial evidence they argued was
proof that the second theater destroyed the business of the
first theater, and they sued the development company for
breach of fiduciary duty and conflict of interest since they
represented both theaters.
The Court of Appeals said this. They pointed out
that there was no evidence, other than the circumstances that
the plaintiff argued, to show that the damage caused, namely
the unprofitability of the first theater, was caused by the
opening of the second. Plaintiff relied solely on those
circumstances and the inferences to be drawn. And this is
what the Court said: Triesault argues that Deseret's
assistance to the Payson theater caused his loss. However,
this claim is based simply on the timing of the opening of
the Payson theater and the coincidental drop in revenues at
the Spanish Fork theater. As a result, Triesault's claim
would require a jury to engage in rank speculation to reach a
verdict.
THE COURT: It seems to me that this case is a
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kind of a discrete issue; is this claim going to be brought
or is not going to be brought, and nothing changes with
respect to that except -- there's absolutely nothing you can
point to that changes - that you would point to Mr. Wilson
getting involved and offering to pay for it.
MR. WHEELER: And the law firm doing an
investigation of the facts.
THE COURT: So. I mean, that's equally as
reasonable as an explanation. I tend to discount the idea
that money could have been obtained from any number of
relatives prior to the time. That would be pure speculation,
but I have a hard time concluding that with respect to what
initiated this dispute that it's not a reasonable inference,
and that's what it really comes down to, is a reasonable
inference that this had something to do with it.
MR. WHEELER: Well. Your Honor. I think it would be
helpful if you look at Exhibit 10 to our memo as well which
is the demand letter that the lawyers for the Slater brothers
sent to Mr. Breton making a demand for payment. This was
prior to the filing of the lawsuit, and it sets forth the
facts and allegations that they deem to be material to a
claim against Mr. Breton. And they go through in some detail
about the findings that they have made with respect to his
conduct as a cotrustee of the trust. They make allegations
of breach of fiduciary duty and other malfeasance and make
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1 the statement in there that the Slaters were shocked or
little different because what we have is allegations of
2 dismayed by what they discovered.
misconduct essentially between the years of 1989 and 1993, if
3
And so to answer the first question you raised is
I remember correctly, and then we have one of the Slater
4 what new happened, what new happened is that they were able
brothers reaching his majority around 1998. So you have a
5 to hire a law firm to conduct a due diligence examination and
period of 15 years where, notwithstanding nothing changed
6 investigation, and they were shocked at what they discovered,
with respect to the trust and no information was gained with
7 according to this letter, what they discovered Mr. Breton had
respect to any breach of duty by Mr. Breton, for 15 years
8 done as a trustee of their trust. So they learned these
nothing happens. No claim is brought. And then something
9 facts for the first time after they were able to hire a
does change, and what changes is 12 of the beneficiaries give
10 lawyer.
up their -- any claim to the trust, and within two years
11
Now, we're not denying that the attempt to get them
after that you have this claim brought.
12 to sign a release was a catalyst in focusing on the conduct
Now, that isn't solid proof of causation, but it
13 of Mr. Breton and this trust, but the fact that it's a
seems to me that there is a reasonable inference of causation
14 catalyst that causes them to focus and decide to go to a
that can be drawn from that chronology alone.
15 lawyer and see what really happened doesn't help the
MR. WHEELER: Well, here again, to rely on the
16 plaintiff on his proof of showing proximate cause. And so
language of the Triesault case, there the same situation
17 there were disclosures made after the lawyers got involved
occurred. I mean, you have a sequence of events that occur
18 that the Slater brothers, according to that letter, were
one after the other, and the inference clearly could be that
19 unaware of before they went to the lawyers. So there was
the first theater's business was destroyed by the opening of
20 something new.
the second. I don't see that the facts of this case are all
21
And in the petition ~ and this is another fact,
that better. They're not as good as that. I mean, the
22 Your Honor, that we keep getting puzzled with in these
Triesault case-23 pleadings. There's nothing in the pleadings, there's nothing
THE COURT: There's all kinds of vagaries in
24 in Exhibit 10, in the demand letter, that ever makes a claim
business. There can be lots of reasons, I suppose, why
25 that the Slaters are claiming that they are entitled to more
theaters are successful
or
not
successful,
but
here
we
have
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1
than their fair share.
2
THE COURT: The petition isn't clear on that
3
respect, and, in fact, the petition names all the other
4
beneficiaries which suggests maybe to the contrary, but on
5
this record we have the testimony of Geraldine Lyle
6
(phonetic) who says on page 85 of her deposition the Slater
7
boys took the position that they were the only three
8
remaining beneficiaries of the trust and therefore were
9
entitled to the entire rest of the trust.
10
In addition to that, we have the exchange that took
place with the attempted rescission which apparently prompted 11
12
an angry and emotional response from the Slater brothers'
13
counsel.
MR. WHEELER: How is that admissible, one lawyer 14
15
interpreting the meaning of another lawyer being upset?
THE COURT: How's it not admissible? It certainly 16
17
wouldn't be hearsay because it's not being offered for the
18
truth.
MR. WHEELER: Because there's no basis upon whichl9
20
one lawyer can interpret the meaning of others. They can
testify as to what was said. They can't testify as to what
21
that meaning is. I mean, if you get angry with me, I can't
22
23
attribute a motive or a meaning to you unless you tell me it.
And there's nothing that was said that discloses that the
24
Slater lawyers thought that that was somehow going to hurt an 25

made whole.
MR. WHEELER: This is all speculation because the
petition doesn't say that, Your Honor. It does not say that.
It makes -- it recites what happened with respect to the
other beneficiaries and argues that that is a sign of bad
faith by Mr. Breton because he's trying to buy off the
beneficiaries in order to hide his misconduct. That's the
allegation of the petition.
And the other beneficiaries are named because they
would be indispensable parties if they had not waived their
rights to the trust and agreed to terminate the trust, which
is what they did. They agreed to terminate the trust which
was what the Slater lawsuit tried to do as well. And, of
course, they had to be named because if there was some
question as to whether they still had to give their consent
to a termination of the trust, then that had to be litigated.
But that doesn't mean that the Slater lawyers thought that
they would get more than their-THE COURT: The fact that the other beneficiaries
were named I think that's a good fact for you, not a bad fact
for you. I'm sorry if I didn't express that. I think the
fact that the other beneficiaries were named goes against the
idea that at the time of filing the petition they thought
they were entitled to 100 percent of the trust's assets.
MR. WHEELER: So I submit, Your Honor, that to

14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
argument that they were entitled to 100 percent.
And besides, Your Honor, we're talking about a
2
3
trust that was without value. There was no value in this
4
trust, so if the Slater lawyers thought that the Slaters were
5
entitled to 100 percent, 100 percent of nothing is nothing.
THE COURT: 100 percent of the claim for breach of 6
7
fiduciary duty is better than 3/15 of a claim for breach of
8
fiduciary duty.
MR. WHEELER: But there's nothing in the petition, 9
Your Honor, that argues that they thought they were entitled
10
to collect damages that would have belonged to the other
11
beneficiaries. How could they possibly make a claim -- the
12
only asset the trust had was a claim against the trustees. I
13
think everybody is in agreement with that. But how could
14
anybody make a claim that they are entitled to more than the
15
damage that was caused to them by the conduct of the
16
trustees? It's legally impossible for them to claim damages
17
that belong to somebody else. I mean, could they offer
18
19
evidence that the other trustees were damaged in such a way
20
and therefore they're entitled to collect for that? No, they
21
couldn't do that.
THE COURT: You mean there's no way to make a clfcffi
23
that the trust itself should be made whole and therefore
24
you'd be entitled to what -- the remaining beneficiaries
25
would be entitled to what 100 percent of the trust after it's

16

allow an inference that somehow the lawsuit was designed to
collect more than the damage that was actually incurred by
these three Slater brothers is pure speculation. There is
absolutely no evidence -THE COURT: Except for what Geraldine Lyle says in
her deposition.
MR. WHEELER: But the pleadings state -- maybe
that's what she thought they were going to do, but the
pleadings don't say that, nor does the demand letter. The
demand letter makes no reference whatsoever to the Clyde Snow
papers, absolutely nothing.
And so let me ask this question, Your Honor. How
can the plaintiff possibly prove that had the Clyde Snow
lawyers prepared different papers, okay, all or nothing, an
all-or-nothing agreement or some other condition that they
think would cure the so-called malpractice here, what
evidence can they produce that those changes would have
caused the Slaters not to file a lawsuit? The Slaters simply
refused to sign a release. They didn't say we're not going
to sign a release unless you put something else in the
papers, or we would sign the release if you put this in the
papers.
THE COURT: I think that the ambiguity of the
release I think that's a nonissue because if they had all
signed it, it would have worked. And regardless of what you
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put in the release, if they don't all sign it it's not going
to work.
MR. WHEELER: Right. And the plaintiff knew that
they hadn't signed and wouldn't sign. Yes, they tried to get
them to sign afterwards, and what they got was a counteroffer
that they would settle for 66,000 which is what their 1/15
pro rata share of the $1 million trust was supposed to have
contained at the time of Saul Breton's death which is again
proof that what they were after is their damage, what they
personally -- their 1/15 times three for the three brothers.
It certainly makes no sense that they could argue,
absent something in the pleadings that could have been
produced, that they were asking for more than their pro rata
share of damages. There's simply nothing except the
speculation of Mr. Breton and his lawyers that that's what
they were trying to do.
Let me get to another point, Your Honor, which I
think is important and which you raised. Let me go to the
Harline case, which is a Utah Supreme Court case where the
plaintiff sued two law firms. He had filed bankruptcy, and
he filed -- he hired one law firm to prepare the filings for
the bankruptcy court. He signed the schedules of property
and debts and so forth prepared by the lawyers. The
bankruptcy court made a finding that those schedules were
fraudulent and did not disclose all of his assets and failed
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resulting injury to the client is required as one of the
elements. Proximate cause--and this is important-proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred.
So here we have the rule that the proximate cause
evidence has to show that but for the negligence of the
lawyers the damage would not have occurred, and in this case
that means that but for the papers prepared by the Clyde Snow
lawyers, and if there was malpractice the malpractice, but
for that malpractice that the Slaters would not have sued.
That's what they have to prove, and they don't have evidence
of that. And more importantly »
THE COURT: I think I'm really more focused on the
allegation that Mr. Breton should have been advised that if
he were to pay the 12 beneficiaries without getting a release
before getting the release from the Slater brothers his
all-or-nothing goal of a global settlement was in jeopardy.
MR. WHEELER: Your Honor, there's absolutely no
case cited by the plaintiff here that a lawyer has to tell a
client what is obvious to everybody on the street.
Mr. Breton knew he did not have releases signed by the
Slaters. There's no question about that. Your Honor stated
that a minute ago. He knew that he did not have releases
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to disclose other material facts.
Mr. Harline, after being denied discharge of his
debts because of false filings, fired the first set of
lawyers and hired a second set and sued them because they had
not amended the fraudulent schedules. The Supreme Court,
first of all, granted summary judgment with respect to the
first set of lawyers, and let me read some things that the
Supreme Court said. Justice Zimmerman was writing the
opinion for the unanimous court. Harline's lawyers made the
same argument that Your Honor has reiterated here, that
proximate cause is an issue for a jury that should not be
decided on a summary judgment motion, particularly in a
malpractice case, attorney malpractice case.
And this is what the judge said with respect to
that: As a preliminary matter, we address the question of
whether a judge or a jury should decide two issues relating
to proximate cause in legal malpractice actions. These
issues are common to both appeals before us, and so they join
in the appeals. Harline first contends that proximate cause
issues inevitably raise jury questions and always preclude
summary judgment. Then'he goes on to state that there are
fact issues and so forth. And Justice Zimmerman writing says
we disagree with both contentions.
And then he goes and he states the rule. He said,
A causal connection between the breach of duty and the

20

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

from those three brothers. He knew that they were the ones
most likely to sue him because this animosity had gone on for
years before that. As Your Honor indicated, it was probably
because of that animosity that he went to Clyde Snow in the
first place to try to get releases from those people in
particular so he wouldn't get sued for breach of fiduciary
duty.
So we're dealing with a situation where the
lawyers' advice to him would have been something that would
be obvious to anybody. That is, if you pay out this money to
the other beneficiaries, you are still not protected from a
lawsuit by the Slaters because they have not signed a
release. He knew that.
THE COURT: So is it your position that I should
just assume that he connected those dots because any
reasonable person would? Is that what it really comes down
to?
MR. WHEELER: I think -- let me read what the court
says here. I think that is one of the prongs that you can
rely on in granting the motion. The Supreme Court said-Mr. Call has just handed me the transcript of Mr. Breton's
testimony. I asked the question: "Well, common sense tells
you that if they hadn't signed a release there's nothing to
stop them from suing you, correct?
"Answer: If that's their intention, yes."
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1 independent business judgment did Mr. Breton make that
I mean, he acknowledges that he knew that they
2
destroys their claim against the Clyde Snow firm7 One, Your
could sue him. And let me read out of the Harline case
3 Honor referred to it, and that is he made a decision to
again. It says, Contrary to Harline's first contention then,
proximate cause issues can be decided as a matter of law when 4 distribute $24,000 to the 12 beneficiaries who had signed
5 releases. He made that decision. There's no dispute about
a determination of the facts fails on either of two opposite
6 that. He admitted that. Now, he claims, well, they should
ends of a factual continuum. Thus, summary judgment is
7 have -- and you mentioned this. The lawyers should have told
appropriate, one, when the facts are so clear that reasonable
8 him not to do it. Well, the same argument can be made in the
persons could not disagree about the underlying facts."
9 Harline case. When the plaintiff there said I don't want to
I think this is one of those that fall in that end
10 amend, the lawyers should have said, based on Your Honor's
of the spectrum. It is so obvious that if somebody doesn't
11 comments, well, you shouldn't do that, that's a bad decision.
sign a release that they can sue you that that is something
12 They didn't tell him that, and that was not raised as an
that is so obvious that reasonable persons could not disagree
13 issue in the appeal. It makes no difference. The plaintiff,
on that about the underlying facts or about the application
14 the client, made the decision, and whether it was right or
of the legal standard. And, two, when the proximate cause of
15 wrong is the client's issue.
an injury is left to speculation so that the claim fails as a
16
Then it goes on -- then we go on. Secondly, his
matter of law.
17 business judgment, and this is all admitted in his
When the court goes on and it talks about
18 deposition, he rejected an offer to settle this case for
intervening causes, I think it answers one of your points
19 $66,000 for each of the three Slater boys. He could have
that you raised because there are several intervening causes
20 settled this case for $66,000 each, and there's a written
here that I think are critical to this case. After the judge
granted a motion for summary judgment as to the first team of 21 document in our exhibits where that formal offer was made,
lawyers who prepared the false submissions to the bankruptcy 22 and he admitted in his deposition he rejected it.
23
The third independent decision that he made which
court, it went on to decide whether failure to amend by the
24 was a business judgment fits within this language of the
second set of lawyers was actionable potentially, and they
went on and said, yes, if the second set of lawyers failed to
25 Harline case was that he elected to spend, according to his
22
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amend the schedules, a jury might have concluded that a
different result would have occurred, and his debts might
have been discharged. And so that is a question we can't
resolve on a summary judgment motion. Then the court went on
to say that the evidence indicates that the plaintiff
voluntarily made the decision not to amend, and therefore
that decision precludes a finding of proximate cause because
there's the intervening cause of the plaintiff making a
decision that leads ultimately to his or her claimed damage.
And that's what happened here.
Let me read the language here because it's very
important. "The evidence demonstrates that Harline chose not
to pursue his available legal remedy of amending his
statement of affairs and schedules prior to his bankruptcy
discharge hearing in August of 1988." And this is the
important language. "We do not believe it would be a wise
judicial policy to allow one party to create legal
liabilities in another by voluntarily exercising the
complaining party's own personal business decisions." And
then it lists a string of citations where the decision by the
plaintiff destroys the chain of proximate cause, and it is a
subsequent intervening cause that the Court talks about in
the beginning when it states that the language is what
proximate cause means.
Now, what intervening acts occurred here? What
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1 numbers, almost a million dollars litigating this Slater
2 lawsuit, and ultimately settling for more than he could have
3 settled it for before the lawsuit was ever filed by paying
4 $225,000 to the three Slaters. Another independent business
5 judgment that he made that is an intervening cause between
6 what the lawyers at Clyde Snow did and what the ultimate
7 damages he claims are.
8
Finally, he elected to manage the trust as a
9 co-trustee in a way that gave rise to allegations that he
10 committed breaches of his fiduciary duty and committed other
11 bad acts as a trustee in violation of California law, which
12 are the allegations of the petition.
13
So he has intervened in this situation at least in
14 four major ways along the way. He also elected not to tender
15 the defense to the law firm. He did not inform them of what
16 he was doing or ask them their opinions as to which decisions
17 he ought to make. He made these decisions and then handed
18 the bill to the Clyde Snow firm and said, okay, I made all
19 these decisions, I decided to litigate this case for a
20 million dollars, now I want you to pay for the decisions I
21 made. That's not right, Your Honor.
22
Those are all intervening causes that destroy the
23 chain of proximate cause to the damages that he's asking for.
24 At the very least, those damages ought to be limited to the
25 offer to settle for $66,000 each. The very least if Your
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Honor's correct on all the other proximate cause, he made an
independent business decision to litigate and reject that
offer without involving the law firm.
Now, I submit, Your Honor, common sense tells you
you cannot do that. You cannot, without involving the
defendants that you ultimately sue in the decisions, make
decisions that incur huge expenses in litigation and never
give them an opportunity to say yes or no or to intervene or
to do anything else, and then hand them a bill and tell them
to pay it. It's not right. It's not in accordance with the
law, and I submit, Your Honor, that it's not appropriate
here, and I submit that his decisions along the way destroy
that chain that has to be maintained for them to collect the
damages that they are asking for here.
THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Wheeler.
MR. WHEELER: Thank you.
THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Oritt.
MR. ORITT: Thank you, Your Honor. As the Court
may imagine in light of your opening comments, I'm going to
skip through the opening part of my argument where it's going
over all of the facts and the reasonable inferences because I
think the Court has outlined them. I may do a quick summary,
but I think it may be more effective if I respond to the
points that Mr. Wheeler has raised, the arguments he's made
anyway, and then the three points the Court -- the three
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petition in which the Slater brothers named the 12 other
beneficiaries as respondents, and I suspect it's because they
were concerned that their argument that the rescission were
invalid would be denied.
But what's very important about the amended
petition, there is language in the petition, I believe, that
indicates that the Slater brothers believed they had
100 percent interest. But in the amended -- first amended
petition, which is Exhibit 8, it couldn't be clearer indeed
under Roman numeral 1, jurisdictional facts, Paragraph 2, the
Slater brothers say, Petitioners name respondents, that is
the 12 others, for the sole purpose of -- this is page 2 of
the amended petition -- for the sole purpose of asking the
Court to confirm the validity and enforceability of the
respondent's releases and satisfaction of their interest in
the trust as set forth (inaudible) Section 2 below. Well,
obviously they're saying throw out those rescissions, and
though don't have any interest.
But then when you look at Roman numeral 2 on
page 3, the heading itself says petitioners are the only
beneficiaries with any remaining interest in the trust. And
then you go to page 14 where Roman numeral 6, Paragraph 58,
because petitioners are the only beneficiaries with any
remaining interest in the trust, they bring this action on
their behalf alone. So in fact, that is the position that
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issues the Court made.
I 1 the Slater brothers took in the underlying litigation. And
First of all, with regard to the cases that
2 as the Court noted, the petitioners are seeking damages from
Mr. Wheeler cited, in particular the theater case, where that
3 two of the four co-trustees, Neil Breton and his brother
case was simply talking about a chronology, that that was the
4 Willie, and presumably - on the grounds that they wasted the
only evidence in that case that would raise a reasonable
5 trust through their alleged bad acts, and they want the
inference. And in our case we not only have the chronology,
6 damages to be what that waste was, which means it goes back
but we have multiple other facts in the record, testimonial
I 7 into the trust, and you have three beneficiaries, not 15.
And that is the position they took, and it's the argument
evidence, documentary evidence, inconsistencies between the
Slater brothers' declarations which were monolithic in their
I 9 we're making on that point based upon the underlying
language versus their deposition testimony both this year and
10 pleadings.
This is kind of a side point, but counsel said
in 2008.
11
that
made
it sound like it's undisputed that Mr. Breton
So we don't just have a chronology, and we have -12
went
to
see
the
defendants to avoid being sued. No, that's
I have summarized that on pages 3 through 6 of our memorandumL3
in opposition. We have 12 different areas of facts that we
14 not true, and we set it forth in our disputed facts and also
believe raise genuine issues of material fact and reasonable
15 additional facts. It was Mr. Breton's siblings who were
inferences, so we don't just have chronology, so that case,
16 pressing him to try to resolve this intraextended family
as the Court noted, is not quite apposite:
17 schism, and so at their request he went forward. It was not
The second point I'd like to make is there was kind
18 because he was afraid of being sued. That may have been
of an extended colloquy between Mr. Wheeler and yourself
19 something he had in his mind, but it was to try to resolve
about the petition and what's in the petition and the 12
20 these issues and get people speaking again. So I just say
other beneficiaries were named. Well, we need to understand
21 that because the presentation was that it's undisputed that
that there was a petition and then there was an amended
22 he went to see them simply to avoid being sued.
THE COURT: I think it's pretty clear that that was
petition. And Exhibit 7 of our memorandum in opposition is
23
the petition in which only the three beneficiaries, the
24 one of his motivations though in putting together this deal.
He definitely wanted the release.
Slater brothers, were
(inaudible).
It
was
the
amended
I
25
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1
MR. ORITT: Yes, I just wanted to say there were
2
other issues, too. And this is along the lines again what
3
the Court was asking counsel. I guess counsel is saying,
yes, any reasonable person would know how to connect the dots 4
5
as far as getting releases and what that would mean. I
6
disagree. Mr. Breton hired Clyde Snow to advise him. He
7
hired Clyde Snow to create the documents that memorialized
8
this plan and wanted it to be an all-or-nothing plan.
Why would any reasonable person know to connect th^ 9
10
dots when they've hired counsel to advise them. Why would
11
any reasonable person know that, well, I better not get
12
releases from the 12 while I'm still waiting to try to get
13
releases from the other three when I've talked about this
14
with my attorneys, and they have not -- and they've told me
15
well, yes, they're creating the language that will be all or
16
nothing, and they have not said that's not a good idea, don't
17
do that. And we cited to Hal Swenson's deposition on
18
pages 53 and 54 in which he admitted that he never advised
19
Mr. Breton to wa t until all 15 beneficiaries had signed. He
20
did not think that was critical. Well, we think it was
21
critical, but the point is he admits that he didn't advise
him. And our position is just as one of the critical aspects
22
23
of malpractice, and Neil went ahead because he had talked to
24
his counsel and counsel did not say no, no, don't do that,
25
that's problematic.

MR. ORITT: Right, all 15.
THE COURT: And the language that you're suggesting
if it had only been signed by 12 wouldn't have worked.
MR. ORITT: What I'm suggesting is that if there
had been clearer language about this truly being all or
nothing, then if only 12 signed and after the leading-on had
happened and the Slater brothers ultimately said, no, we're
not going to sign, then there wouldn't have been a deal, and
there would have been a need -- those other releases would
not have been valid, and the money would have had to come
back. That's the argument we're making, because the language
that should have been in there should have indicated that if
all 15 don't sign, the deal is off.
And as we indicated in our memorandum in
opposition, what Mr. Breton testified to is that if that had
happened he simply would have gone back to the California
probate court that was still open under Saul Breton's trust
and proposed the plan before the court. But that didn't
happen because of all that did happen, but that's the
argument that we're making; that is, if the language had been
there and the 12 did sign and the three ultimately didn't
sign, the deal would have been off, and things would have
been reversed. And then, of course, yes, the Slater
brothers -THE COURT: Did he ever try -- after the Slater
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THE COURT: I've got to tell you. Mr. Oritt. this
1 brothers stopped leading him on, did he ever go back to the
is really the part of it that bothers me the most from your
2 other people and say deal's off. You all knew from the
standpoint, and that is I can't really articulate in my own
3 releases that each person had to sign or else there wasn't a
mind what it is that Mr. Breton did know that he should have
4 deal, and had one of them say, wait a minute, I read this
been advised of. I think that the record is pretty clear he
5 release differently than that. I read it as saying that I
knew that he did not have the releases from all 15. I think
6 just have to sign to get -- that "each" means me, so if I
that the record suggests at least that he believed at the
7 sign I get to keep my money. Did that conversation ever take
time he made the distribution that he was going to get
8 place or was that ever attempted?
releases from the Slater brothers. It sounds like they were
9
MR. ORITT: To my knowledge that conversation
sort of leading him on.
10 didn't take place or that conversation with MR. ORITT: Yes.
11
THE COURT: So how are you worse off based on the
THE COURT: And he thought that that was the case| 12 language of the release? I mean, it may have worked if he
Did he not know that if he went ahead and distributed the
13 had done what you suggested he would have done had the
24,000 to each of the 12 that if the Slater brothers didn't
14 releases been more clear, may have worked with the releases
sign they could still sue him? What is it that he didn't
15 he had. We just don't know. He never tried.
know?
16
MR. ORITT: Right, and that's where --1 mean, the
MR. ORITT: What he believed -- well, a couple of
17 defense is saying as far as the allegations we may speculate,
things. First of all, he believed that he was being
18 speculate, speculate. It is speculative both ways. We can't
protected by the all-or-nothing language which we believe
19 know because the facts didn't happen that way. We have the
didn't protect him. That's one of our arguments on the
20 facts that are before us, but he wasn't advised by his
negligence issue. And that if, in f a c t 21 attorneys. And then after this took place and the deal
THE COURT: Let me just explore that with you.
22 didn't happen with the Slater brothers, then things were
Because even if -- the releases that he had, had they been
23 essentially in limbo - or not in limbo but continued on as
signed by all 15, would have been fine. They would have
24 the Slater brothers took their path and talked with Uncle
worked.
25 Mike
else took place from that point.
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I don't know what to say other than the fact that
on both sides of this, this lawsuit we're in. I guess it
would be speculative to say if that had happened then maybe
this would have happened, or that should have happened and it
didn't. I don't know what else to say other than the fact
that those conversations didn't take place and things
progressed as they progressed in a mostly undisputed way.
(inaudible).
THE COURT: (inaudible) you make me hurt.
MR. ORITT: I'm doing a lot better.
On the seven intervening causes that counsel spoke
to, and I guess that goes to -- well, actually I think it's
the second of your three issues. It's also the fifth one
that counsel mentioned, or the fourth one, I'm sorry, the
third of your issues, but I need to speak to those points
that Mr. Wheeler said.
We actually just now talked about Mr. Breton's
decision to get releases from the 12, and I think I pointed
out or I think I've argued that it wasn't an independent
business decision. He'd been talking with his attorneys. He
was not advised. We have the cite from Mr. Swenson.
The second point, that is, it was Mr. Breton's
decision to reject the offer of the Slater brothers to settle
for what would be 1/15 of the one million that wasn't in the
trust, and. in fact, as we know from the underlying facts
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Slater brothers' lead counsel and said I don't want to fight
this, what will you take. Well, their demand was for
8 million plus punitives, so what would the demand have been,
a million, 2 million, 3 million? Should he have accepted
that and then that would have been another independent
business decision, I think, that the defendants would have
come in and said he never should have settled, he should have
fought it.
THE COURT: I sort of analyze the most of those
issues differently than Mr. Wheeler, and maybe he'll stand up
again and tell me why this isn't right, but with respect to
things that happened prior to the engagement of Clyde Snow. I
mean, that's just the facts on the ground as they were at the
time of the representation was engaged. That's not causally
related. Either it's malpractice or it's not. It's either
caused by the actions of the lawyer or it's not, but those
were the issues as they appear.
And thereafter when it: comes to accepting the offer
and deciding to litigate and everything happens up to that, I
would analyze that under the rule of mitigation of damages.
In other words, Mr. Breton has to act reasonably. After the
malpractice, if it occurred, he has to act reasonably to
mitigate his damages. And we're entitled to second-guess
every decision that he made, but we have to second-guess it
based upon what was known to him at the time that those
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1 decisions were made to ensure that he acted reasonably. And
that we've cited was never in the trust even from Mr. Saul
2
I don't think I can decide that under a chain of causation
Breton's death. So the offer from -- or the counteroffer
3 analysis, at least not on this motion.
from the Slater brothers was three times or almost three
4
With respect to the one, the decision to pay out
times what their cousins all received, and that offer, the
5 the 24,000 to each of the 12,1 think that that clearly
counteroffer they made, was rejected because it was, in
6 impacts causation, and that, I think, is maybe your biggest
Mr. Breton's view as the co-trustee, was simply unfair to the
7 problem in the case.
other 12. I don't know how -- and they don't cite any
8
MR. ORITT: Well, I understand -authority for their argument -- how the defendants can say
9
T H E COURT: We talked about that.
that's an independent business decision, an intervening cause
10
MR. ORITT: Right, and our argument as to his
that wipes away, as we argue, the malpractice, and that the
11 counsel (inaudible) Clyde Snow.
malpractice -- or but for the malpractice the Slater brothers
12
The final -- that was what I was going to say, by
wouldn't have sued.
13
the
way,
prehiring
the Clyde Snow, that is the fourth point
I guess their argument is, well, you had an
14 that Mr. Wheeler made managing the trust that gave rise to
opportunity to settle with this counteroffer. Then we take
15 allegations. Like you say. that's facts on the ground prior
that to its most illogical extreme; what if their
16 to.
counteroffer had been pay each of us $100,000 instead of the
17
The fifth one, the last one he mentions, is that
24,000 that each of our cousins received. Would defendant's
argument be that you should have taken that; too? Otherwise. 18 Neil did not tender the defense of the California case to
19 Clyde Snow. Well, let's remember it's undisputed that when
it's an intervening cause.
20
Neil got the demand letter he went to Clyde Snow with the
It's actually the same argument. I believe, when
21
demand letter. Now, Mr. Swenson was having medical issues so
they say it's another intervening cause that he elected to
22
he
wasn't there. But as we noted in our memorandum,
fight the underlying case and spend the money on that. Well,
23 Mr. Wiese met with him, and he showed him the letter, and
what would have happened if Mr. Breton after receiving the
24 Mr. Wiese said, well, gee, we don't do anything in
demand letter had simply said, or through counsel or
25 California, and we don't really work in this area so let me
directly, had contacted
Patty
Glazer,
their
lead
counsel,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
QR

37

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

see if I can find you some names. And it was some referrals
that Mr. Wiese gave to Mr. Breton in his own investigation
that led him to hire counsel. So the first point is they
knew about it. As far as the-THE COURT: Did they know he was claiming it was
their fault, or did he just say, look, I've got this problem,
or did he say you guys caused me this problem, what are you
going to do about it?
MR. ORITT: Let me see if I mentioned that. He
received the demand letter, and it had the draft petition, so
it wasn't just the demand letter. And he went to discuss it,
and so I don't know that either Mr. Wiese or Mr. Breton
recalled the substance of the conversation as far as, well,
this is your fault or it's because of you. We don't have
that as an undisputed fact. But the first point is that he
brought it to their attention, and they directed him to some
people.
The second point is that -- and the defense did not
identify any case law on this point and we do. We referenced
Mallam (phonetic) and Smith. And, again, I think it goes to
mitigation of damages, but there is no obligation on the part
of Mr. Breton to tender the defense of the California case to
Clyde Snow. As I mentioned in the memorandum, if the lawsuit
had been brought in Utah, Clyde Snow would have been able to
participate as a third-party defendant. Another problem with
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We think we've responded to the Court's second
issue of was the chain of causation broken by Neil.
Appreciate the Court's analysis of that. And the third
issue, that is, loss is solely caused by his breach of duty
prior to retaining. We talked about that.
So, Your Honor, in light of all of that, we believe
that we have met our burden of raising genuine issues of
material fact, and this matter should be -- the motion for
summary judgment should be denied.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Oritt. Let me hear
finally from Mr. Wheeler.
MR. WHEELER: Thank you, Your Honor. Let me try tc
deal with these points one by one. First of all, the
petition and Exhibit 8, which is the first amended petition.
Counsel reads from petition -- this is Plaintiff's Exhibit 8,
which is the first amended petition that he refers to, which
is the first time, as he says, that the issue of the releases
was raised. That's a significant admission right there, Your
Honor, because if it doesn't come to light until down the
road in the pleadings, then it must not have been a
motivating factor in filing (indiscernible) in the first
place.
THE COURT: When was the first amended petition7
MR. WHEELER: First amended petition is Exhibit 7.
(Overlapping speakers.)
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the defendant's argument is giving them a chance to
participate unless it's purely financial it would be a
conflict of interest if they would be co-counsel in any way
representing Mr. Breton on issues that in our view were a
result of their malpractice. So I think the argument that he
didn't tender the defense is wrong on multiple levels.
That's how I would respond to that intervening cause
argument.
I think the final point, Your Honor, I would make I
think Your Honor covered it on your first issue, that is, the
record and especially the Slater brothers' declaration.
We've gone after that at length in our memorandum in
opposition. In some ways it's quite challenging for the
plaintiff when the defendants have the three Slater brothers'
declarations that are near identical saying, no, it wasn't
economic, no, it wasn't, no, it wasn't, and, of course, that
puts at issue their motivation and intent.
And the Court cited the law on that, as we did in
our memorandum, and that's what we've tried to do to show
with record evidence that, in fact, there are questions of
material fact as to their credibility, as to their
truthfulness in those declarations. And so we believe that
issues of fact and reasonable inferences get us past that
barrier on the point of the Slater brothers saying, no, it
wasn't the economic incentive.
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THE COURT: Seven months after the first petition.
MR. WHEELER: Yes. So seven months passes, but
even more if you take the demand letter, which was shown to
Clyde Snow when they referred him to the California counsel,
that demand letter makes no reference to any interest or
claim that Clyde Snow was at fault or that somehow they were
going to claim more than their pro rata share of damages.
There's nothing in that letter that would suggest that.
There's nothing in the first petition to suggest that. So
half a year later you see the first appearance of references
to the other beneficiaries.
And the part that he read there, petitioner names
respondent in this action for the sole purpose of asking the
court to confirm the validity and enforceability of the
respondent's releases and satisfaction of their interest in
the trust as set forth more fully in Roman numeral 2 below.
So they refer to Roman numeral 2 to explain what they mean by
this.
I submit that that is just as consistent to
interpret that to mean we're the only litigants in this case
because the others have released it, and if there's any
question about that we've named them so that can be resolved.
They're not indispensable parties. They don't need to be
parties in this lawsuit. They have released their claims and
have released any interest in the trust so we don't need to
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name them as indispensable parties.
If you go to Roman numeral 2, the allegations there
have nothing to do with a claim that they're entitled to
additional damages because the other beneficiaries have
signed releases. It's in Paragraph 9 it says in an apparent
attempt to avoid liability for their mismanagement of the
trust and breaches of fiduciary duties, Neil and Willie
attempted to buy the beneficiaries' silence. And then they
go on and recite the attempt to pay the 24,000 in releases,
and then talks about the other respondents accepting the 24
in full payment. It never says anything in there about the
Slaters being entitled to more than their pro rata interest
for the damages that they have suffered. It's shown here as
a bad act by the plaintiff in trying to buy off the
beneficiaries so he can hide his malfeasance. That's what
the allegation is, and it's in the second petition. It's not
even in the first one.
So we think, Your Honor, that the inferences that
are drawn there are not reasonable and are pure speculation
as to what is intended by that. And I submit that the
statement by his California lawyers in effect is no different
than if Mr. Oritt says that he thinks that they were trying
to collect more than their pro rata share.. There's nothing
in the pleadings, nothing in the statements of the Slaters or
Mr. Larsen that that is the case. They deny it, and so
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anything I'm going to decide but it's -MR. WHEELER: There's nothing in the statement of
facts by either side that would justify that conclusion, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Fair enough.
(
MR. WHEELER: With respect to the intervening
cause -- and, Your Honor, I don't dispute or argue with your
analysis. That can be analyzed several ways. I analyze it
as an intervening cause that changes the situation. But
Mr. Oritt's arguments I don't think are valid with respect to
what Mr. Breton should have done when he was made an offer to <
settle with the Slaters for $66,000 apiece.
Number one, I can answer the question that both of
the lawyers from Clyde Snow who were deposed denied that they
were ever accused by Mr. Breton until this lawsuit was
fomenting; that they were ever told by Mr. Breton that they
i{
were the cause of the Slater lawsuit. They were never told
that he considered their conduct to be the reason why he was
having to litigate the case. That was never said during the
entire litigation of the case in California. It was only
brought up when a demand letter was sent to Clyde Snow long
after the settlement of that case.
l
But to answer Mr. Oritt's questions, what should he
have done? He should have allowed the Clyde Snow people to
be a part of the decision. He doesn't have to make the
44

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

you're asking -- you're going to be asking the jury -they're going to be asking the jury to draw inferences that
are totally contradictory by the only people who really know
what the fact are.
Your Honor stated that you thought that there was
an attempt being made by the plaintiff to get the Slaters to
sign and he thought they would sign. That is not correct,
Your Honor. Willie, his brother, continued to try to get the
Slaters to sign. It was Willie who was trying to convince
the Slaters to sign off and was offering them other benefits
and so forth if they would sign, including the extinguishing
of the debt that their parents owed to Mr. Breton. So it was
Willie that was trying to sign it. We cannot find it right
now because it was a surprise to us, but Mr. Call and I both
remember that Mr. Breton said he never believed that Willie
was ever going to get the Slaters to sign off. It was
Willie's futile attempts to get them to sign, but he never
believed that it would ever happen.
THE COURT: I can't remember anything specific
about that. I just came away sort of with the impression
that it sounded like Mr. Breton thought that they were
ultimately going to sign. That isn't a linchpin.
MR. WHEELER: I don't think that's true, and if
you'd like we can find it in the transcript.
THE COURT: Like I said, it's not a linchpin for
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decision as to whether the Slaters get more than the other
beneficiaries. He can tell the other beneficiaries, look,
the Clyde Snow people caused this problem. I'm turning it
over to them with respect to how they want to deal with the
Slater claims. How does he know that the Clyde Snow carriers
wouldn't have said we don't want to litigate this, we'll pay
$66,000 and be done with it. They were never given that
chance because they were never told. They were never told or
given the opportunity, and maybe they didn't have to do a
formal tender of the defense. I think that's the appropriate
way to handle it. If you think a third party is responsible
for a claim made against you, the proper procedure is to
tender the defense to them and their carrier and say you
caused this problem, you fix it.
THE COURT: I'm not sure it breaks the chain of
causation though. One thing it does do, I mean, if they make
that tender and Clyde Snow says, no, we're not interested,
it's not our fault, then it's a lot harder for Clyde Snow to
come back and second-guess the decisions that were made
thereafter.
MR. WHEELER: I agree.
THE COURT: But, you know, you deny yourself the
ability -- if you don't give them the chance to participate,
you deny yourself the ability to say we did the best we
could. It just makes it a lot harder case I think.
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1
MR. WHEELER: For the plaintiff you mean?
THE COURT: Yeah, if you don't tender the defense. 2
3
MR. WHEELER: Yes, I agree.
4
THE COURT: In reference you ought to allow the
5
second-guess.
bic6
MR. WHEELER: Your Honor, I would submit going
7
to the Harline case again that we're talking about here two
8
ends of the spectrum on summary judgment the Court can
9
consider. One end of the spectrum is that the evidence is so
10
clear that reasonable people cannot dispute the conclusions.
11
Let me talk about that first.
12
They have taken upon themselves in this case the
13
burden of trying to prove what motivated the Slater brothers
14
in filing that lawsuit. That's the burden they've accepted
15
by claiming virtually all of their damages from the
16
litigation of the California lawsuit. And so they have to
17
show by evidence that they have enough evidence that
18
reasonable people could disagree as to why the Slater
19
brothers sued.
20
In the face of that burden that they have, we have,
21
one, the undisputed history of tremendous animosity between
the Slaters and this plaintiff. There was litigation before
22
they ever came to the Clyde Snow firm. The defendant himself 23
in his deposition said that he viewed his eviction of them
24
25
from their home and putting them out in the street was the

the time they went to Clyde Snow, with the sworn testimony of
the Slaters saying it never entered their mind, that it was
not part of their decision to sue, the fact that it was not
even raised in the demand letter or in the first petition,
was not even raised until the second petition demonstrates
that no reasonable person could conclude that that lawsuit
was filed because they thought that the papers prepared by
Clyde Snow gave them some additional damages that they would
not otherwise be entitled to. I just cannot see how you can
come to that conclusion.
Now, counsel tries to avoid that by arguing the
credibility of Breton Slater. That's not appropriate. He
has no case authority saying that Your Honor can ignore sworn
testimony. And it's a specious argument anyway to say, well,
he lied in a letter to Mr. Breton. He doesn't have any
evidence that Breton Slater ever lied under oath. He has a
statement that was not correct on some totally unrelated
issue, and so we ask you to ignore the sworn testimony.
THE COURT: I struggle with that a little bit, too,
but I don't think I can ignore the hostility. I'm not going
to decide the credibility of the Slaters in ruling on this
motion. I think what it ultimately comes down to is, is
there a reasonable inference that contradicts their
testimony. And if there's a reasonable inference that
contradicts their testimony, it doesn't matter if you've got
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genesis of the lawsuit that was filed against them. He's
1 six witnesses. I don't balance the evidence, I don't weigh
made claims -- they made claims in their paper that
2 the evidence. If there's a reasonable inference that
Mr. Slater said that he was going to use his children's
3 contradicts it, then it's a question of fact, so I weigh
lawsuit as retaliation for all that Mr. Breton had done to
4 against is it a reasonable inference. Do you disagree with
them, so we have all these motivating factors that are
5 that analysis?
admitted. All of this took place before the Clyde Snow
6
MR. WHEELER: An inference of what? What they're
people were retained.
7 trying to do is they're taking the circumstances I submit that he is going to Clyde Snow and paying
8
THE COURT: It's a reasonable inference that the
money to lawyers to prepare a release that had to be at least
9 reason that the case was brought in 2007 is because the other
in part a factor to prove that he knew that there was a risk
10 12 people released their claims. I understand you disagree
he was going to get sued. If he didn't think there was a
11 with all this, but this is a reasonable inference that it's
risk, why did he go to the trouble? Why did he pay a lawyer
12 based on -- it was influenced, at least to some degree, by
to prepare releases if he didn't think there was any chance
13 the fact that the 12 had given up their claims, and so it
he was going to get sued? And, finally, you have the sworn
14 opened up the possibility of recovering the entire amount of
testimony of the Slaters that say that this was not a factor.
15 the trust or the entire claim of breach of fiduciary duty
So in order to agree with their conclusions, you
16 rather than just 3/15 of it. Then if that's a reasonable
would have to disregard the sworn testimony of four
17 inference based upon the record, then it doesn't matter how
witnesses, the three Slaters and their uncle, all of whom
18 many witnesses are lined up against it. It's still a
testified under oath, not just in their affidavits. They
19 question of fact.
were deposed, and they testified under oath that the idea
20
MR. WHEELER: That inference is drawn upon
that they were going to get 100 percent of the trust and
21 situations and circumstantial evidence that is as consistent
thereby increase their potential damages never entered their
22 with the Slaters' denials as it is with their inference.
mind. That's what they said. You have to disbelieve that.
23 We're not arguing here about circumstantial evidence that
And I submit, Your Honor, with all of the history
24 raises -- that is contradictory to the statement of the •
that occurred with
this defendant and the Slaters prior to
25 Slaters
thereby
raising
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law
School,
BYU.a fact question. We're talking about
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

inferences that are drawn from evidence, namely the sequence
of events and the history of the Slaters and the plaintiff
and so forth. We're drawing inferences from that evidence
which is consistent and explained by the Slaters' testimony.
They explained all of this why they waited so long, they
explain why they didn't file a lawsuit to begin with, they
explain all of this in their testimony. And yet the
plaintiff is trying to say, okay, well, they say that's what
happened, but we think that it's possible to take that
evidence and draw another inference from it. That is
speculation, Your Honor. If you read the cases, the Clark
caseTHE COURT: I understand your position that it's
speculation, but you would agree with me, I take it, that if
it were a reasonable inference - and you don't believe it
is, but if it were a reasonable inference, then that's a
question of fact.
MR. WHEELER: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay. You've given me lots to think
about. Is there something else you want to say7 I didn't
mean to cut you off.
MR. WHEELER: Your Honor, if you'd like us to find
the reference to where Mr. Breton testified that he didn't
think the Slaters would ever sign, we can try to find that.
If it's not important to you, we won't take the time to

1
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brother when she passes, so that's a problem for me, Your
Honor. Later in the week would be probably better, but even
then I don't know for sure what my situation is going to be.
THE COURT: Can we set something up tentatively,
and I understand if you need to cancel or maybe you could
i
just send Mr. Call.
MR. WHEELER: Are you going to ask for further
argument or just announce your decision?
THE COURT: I was just going to announce my
decision.
MR. WHEELER: If that's the case, then Mr. Call can <
be here if you don't need me to respond to anything else.
THE COURT: I'm going to try and read the things
that you've asked me to read, and if you can give me the
citation -- actually I only have the excerpts from the
depositions, so if it's not in one of the excerpts I have,
(
you can find that and get it to me.
M R. WHEELER: We can give your clerk copies from
our file of those cases, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay, that would be helpful, but I was
talking about Mr. Breton's deposition. I only had the
excerpts. If you wanted to give me that.
MR. WHEELER: We can do that as well. Your Honor. '
THE COURT: If there's anything else you wanted me
to look at, get it to me by the end of the day tomorrow.
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1
bother with it. But I would request that you read those
2
three cases in particular because I think Mr. Breton's
3
decision to unilaterally litigate that case without ever
4
informing Clyde Snow that he thought they were responsible,
5
without ever giving them a chance to intervene and to try to
6
settle it, without giving them a chance to accept the offer
7
of the 66,000, it's exactly what Justice Zimmerman was
talking about when he said you make an independent business 8
9
judgment, you cannot pass the bill to your lawyer and say I
10
made these decisions, now you pay for those decisions that I
11
made, which is exactly what we're doing here. Thank you,
12
Your Honor.
13
THE COURT: All right, thank you. I want to think
14
about this a little bit more. I'm wondering if lean impose
15
on you. I'm going to be out of town for a couple of days
16
starting sort of middle of next week, and I would like to get
17
this decided while it's fresh in my mind. I'm probably not
18
going to have a chance to write something between now and
19
then. Could I impose on you to come back for an oral ruling
20
on Monday at let's say 10:00:
MR. WHEELER: Normally I would, Your Honor, but I 21
22
have a sister-in-law who's on her death bed, and we expect
23
her to pass at any time, and I don't know where I'm going to
24
be Monday if she passes. I'm going to have to leave town.
25
She's down in St. George, and I'm going to have to be with my

Mr. Oritt, I'm not sure that there is anything.
MR. ORITT: As long as --1 assume counsel
(inaudible) provide me a copy of the portion of the
deposition they provide you, and then if I think -(Overlapping speakers,)

M R.
THE
MR.
THE

ORITT:
COURT:
ORITT:
COURT:

Mr. Call?
MR. CALL: I'll make it work, Your Honor.
THE COURT: We'll see you then.
(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at
2:23 p.m.).
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Your Honor, what time did you want us?
Can we do it at ten?
Sure. On this Monday the 1 st .
Right. Does that work for you,
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1
2
MONDAY, AUGUST 1, 2011
9:56 A.M.
3
4
PROCEEDINGS
5
6
THE COURT: Breton versus Clyde Snow and Sessions.7
State your appearances, please.
8
MR. ORITT: Jeff Oritt on behalf of the plaintiff,
9
Your Honor.
10
MR. WHEELER: Max Wheeler and Keith Call for the 11
defendants, Your Honor.
12
THE COURT: And you're still with us.
13
MR. WHEELER: Yes. My sister-in-law did pass over 14
the weekend, but the funeral is not until later this week, so
15
it allowed me to be here.
16
THE COURT: I'm sorry about your sister-in-law.
17
MR. WHEELER: She was in bad shape. It was a
18
blessing when she died. She was in great pain. Some people
19
have a hard time dying. I hope I'm not one of them.
20
THE COURT: There isn't very many that get out of 21
22
this life easily.
23
Well, let's turn our attention to this case. I
24
brought you back here for a ruling today. I've had a chance
to review the additional materials that you have prepared.
25
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

reasonable inferences can be drawn. And this is by no means
clear, but based upon the chain of inferences that I
articulated last time we were together, I think that you can
draw reasonable inferences to overcome a motion for summary
judgment on causation grounds.
The more I thought about it the less convinced I am
about sort of the ultimate inference that you would have to
make, which is really the legal decision, about whether or
not the release by the other 12 beneficiaries includes the
share of damages that the Slater brothers would have been
able to receive. The more I think about that the more I
doubt that's the case, but I haven't got enough information
to decide that as a matter of law.
But the good news from the standpoint of the
defendants at least is that I thought a lot more about the
second issue, the more troubling issue, which is does the
fact that Neil Breton decided to pay the 12 beneficiaries
without getting releases from all 15 did that break the chain
of causation, and I guess I've come around to the view that
it has broken the chain of causation.
In Mr. Breton's deposition this exchange takes
place. What he's really saying is that he should have been
told that if he didn't get releases from all 15 then he was
exposed to the possibility of a lawsuit from the Slater
brothers. And I guess the problem that I have with that from

2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

We really talked about four issues. The three
issues that I identified or the three categories of issues
that I identified. I was urged to also consider a fourth
category. Those categories of issues are the first one
whether or not the economic incentive theory that has been
advanced by the plaintiffs falls on causation grounds as a
matter of law. The second is whether or not the decision to
distribute the funds breaks the chain of causation. The
third was MR. WHEELER: Payment of the 24,000.
T H E COURT: Right. Essentially all the decisions
that were made postsettlement, but there was one other.
MR. ORITT: I think the third one was preretention

14 of Clyde Snow, any actions that may or may not be breach of
15 fiduciary duties, mismanagement and so forth.
16
THE COURT: That's the four. I really haven't
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

a causation standpoint is that he seems to concede that he
already knows that, and how can the lack of that advice be
the cause of the injury if he already knew what he would like
to have been advised of. This is essentially what - I'm
just reading -- so it's in front of all of us and fresh in
our minds, let me read what his deposition says.
This is beginning at the very bottom of page 269.
I'm going to start in the middle of an answer, but this is
Mr. Breton speaking, and he says: "And they could have
easily said you can't distribute any money to anybody until
everybody signs, and that would have been the end of the
story. I would have been a million dollars richer. We

13 wouldn't all be sitting here. That's not what happened."
14
And the question then is: "Okay. So one piece of

15
16
changed my mind on any of them except for the second which is 17
18
the one that was the most troubling, you might recall, to me
19
at the time of the hearing. We spent a lot of time talking
20
about the first one. I've gone back and reread your
21
causation cases.
22
I think that really the analysis under summary
23
judgment has tightened up a little bit as a result of the USA
24
Power case that was decided about a year ago that I think
25
refocuses the analysis on whether or not inferences --

advice that they didn't give you that you think you should
have is that they should have told you not to make any
distributions unless everybody signed?"
And the answer is: "Absolutely."
And I'm skipping a question. "You previously
testified that you and Willie made a decision to distribute
the money, not the lawyers, but your complaint is they didn't
tell you not to do it; is that right?"
And the answer is: "My complaint is they never
said that by doing anything all or nothing you leave yourself
exposed to potentially a very -- well, I didn't know how
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1

large the lawsuit would be and neither did 1, but you left

1

2

yourself exposed, and that was again -- this was --1 had no

2

listening to what you were saying, 1 think you said among

3

reason to do any of this, consent, release, distribute money,

3

other things the Court thinks that Mr. Breton already knew

4
5

any of that. There was no time frame, no gun to my head.
There were 12 more years ahead of me so, yeah, I'm a little

4

that if he got releases from the 12 he could still be sued.

6
7
8
9
10
11

upset.

5
6
7
8
9
10
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16
17
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Yeah, 1 understand that, but -- and please tell me if I've
misunderstood. It also sounded like you were saying or
thinking that if Mr. Breton -- or that Mr. Breton seemed to
know what he thought his attorneys should have advised him,
that is, what was caused by the failure to advise him.
THE COURT: Maybe 1 didn't say it very well. What
I'm trying to say is that he's claiming it was malpractice
not to tell him that if he didn't get releases from all 15
that he was still at risk for being sued by the other three,
and I'm saying that -- I'm accepting as true that they didn't
tell him that. But if he already knew that, then as a matter
of law the lawyer's failure to tell him that was not the
cause of what ultimately happened.
MR. ORITT: And 1 think that there's the
misunderstanding, and 1 thought that we had argued this not
only in our memo in opposition but also in our argument last
week. That is, that it wasn't their failure to advise him
that if you don't get all the releases they can still sue

"Question: Well, let me ask you this. At the time
you and Willie decided to distribute the money to the signing
grandchildren, you knew, did you not, that the Slaters had
not signed the releases?
"Answer: At that time 1 knew they had not signed

12 the releases.
13
"Question: You knew that without them signing
14 those releases that they were free to sue you?
15
"Answer: 1 didn't focus on that at the time, but
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

yes, apparently they would be free to sue me as they did.
"Question: Well, common sense tells you that if
they haven't signed a release there's nothing to stop them
from suing you, correct?
"Answer: If that's their intention, yes."
And so the more 1 think about that, how can there
be causation if Mr. Breton already knew what he wanted to be
advised by his lawyer, what he thinks in retrospect was a
mistake not to advise him of.
I've already expressed that 1 have a lot of

MR. ORITT: Thank you, Your Honor. As 1 was

23 you. It was their failure to advise him to not distribute
24 unless he got all of the releases; that had it to be an all
25 or nothing. Don't go through with the plan getting the
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8

concerns about the ambiguity or the alleged ambiguity in the
1 releases, distributing the money unless you get all of them.
releases because if everybody had signed this release it
2 And maybe I'm missing something here, Your Honor. But if
would have worked just fine, and if only 12 had signed a more
3 they had advised him of that, and Mr. Swenson admitted that
clear release, it would have had the same effect as where we
4 he did not advise him of that, he didn't think it was
are now.
5 critical, and 1 think it was, and Neil testified that he did
And 1 understand the argument that because of the 6 not get advice that he should not distribute which is part of
ambiguity in the release it would provide a basis for people
7 getting release signed and distributing.
to argue if he asked for the money back that they wouldn't
8
T H E COURT: It's really part and parcel of the same
have to give it back, but it's admitted that that discussion
9 thing the way 1 see it. 1 guess if the complaint was and the
never happened. He never requested the money back, so we
10 facts were that I'm out the money that 1 paid to the other
don't know whether the release that the 12 actually signed
11 12, if that was the theory of damages, then 1 could follow
would have worked or not, would have allowed him to claw back 12 that, and if he had tried to get that money back and been
the settlement in the event that all 15 did not sign.
13 unable to do it, you could say, well, gee, you should have
There's no attempt to do that anyway.
14 told me. 1 shouldn't be giving anybody money until everybody
So it really comes down to what was caused by the
15 signed because, look, I'm now out 12 times $24,000.
failure to specifically advise Mr. Breton that if you don't
16
1 can see a causation argument may be that that's
get all 15 to sign you're still at risk, and you distribute
17 the cause of that, if he had tried to get it back and hadn't
to the 12 you're still at risk for being sued by the other
18 been able to, but it's really the same thing. The way 1 said
three. And 1 think that it's so clear in anybody's mind that
19 and the way you said it amounts to the same thing. He knew,
he was still at risk to be sued by the other three that the
20 regardless of whether he paid the money or not, until he had
failure to tell him that was not the cause of what happened.
21 all 15 signed he could still be sued by whoever did sign, and
1 said 1 wouldn't allow any additional argument,
22 that's the ultimate cause of his -- the ultimate suit in the
but since Mr. Wheeler is here, I'm going to allow you one
23 case, the suit that he settled for a million -- with legal
last chance to tell me if there's something I'm missing
24 fees and everything, it cost him more than a million dollars.
there, Mr. Ontt.Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
25 Clark
In fact,
heSchool,
didn't BYU.
get releases from all 15.
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MR. ORITT: To the tying into the economic
incentive theory that you talked about earlier, if he had
been advised not that either he had to get all 15 or none,
and he couldn't get all 15, then he wouldn't have gone
forward with it. And then to follow our argument, there
would have been no incentive, and they wouldn't have sued
him.
It seems to me what the Court is saying is that -well, actually I'm not sure what the Court is saying when
we're saying if he had been advised, as we allege he should
have been, either get all of them or don't go forward with
this, and he had not been able to get all of them because the
three weren't doing (indiscernible), then he wouldn't have
gone forward with it, and as we argued he would have
submitted it to the California probate court. That's the
argument that we're making. Either that he should have been
advised if you go forward with all of it it's over because
you get all of it. If you don't go forward with it because
you haven't gotten all of them, then, as we argue, there
would be no economic incentive for the Slater boys, and they
wouldn't have sued him, and we think the reasonable
inferences support that. That's what our argument is.
MR. WHEELER: We'll submit it, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I'm going to rule. I'm going to grant
the motion for summary judgment on that one ground. I think
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that's where I am at this point in time. Mr. Wheeler, would
you prepare the order.
MR. WHEELER: We will, Your Honor, thank you.
MR. CALL Your Honor, may we have until a week
from this coming Friday to submit the order. Mr. Oritt
(indiscernible) in arbitration this week, and so I'd like to
have next week to prepare the order.
THE COURT: Sure.
(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at
10:11 a.m.)
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The Honorable Anthony Quinn
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
marianad@etnail.utcourts.gov

Terence L. Rooney
Jill L- Dunyon

RE: Neil Breton v. Clyde, Snow & Sessions, ei at. (Civil Mo. 090919546)

David L. Pinkston
Julianne Blanch
Brian P. Miller

Dear Judge Quinn:

Judith D.Wolfera
Keith A. Call
Kara L. Pettit
Heather S.White
Robert R. Harrison
Robert W.Thompson
Scott H. Martin

I have attached excerpts from the transcript of the December 8, 2010
deposition of Neil Breton. W e believe the folio wing excerpts demonstrate that Mr.
Breton was fully informed that he could be sued and was skeptical that the Slater
Brothers would sign releases at the time he and his two siblings released funds to the
12 grandchildren:

Joseph P. Barrett
Trystan B. Smith
Maralyn M. English.
Kenneth .L.Reich
Bradley R. Blackham
Robert J. Shelby
D.Jason Hawkins
Richard A.Vazquez
David F. Mull
P. Matthew Cox

p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.

120 1,15 t o p . 121 1. 16
122 1. 14 to p. 123 1. 13, esp. p. 122 1. 24 ("I thought it was futile")
184 1. 18 to p. 186 1. 9, esp. p. 186 11. 4-5 ("I was very leery")
223.1. 12 t o p . 225 1. 9
227 1. 20 to p. 230 1. 5
239 1. 6 to p. 241 1. 1
271 1. 16 t o p . 274 1. 21

Derek J. Williams
Tammy B. Georgelas
R. Scott Young
Matthew W. Starley
Levi J. Clegg
John S.Treu
Christopher W. Droubay
Nathan R. Skeen
Brian A. Mills

I have also attached a copy of Deposition Exhibit 37, an email from William
Breton to Neil Breton, in which William reports that Rhonda Slater told him on
January 3, 2005, "The [Slater] kids aren't signing." The funds were disbursed to the
grandchildren sometime between January 6, 2005 and February 6, 2006.
See
Deposition Exhibits 38 and 43, also attached. (These exhibits are discussed in the
references provided above.)

Melinda K. Bowen

I have also attached copies of the following cases:
Of Counsel
Harold G. Christensen
Reed L. Martincau
A. Dennis Norton
Joseph Novak

Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Business District, 2005 U T App 489, 126 P.3d 781
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996)
Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
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Thank you for your consideration.
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cc: Jeffrey R. Oritt, Attorney (via email)
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER
l

gave Hal the information I was able to give him, and

2

he put together a plan, estate plan.

3

various trusts and explained how they would operate

4

and kind of gave us an education about

5

planning and how we should proceed, and that's how I

6

knew or met Hal.

Was setting up

estate

And we had that relationship

7

for a couple

8

years, and from time to time I think we met

9

occasionally at Hal's office to update or review the

10

estate plans as assets changed and things became

11

clearer in my life in terms of financial situation.
Q

12

Okay.

But my question goes to what

13

prompted you to go to Hal or to Clyde Snow with

14

respect to the grandchildren's trust.
A

15

That was just -- it was basically -- I knew

16

Hal.

I knew he did estate work, and I believed at

17

the time that he understood our family and that I had

18

this matter that I'd been asked by my other two

19

trustees to try to resolve, a family global dispute,

20

and I went to the Clyde Swenson firm,

21

about his advice about how we best -- at one point --

22

at the same time protect me from —

23

several failed attempts at trying to settle a

24

global -- reach a global settlement, and this was at

25

my brother's and sister's insistence that we get a

spoke to Hal

because we had
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1

lawyer, and I said, "Well, I know somebody in Utah,

2

and since you both don't live in this country, let me

3

talk to Hal and see" -- "explain to him the situation'

4

and see if he can put together a document that you

5

can present to Rhonda and her children, and if they

6

accept i t, we'll reach a settlement.

7

then we' 11 have spent money on a document that won't

8

go anywh ere."

' 9
10

Q

I think you said "at the insistence of your

brother and sisters. "

11

A

Right.

12

Q

Plural.

13

A

That's correct.

14

Q

Was Rhonda insisting --

15

A

No, no.

16

Q

Sister?

18

A

Yeah.

20

I meant brother and sister.

Jana --

17

19

If they don't,

Rhonda had nothing to do with this.

It was Willie and Jana.
Q

And you said there was a family dispute

21

that was kind of the catalyst for this decision.

22

What was that dispute?

23

A

Well, party —

a few things.

One, my

24

mother --- you know, my mother, who we were all very

25

close tc , was really being torn apart by the fact
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1.

that her family was not speaking for years, and my

2

nephews and I -- my sister had accumulated

3

years of birthday presents that.we'd mailed them and

4

sent them all back.

5

real family mess that wasn't going anywhere.

6

weren't going to resolve anything.

71

eight

It was just -- it was just a
We

Jana had a relationship with Rhonda, but it

8

was strained.

9

I didn't speak to anybody in the Slater family, nor

10

were they allowed to speak to me or any of my kids.

11

They disowned all my kids.

12

very close to their aunt, were basically, you know,

13

removed from any family communications.

14

Willie occasionally spoke to.Rhonda.

My daughters, who were

And so it was probably partly my mother

l5i • requesting we try to make a settlement.

I know I had

16

a meeting at my -- with my mom and my aunt, with

17

Rhonda actually there, sometime years earlier, and

18

she was crying about, "Why can't we all get this

19

worked out?"

20

husband is a problem that we can't resolve and work

21

around.

221

allowed back in her house, and it just became a

23|

really ongoing ugly and uglier family issue that

241

this was an attempt —

25|

Jana and Willie offered to try to negotiate, once

And I, of course, explained that her

And then, of course, my mother was never

—

I thought it was futile, but
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again, after several failed attempts at global
settlement, and I said, "Look, you two trustees
I'm only one vote.

—

If the two of you can negotiate a

deal that satisfies everybody, I'm willing to give up
the judgment," which is a huge gift.

That's a

quarter million dollars more than anybody else got or
was entitled to, and the judgment was still valid.

I

said, "That's what I'll give up, but I'm not engaging
in any communications or writing any letters, .talking
to anybody.

You negotiate it, you make the deal, and

if you make a deal, I'll go to a lawyer and have it
papered," and that's what I did, given the assurance
that they had made a deal.
Q

Okay.

So, as I understand what you're

saying, is that this is a general good faith attempt
by you to settle the family feud that has been going
on for years, correct?
A
to —

It was an attempt by all —

yes, all of us,

all the parties.
Q

And who was it that came up with the idea

•that, "Well, let's pay each of the grandchildren some
money and see if that takes care of the problem"?
A

Jana.

Jana was aware that I put money

aside in a personal account --- in this account,
actually.

It was my money.

It was about --
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A

Yes.

Q

Which is a number of months after you

1

actuall y received the letter , correct?
A

Well, I told you I wasn't sure when I

• received the letter, but it was sometime before
October of '04.
Q

01.
(Whereupon Deposit ion Exhibit No. 26 was

marked for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. WHEELER)

Do you recognize this as

one of the drafts of Receipt and Release and Consent

1

to Terminate?
A

Yes.

Q

And this was one o f the drafts prepared by

the lawyers at Clyde Snow?
A

Yes.

Q

And describe the p rocedure, if you would,

•|

when -- I see that you sent Willie's letter to Hal
Swenson where he explains wh at he wants in the
letter.

Did you also provid e any information to

Mr. Swenson or to Mr. Wiese as to what you thought
should be in the letter?
A

Yes.

Q

And how did you do that?

In writing or

orally?
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A

Orally.

Q

And —

A

As I recall, it was orally, but I don't

recall the documents that were written.
Q

Tell me, as best as you can recall, what

you told Mr. Swenson you wanted in the letter.
A

Initially I think it was Mr. Swenson, and

then I think at one point it became Mr. Wiese, but I
think -- if I —
Mr. Swenson —

and I'm assuming this is to

that I brought him up to speed with

the family history, I brought him up to speed, I
think in great detail, because he explained that in
his own deposition, that he understood there was -he hated my guts, or some term, I think, some phrase
that Hal referred to, that there was serious -- he
understood, Hal did, that there was serious problems
between Mark Slater and myself and that Willie and
Jana had been negotiating, for the umpteenth time, to
try to find a global settlement, and in Jana's case,
as I spoke to you and answered your question earlier,
she specifically needed the money, so when she said
everybody needed it, she was being a little generous
with the facts.

She was specifically the only one

that needed money.
I tried to accommodate her.

RENEE
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offered her —

to loan her the money, but she thought

if we just distributed the money and ended all of
this, she .got indication from Rhonda that's what they
all wanted,•was a global settlement, and I was very
leery, but when I met with Hal, I was very clear
about, "I have no obligation to do this.

I!m not

even sure that it will get settled, but if we do it,
it's got to be something that all of the trustees are
protected.

There are no repercussions."
Hal acknowledged that, understood that, and

referred to it as "the all or nothing clause," which
was critical, totally critical for me to be involved
in any of this transaction.

And, unfortunately,

whatever Hal's best efforts were, he didn't
accomplish that goal, and I ended up in a lawsuit.
Q

Okay.

Tell me exactly how you transmitted

the information concerning your family feud to
Mr. Swenson or Mr. Wiese.
A

Just that there had been years of threats

of litigation.
documents.

I think I maybe even produced some

I don't know if I did or I didn't.

of the letters that I'd seen or gotten.

Some

But I made

it crystal clear, to use an old expression, that
there was about as bad of blood between our families
as there could be.

RENEE
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writ ing letters to Rhonda, saying, "Let's bury the
hatchet " —

my words, not his —

"and let s solve

this family dispute and sign off, and the money is
sitting in the account for you," and this goes on for
a long time, right?
A

Yes, that's correct.

Q

So these letters continue, and efforts by

Will ie, in particular, continue to try to convince
Rhon da to get her kids to sign off?
A

That's fair.

Q

Thirty-eight, CSS.

Is that fair?

(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 37 was
mark ed for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. WHEELER)

Exhibit 37 to your

deposition appears to be an e-mail -- may have
been —
A

It was a fax, maybe.

Q

It may have been a fax.

It's addressed to

you, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Is it from Willie?

A

No.

It's actually -- well, it .Is from

Will ie, but it's from —

this says "MBreton," that he

was in town at my mom 1 s.
Q

I see.

That's why the "MBreton i

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

223

BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER
nothing,1 then the kids decided not to sign, either."
And then she goes on to complain about not
seeing tax returns or other information, correct?
A

Right.

And that she doesn't trust me.

She

put that in there.
Q

Yeah.

And that she doesn't like you.

A

Yeah.

Q

And doesn't trust you.

A

Right.

Q

So would you agree that, assuming that

that's an accurate recording of the conversation,
Rhonda thinks this is an all-or-nothing deal that she
can kill if she doesn't cooperate?
A

Well

—

MR. ORITT:

I'm just going to object.

I

don't know that it's a recording, because he says
it's a summary, but go ahead.
MR. WHEELER:

Okay.

THE WITNESS:

Yeah.

It doesn't matter.

I —

your question, I

think, is, does -- I mean, Willie says, "Rhonda,
you're saying opposite things.

If this was an issue

of time, then you should have consulted a lawyer."
mean, her kids had these documents for weeks.
don't know.

I

I

This was Rhonda being Rhonda, and I

really don't know what she intended to say.
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Q

Do you know whose handwriting that is?

A

It looks like it's Willie's.

Q

Okay.

"Aunt Vickie talking"?

A

Yeah.

That's my mom.

Q

Can you read that?

A

It just says, "Aunt Vickie talking.

Murdis.

1

Reconfirmed no intent.

of kids with" —

Speaking on behalf

I don!t know what that —

know wh<at Willie's

Vickie

I don't

—

Q

With the kids' knowledge?

I

A

It says, "With kids'.knowledge."

I don't

know what Willie had in mind with this.
Q

That's kind of consistent with what the

text sa1ys , is that she showed it to the kids and
decided A

Apparently.

Q

They all decided not to

A

That's what it appears to say.

Q

Let's go to 6717 BRE.

—

(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 38 was
marked for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. WHEELER)

You recognize this?

A

This was sent to me —

well, Formaggio is

my wife ? s -- that's Gail's e-mail addresses,
Formagg io 49 -- to me, so this is —

RENEE
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1

Willie's wife.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

So you see who the players are.

4

Q

I don't understand why there's so many

5

addresses up above.

6

A

I don't know.

7

Q

Getting down to the text, it

8

A

Neither of them, back in '05, are probably

9|

I —

yeah.

It beats me.
—

very literate with using computers and texting and

10

everything and —

11

like -- this looks like, to me, like Judy and Gail

12

were speaking.

13

has nothing -- this has nothing —

14

let me explain.

15

it's not so simple, but this looks

From Willie, though.

Oh, no.

all right.

This
Well,

The Kobb bank accounts is a totally

16

different matter.

Willie and I own a piece of

17

property in a partnership called Kobb Realty.

18

and the 76 are our ownerships respectively of that

19

real estate partnership, so my brother and I

20

currently own a property.

The 23

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

And so that's the whole Kobb part of this

23

letter, okay?

Just so you know, it's nothing to do

24

with whatever else is in -- "With regards to Rhonda's

25

letter, you told me that you'd have the lawyer send a
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:f

1

copy of the draft for my input before mailing it

2

out."

3

THE REPORTER:

4

MR. ORITT:

5

Sir

Yeah.

—
You better read that to

yourself or read it slower.

6

THE REPORTER:

It's getting harder and

' I

7

harder and harder.

8
9
10

THE WITNESS:

I'm sorry.

I'll go slowly.

I f ll just read it to myself so you won't even have to
listen.

11

Q

(BY MR. WHEELER)

Yeah, just read to

12

yourself.

Well, let me read it so we have it on the

13

record.

14

start, is, "Also, with regards to Rhonda's letter,

15

you told me that you would have the lawyer send me a

16

copy of the draft for my input before mailing it

17

out."

18

everything that went out?

Talking about Rhonda, that's where I want, to

Was that the practice, that he wanted to see

19

A

Willie -- I think so, yes.

20

Q

"I'm thinking that since Rhonda's kids'

21

issues will take a bit of time, you will probably

22

want to distribute everything to the early signers

23

and leave $75,000 for the time being."

24

that's talking about the 24,000, correct?

25

A

Is that

—

Yeah.
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Q

And he's suggesting that he wants you to

distribute to those that signed and to leave in the
account $75,000 to pay the Slater boys, because he
thinks they're going to come around later, right?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

Let's go to 765.
MR. CALL:

One more time, please?

MR. WHEELER:

CSS 765.

(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 39 was
marked for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. WHEELER)

Exhibit 39, again, is a

letter that's unsigned, and it says "not sent," if
you'll see there in the handwriting, addressed to
Jordan Slater

Do you know how this document came to

be drafted?
MR. WHEELER:

Oh, just as the day goes on

MR. ORITT:
|

Are you a little warm?

it's getting a little stuffy, but I'm okay.
MR. WHEELER:

Got to wear you guys down.

THE WITNESS:

I got a little —

little left in me.

I got a

My tank's not empty yet.

MR. WHEELER:

Yeah.

I'm talking to him,

THE WITNESS:

Oh.

MR. WHEELER:

It looks like you can go

not you.
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that he wanted that —
Q

it likely did.

And the letter would have come from him, I

assume.
A

Yes.

Q

Let's go to 6720.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 43 was

marked for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. WHEELER)

Do you recognize this

document?
A

Yeah.

This —

yes.

Q

It's an e-mail to you from Willie, correct?

A

Yeah.

Q

So at this stage you're starting to use

e-mails --

•

A

Yes.

Q

-- it appears.

A

Disregard the fact that I didn't shoot any

geese.

Don't -- don't hold me responsible'for that.

It was a very foggy day.
Q

And is he talking about the checks to the

signing grandchildren?
A

I think he's referring, actually, to what

the FedEx —
building.

because FedEx is our tenant in a
I don't know, but I just —

I saw the word

"FedEx" and it just made me wonder.
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Q

It says, "You'll have the checks by Tuesday

afternoon."
A
account.

Which checks is he talking about?

I think we -- I distribute checks to his
I manage a real estate partnership, and

FedEx is our tenant, so I don't really know if this
was -- if these were the checks to the kids, to the
Vanguard, because Willie has an account at Vanguard.
Oh.

It says "the kids' money," so

—

Q

Yes.

A

Yeah, I think it is the checks.

Q

When it says that the kids1 money arrived,

I'm assuming he's talking about his own kids.
A

Yes, I think that's correct.

Q

So you have made the distribution of the

money, and his kids received their share?
A

Yes.

Q

And he's talking about the checks?

A

Yes.

Q

Also relating to the children's money?

A

Yes.

Q

Arriving by Tuesday?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, the decision to distribute that money

was made by you and Willie?
A

And Jana.

RENEE
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Q

And Jana.

The three of you together.

Let's go to 6719.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 44 was
marked for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. WHEELER)

Looks like we're still

getting drafts from Willie here.

Do you recognize

Exhibit 44?
A

Yeah.

It looks kind of like the same

version as the one he wrote back on January 21st,
Exhibit No. 41.
MR. ORITT:

Not exactly.

THE.WITNESS:

Not exactly, but it's

similar.
Q

(BY MR. WHEELER)

Are you encouraging him

to try to get this done with Rhonda, or is this
something he's just doing on his own?
A

He is really operating on his own at this

point.
Q

Yet

—

A

I mean, he --

Q

You're having your lawyers look at his

drafts, correct?
A

Or not

—

At this point, I'm not even sure that —

don't see anything that —

on these drafts that I

even sent them off to anybody.
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1

Maybe even your firm.

2

Q

So yeah, I was —

I was

—

Well, you previously testified that you and

3

Willie made a decision to distribute the money, not

4

the lawyers, but your complaint is they didn't tell

5

you not to do it; is that right?

6

'

7

doing anything other than the all or nothing, you

8

leave yourself exposed to potentially a very" --

9

well, they didn't know how large the lawsuit would

A

My complaint is they never said that, "By

10

be.

11

and that was —

12

do any of this consent, release, distribute money,

13

any of that.

14

to my head.

15

so yeah, I'm a little upset.

16

Neither did I.

Q

But you left yourself exposed,

again, this was -- I had no reason to

There was no time frame that —

no gun

There was 12 more years ahead of me, and

Well, let me ask you this:

At the time you

17

and Willie decided to distribute money to the signing

18

grandchildren, you knew, did you not, that the

19

Slaters had not signed releases?

20
21
22
23
24
25

A

At that time, I knew they had not signed-

the releases.
Q

And you knew that, without them signing

those releases, that they were free to sue you?
A

I didn't focus on that at the time, but

—

yes, apparently they would be free to sue me, as they
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made the distribution, that you had been threatened
with a lawsuit by Breton Slater, correct?
A

Ten years earlier?

Q

Yeah.

A

Yeah.

When he was 14 years old, I think he

threatened to sue me, yeah.

I think -- yes, I do

recall that he threatened to sue me a couple times.
Q

And you knew that they had bitter feelings

against you because they thought you had thrown them
out in the street when you foreclosed on their house,
correct?
A

I did not know that until their

depositions.

I knew, they were bitter at me, but that

was what came out in the deposition.
Q

And you had been in litigation with Rhonda

as well that we talked about in some of these other
lawsuits where you were adverse to her in cases prior
to this, correct?
A

Correct.

Q

Okay.

So you knew that there had been

threats of litigations -- litigation against you by
the Slaters; there had been written threats; there
had been allegations by them that you had mishandled
the funds.

All of this is true, correct?

Prior to

the time you distributed the money to the
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1
2

grandchildren?
A

The last communication I got from them was

3

in 19- —

4

threats —

5

concerned that, for ten years, I didn f t hear another

6

word from them, so I don't know what their thinking

7

was for the next ten years, so I —

8

assume anything about what they were thinking.

9

know is what they did.

10

Q

mid

'90s, so ten years had gone by.

Those

I mean, I -- you know, they were so

I don't want to
All I

Well, if you were not concerned, why did

11

you make it so abundantly clear to the Clyde Snow

12

people that you wanted to make sure that you were not

13

going to get sued?

14

objective.

15

A

16

California.

17

dollars of litigation fees, and I was not interested

18

in inviting a lawsuit that I didn't need to invite,

19

and I had moved to Utah, and that was the last thing

20

on my mind, was to get into further litigation with

21

any of my relatives.

22

Q

You said that was your primary

Just because I'd been in litigation in
I'd gone through a lot of —

millions of

What evidence do you have that the Slaters

23

would not have sued you but for the work done by

24

Clyde Snow & Sessions?

25

MR. ORITT:

Well, I'll object to the extent
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and Appellees.
Wesley G. HARLINE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Pete N. VLAHOS and Vlahos and Sharp, a partnership, Defendants and Appellees.
Nos. 940322,940323.
Feb. 14, 1996.
Client brought two legal malpractice actions
against bankruptcy attorneys. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Tyrone Medley and Leslie
A. Lewis. JJ., granted summary judgment for attorneys, and client appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) doctrine of issue preclusion bound client to bankruptcy court's determination
that he transferred property with intent to defraud
creditors and that he knowingly andfraudulentlymade
false oath and that therefore his discharge had to be
denied on those grounds, and (2) client's instructions
to his attorneys not to amend his bankruptcy schedules
precluded finding that attorneys' negligence proximately caused denial of client's bankruptcy discharge.

and prove (1) attorney-client relationship, (2) duty of
attorney to client arising from their relationship, (3)
breach of that duty, (4) causal connection between
breach of duty and resulting injury to client, and (5)
actual damages.
J21 Attorney and Client 45 ©?*105£
45 Attorney and Client
45ITI Duties and Liabilities ofAttorney to Client
45k 105.5 k. Elements of malpractice or negligence action in general. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 45kl05)
For purposes of proving legal malpractice,
"proximate cause" is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the
result would not have occurred; it is the efficient cause
which necessarily sets in operation the factors that
accomplish the injury.
E l Attorney and Client 45 0^129(3)
4£ Attorney and Client
45IIL Duties and Liabilities ofAttorney to Client
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts
45k 129(3) k. Trial and judgment. MflSl

Affirmed.
See also, 854 P.2d 595.

For purposes of legal malpractice action, question
ofproximate cause generally raises issue of fact to be
submitted to jury for its determination.

West Headnotes
J3J Attorney and Client 45 €1^129(3)
HJ Attorney and Client 45 €^»129(2)
45 Attorney and Client
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts
45kl29f2) k. Pleading and evidence. Most

45 Attorney and Client
45HL Duties and Liabilities ofAttorney to Client
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts
45k 129m k. Trial and judgment. Most
Citeci Cases.

Cited Cases

In legal malpractice action, plaintiff must plead

Proximate cause issue in legal malpractice action
can be decided as matter of law when (1) facts are so
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clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about
underlying facts or about application of legal standard
to the facts, or (2) when proximate cause of injury is
left to speculation so that claim fails as matter of law.

have been different but for attorney's alleged negligence, subjective opinion testimony mom judge who
presided over original case as to how that judge would
have ruled absent the alleged negligence of attorney is
improper and inadmissible.

E ] Attorney and Client 45 € = 1 1 2
18] Appeal and Error 30 €=1050.1(12)
45, Attorney and Client
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45k112 k. Conduct of litigation. Most Cited
Cases
For purposes of proving proximate cause in legal
malpractice cases by showing that absent the attorney's negligence, the underlying suit would have been
successful, the objective is to establish what the result
ofunderlying litigation should have been, which is an
objective standard, not what particular judge or jury
would have decided, which is a subjective standard.
IS] Attorney and Client 45 €=»129(3)
45 Attorney and Client
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts
45k129(3) k. Trial and judgment. Most
Cited Cases

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVim Harmless Error
30XVimiO Admission of Evidence
30k 1050 Prejudicial Effect in General
30k 1050 1 Evidence in General
30kl050.1(8) Particular Types of
Evidence
3Qkl05Q.in2^k. Opinions and
conclusions. Most Cited Cases
Error in admitting, in legal malpractice suit
against plaintiffs bankruptcy attorney, subjective
opinion testimony from bankruptcy judge who presided over original case as to how that judge would
have ruled absent the alleged negligence of attorney
was harmless error where plaintiff foiled to show that
bankruptcy attorney caused plaintiffs denial of discharge in underlying bankruptcy cases.
B l Appeal and Error 30 <£=s?1026

For purposes ofproving proximate cause in legal
malpractice cases by showing that, absent the attorney's negligence, the underlying suit would have been
successful, if only a bankruptcy judge could have
decided issues in the underlying suit in the first instance, then malpractice plaintiff is not entitled to lay
jury in malpractice action to decide what outcome of
underlying suit would have been absent attorney's
negligence.
fZl Attorney and Client 45 €=129(2)
45 Attorney and Client
45IT1 Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts
45k 129(2) k. Pleading and evidence. Most
Cited Cases
For purposes of determining, in legal malpractice
action, whether outcome in underlying suit would

2H Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
3HXYICU Harmless Error
30XVIQU In General
lQklH2i Prejudice to Rights of Party as
Ground of Review
30k 1026 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
"Harmless error" is error which, although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, is sufficiently inconsequential that appellate court concludes that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
error affected outcome ofproceedings.
fljQJ Judgment 228 "C^mo
22S. Judgment
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
22ftXIVfn Matters Concluded
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228k716 Matters in Issue
228k720 k. Matters actually litigated
and determined. Most Cited Cases
Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues
that have once been adjudicated even though claims
for relief in the separate actions may have been different.
01] Judgment 228 €^829(3)
22& Judgment
228XVII Foreign Judgments
2 2 M 2 2 Effect ofJudgments of United States
Courts in State Courts
228k829H) k. Operation and effect. Most
Cited Cases
Doctrine of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel
bound former Chapter 7 debtor to bankruptcy court's
factual determination that he transferred property with
intent to defraud creditors and that he knowingly and
fraudulently made false oath and that therefore his
discharge had to be denied; thus, debtor could not
prove that outcome in bankruptcy proceedings would
have been different but for attorney's alleged negligence in preparing debtor's schedules and statement of
affairs.
IIU Bankruptcy 51 €=•3315(2)
51 Bankruptcy
51X Discharge
51X(B) Dischargeable Debtors
51 X(B)2 Determination of Dischargeabil ity
i l k l l H Evidence
51k3315 Presumptions and Burden of
Proof
51k3315(2) k. Particular grounds
for objection to discharge. Most Cited Cases
Bankruptcy 51 G»3317(1)
51 Bankraptcy
51X Discharge
51X(B) Dischargeable Debtors
51X(B)2 Determination of Dischargeabil ity
HJL&14 Evidence
51k3317Weight and Sufficiency
51km7(1) k. In general. Most

©2011 Thomson Reuters. No

Cited Cases
When creditor objects to debtor's discharge,
burden of proof is on creditor to prove by preponderance of evidence that debtor acted with fraudulent
intent.
[13] Bankruptcy 51 €^3315(2)
51 Bankruptcy
51X Discharge
51X(R) Dischargeable Debtors
51X(B)2 Determination ofDischargeabil ity
i l k 2 H 4 Evidence
51k3315 Presumptions and Burden of
Proof
51k3315f2) k. Particular grounds
for objection to discharge. Most Cited Cases
When creditor objects to debtor's discharge,
bankmptcy court may deduce or infer requisite intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors from facts and
circumstances ofthe case.
[14] Bankruptcy 51 €=^3274
l i Bankruptcy
5IX Discharge
5lX(B) Dischargeable Debtors
51X(TO1 In General
51k3273 Grounds for Denial of Discharge
51k3274k. Intent. Most Cited Cases
For purposes of denying discharge for intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, finding of "reckless indifference to the truth" suffices to establish
requisite intent to defraud.
{15] Bankruptcy 51 <fc*3274
51 Bankmptcy
51X Discharge
51X(B) Dischargeable Debtors
51X(B)1 In General
5lk3273 Grounds for Denial of Discharge
51k3274k. Intent. Most Cited Cases
Generally, debtor who acts in reliance on advice
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of his attorney lacks intent required to deny his discharge, but his reliance must be in good faith.
HJ5J Attorney and Client 45 0 ^ 1 0 9
A5. Attorney and Client
45I1I Duties and Liabilities ofAttorney to Client
45k 109 k. Acts and omissions of attorney in
general. Most Cited Cases
Chapter 7 debtor's refusal to amend his statement
of affairs and schedules prior to discharge hearing
precluded finding in debtor's later legal malpractice
action against his bankmptcy attorneys that bankruptcy attorneys1 alleged negligence in failing to
amend his schedules and statement proximately
caused the denial of debtor's discharge for intending to
defraud creditors andfilingfalse statements.
*434 Third District, Salt Lake County; Tyrone Medley
in the Barker case; Leslie A. Lewis in the Vlahos
case. J. Bruce Reading. Wesley D. Hutchins.Salt Lake
City, for Harline.
Thomas L. Kay, Mark O. Morris. AmvE. Weissman.
Salt Lake City, for Barker and Whyte.

gether and discuss pertinent differences between them
in our analysis as necessary. We affirm both rulings.
FN1. The malpractice actions were assigned
to different judges in the Third District Court.
" '[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovingparty.' "K& T.lna v.Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623. 624
(Utah 1994) (quoting Hiqciins v. 5£/f Lake County,
KS5 P7.H m 2K nitah 1993)). Because summary
judgment was entered against Harline in both cases,
we state the tacts in the light most favorable to him.
In February of 1986, Harline retained Vlahos in
connection with his chapter 11 petition for bankmptcy. Harline gave Vlahos a list of his creditors and his
assets. Vlahos filed Harline's bankmptcy petition on
February 14, 1986. Five weeks later, on March 21st,
Harline signed both a "Statement of Affairs for Debtor
Not Engaged in Business" and schedules ofhis assets
and liabilities. Harline's signature on each document
was preceded by the statement "I, Wesley G. Harline,
certify under penalty ofperjury that I have read ... the
foregoing ... and that [it is] true and correct to the best
of my knowledge, infonnation and belief." These
documents were then submitted to the bankmptcy
court.

for Vlahos.
*435 ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
This opinion addresses two appeals filed by
Wesley G. Harline from separate grants of summary
judgment, each in favor of the attorneys who
represented Harline in connection with his bankmptcy
before the U.S. Bankmptcy Court for the District of
Utah. After the bankmptcy court denied Harline's
bankmptcy discharge, Harline brought two legal
malpractice actions, the first against defendants Pete
N. Vlahos and the law firm Vlahos and Sharp (collectively "Vlahos"), and the second against defendants
Ronald C. Barker and Larry Whyte. Both sets of attorneys moved for summary judgment, alleging that
they were not the proximate cause of the denial of
Harline's discharge. The trial court in each action
granted the motion, ruling that Harline had failed to
produce any record evidence that the attorneys had
caused the denial of Harline's bankmptcy discharge. ^ Harline appeals both rulings. Because each
appeal raises similar claims, we consider them to-

©2011 Thomson Reuters. No

In June of 1986, Vlahos withdrew as bankmptcy
counsel for Harline, and Betty J. Marsh entered her
appearance as counsel. Marsh subsequently withdrew,
and in the tall of 1986, Barker and Whyte began
representing Harline. — On September 18, 1986, the
bankmptcy court converted Harline's case to a chapter
7 proceeding and entered an order directing Harline
and his counsel to prepare and file chapter 7 schedules
and statements on or before November 18,1986.
FN2. The parties dispute the date on which
Harline engaged Barker and Whyte. Flowever, solely for purposes of this appeal,
Barker and Whyte concede that they
represented Harline during the relevant time
period.
About two years later, in August of 1988, a
hearing was held at which Harline's creditors objected
to his bankmptcy discharge. By this date, Harline and
his counsel still had not filed new or amended state-
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ments and schedules. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the bankruptcy court orally denied Harline's discharge
on the ground that there were omissions and inaccuracies in Harline's statement of affairs and bankruptcy
schedules. The court based its denial of discharge on
section 121(a)(2) and (4) of the Bankruptcy Code.
which provides:
The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-

(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate
charged with custody ofproperty under this title,
has transferred, ... or has permitted to be transferred ...
(A) property of the debtor, within one year
before the date ofthe filing ofthe petition; or
(B) property ofthe estate, after the date ofthe
filing ofthe petition;

*436 (4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case(A) made a false oath or account[.]
11 U S C § 727(a).
The bankruptcy court found that Harline had
failed to disclose transfers ofpartnership interests and
real property on his March 21, 1986, statement of
affairs. Specifically, Harline answered "No" when
asked whether he had been engaged in a partnership or
in any business during the six years immediately
preceding the filing of his original bankruptcy petition. However, the court found that in January of
1985, thirteen months prior to the filing ofhis bankruptcy petition, Harline had assigned two partnersh ip
interests to the Weber Clinic pension plan, m which
he should have disclosed on the statement. In addition,
Harline answered "None" on the statement when
asked whether he had made any transfer or other
dispositionofreal or tangible personal property during
the year immediately preceding the filing ofhis original bankruptcy petition. However, the court found

©2011 Thomson Reuters. No

that in January of 1985 and December of 1984, Harline executed, without consideration, four quitclaim
deeds conveying real property to his children. Two of
these deeds were recorded in November of 1985, three
months prior to the filing of Harline's original bankruptcy petition; the other two were recorded in March
and May of 1986, after Harline's petition was filed.
The court held that the date the deed was recorded
determined the date of each transfer and that Harli ne
should have disclosed therealproperty transfers on his
statement of affairs.
FN3. Harline, a medical doctor, was employed by the Weber Clinic.
The court also found other omissions and misstatements in Harline's filing. Specifically, Harline
owned a Merrill Lynch stock account at the time he
filed his bankruptcy petition but failed to list the account on his bankruptcy schedules. In addition, immediately before and after filing his bankruptcy petition, Harline directed Merrill Lynch to cash out the
account, and he used the $38,63427 in proceeds for
his personal expenses without authorization from the
bankruptcy court. Finally, the court found that Harline
did not reside at the address listed on his statement of
affairs.
The bankruptcy court found that Harline made the
transfers of property and cashed the Merrill Lynch
account with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors and that he knowingly andfraudulentlymade
a false oath by signing the statement of affairs and
schedules which misstated his residence, denied the
partnership and real property transfers, and omitted
the Merrill Lynch account In making these findings,
the court noted that Harline had testified that he signed
the statement of aflairs and schedules "after only
glancing through them [and t]hat he didn't read them,
that he was not familiar with bankruptcy law or
bankruptcy rules, but that he gave information [omitted from his statement and schedules] to his attorney."
However, the court concluded:
My findings as to intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors and knowing and fraudulent false
oath are made because of the significant number of
wrongful acts and the reckless indifference to the
truth showed [sic] by Wesley G. Harline.
The sheer weight of the evidence gives rise to the
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inescapable conclusion that Wesley G. Harline
acted knowingly and with the intent to avoid paying
creditors with the intent to conceal property or to
place the property beyond the reach of creditors.

considered on its merits in the federal courts.
P& Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595. 598 n. 1
(Utah CIApp.), cert denied, 862 P,2d 1356
(Utah 1993).

The Court therefore will not grant to the debtor a
discharge. Discharge will be denied.

FN5. Vlahos contended that (i) Harline's
signature on the statement of affairs and
schedules constituted an intervening cause;
(ii) Harline's failure to amend his statement
and schedules was the proximate cause of his
denial of discharge; and (iii) Harline's
pre-petition fraudulent conveyances and
misstatements in the original statement and
schedules caused his denial of discharge.

After the bankruptcy discharge ruling, Harline's
attorneys moved to alter or amend the judgment. The
motion addressed all the bases the judge gave for his
ruling: Harline contended that the real property
transfers to his children occurred on the dates Harline
conveyed the deeds and not on the dates the deeds
were recorded; that liquidating the Merrill Lynch
stock account constituted an exchange of assets rather
than a transfer; and that Harline did not knowingly and
fraudulently make a false oath because he provided his
attorneys with all of the information for his statement
of affairs and schedules, *437 advised them of subsequent changes, did not himself prepare or file the
statement and schedules, was unfamiliar with bankruptcy rules, relied on the advice of counsel, was
unaware that the statement and schedules contained
erroneous information, and signed the schedules after
only briefly glancing through them. The bankruptcy
court denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment. Harline's attorneys then appealed, and in May of
1989, the federal district court dismissed Harline's
appeal, affirming both the denial of discharge and the
denial of the motion to alter or amend.
Harline next filed a malpractice lawsuit in state
court in January of 1990, alleging that Vlahos'negligent preparation of Harline's statement of affairs and
schedules directly resulted in the denial of Harline's
bankruptcy discharge.im In December of 1990, Vlahos filed the first of three motions for summary
judgment, contending that Harline's suit was barred by
equitable and collateral estoppel and that even if
Vlahos was negligent, that negligence was not the
proximate cause of Harline's denial of discharge. m The district court denied the motion in June of 1991.
FN4. Harline also alleged that Vlahos' negligence directly resulted in the loss of any
exemptions. All parties to this appeal conceded at oral argument that the exemption
issue is moot, because the bankmptcy court
eventually allowed Harline to file an
amended exemption schedule which was

Meanwhile, in November of 1990, Harline filed a
second malpractice lawsuit in state district court
against Barker and Whyte, alleging that their failure to
prepare an amended or new statement of affairs and
schedules resulted in the denial of Harline's discharge.1^ Barker and Whyte filed their first motion
for summary judgment, alleging that Harline's claims
were barred by equitable estoppel, that they had no
duty to amend the schedules, and that they were not
the proximate cause of the denial of Harline's discharge. The trial court granted Barker and Whyte's
motion. Vlahos then immediately moved for summary
judgment a second time in his separate suit on the
ground that the Barker and Whyte judgment constituted res judicata as to the proximate cause issue. The
trial court granted Vlahos' second m o t i o n ^
FN6 Harline also alleged that Barker and
Whyte's negligence resulted in the denial of
any exemptions. This allegation is now moot.
Sea supra note 4.
FN7. The propriety of the trial court's decision on Vlahos' second motion for summary
judgment is not before us in this appeal, and
we therefore express no opinion regarding
the basis for that court's ruling.
Harline appealed both rulings to this court, which
transferred the cases to the Utah Court of Appeals.
The appeals court reversed the Barker and Whyte
judgment, holding that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on the proximate cause issue.
Harlinev.Barker. 854 P2d 595rtJtah CtAm.). cart
denied, 862P.2d n56flJtah 1993\ The appeals court
held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to

©2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 7
912P2d433
(Cite as: 912 PJ2d 433)
how a "reasonable juror" would have ruled regarding
Harline's intent to defraud if Harline had submitted
amended bankruptcy schedules. Id. af 602. The appeals court subsequently issued an unpublished memorandum decision reversing and remanding the
Vlahos judgment on the basis of its decision in Barker.
Harline v. Vlahos, No. 930067, slip op. (Utah CtApp.
Aug. 5,1993) (mem.).

vigorously contesting both the ethical propriety and
the admissibility of the ruling. In addition, in an attempt to establish the existence of a disputed issue of
material fact, Harline submitted portions of Whyte's
deposition and answers to interrogatories which indicated that Whyte knew Harline's statement of affairs
and schedules were deficient. After a hearing, the trial
court granted the summary judgment motion.

Vlahos then filed a motion requesting that the
original bankruptcy judge clarify his August 1988
order denying Harline's discharge. Vlahos asked the
judge to rule that he would have denied Harline's
discharge even ifHarline had amended his schedules.
In essence, Vlahos wanted the bankruptcy judge to
state for the record that it was Harline's own wrongdoing that caused the denial of his discharge. On
January 24, 1994, the bankruptcy court held aheari ng
on Vlahos' motion.*438 Although noting that he was
being asked to clarify an order entered over five years
earlier and his discomfort with the fact that Harline's
attorney was not present, the bankruptcy judge entered
an oral ruling "that an amendment would have made
no difference whatsoever with this Court's denial of
discharge, that the act was the act of Mr. Harline,
Wesley Harline, and not the act of any lawyers" and
directed "everybody concerned" to his opinion in Job
v. Qa/cfar (In re Calder), 93 B.R. 734, 737-38
fBankr.D.Utah 1988) (finding debtor's subsequent
disclosure of property interests omitted from statement and schedules insufficient torebutdebtor's intent

Meanwhile, Vlahos filed his third motion for
summary judgment. This motion essentially mirrored
Barker aid Whyte's second summary judgment motion. In addition, Vlahos argued that the doctrine of res
judicata precluded Harline from litigating the proximate cause issue because of the trial court's decision
in the Baiker and Whyte case. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Vlahos, ruling that
there was; no longer any material fact at issue, that
Harline could not establish that any act or omission by
Vlahos proximately caused his loss, and as an additional ground, that the Barker and Whyte judgment
was res judicata as to the proximate cause issue.

to defraud), aff'd, 907 F.2d 953 (10th Cir,1990).
Vlahos' counsel submitted a written order to the
bankruptcy court incorporating its oral ruling. Harline's counsel then moved for reconsideration. At an
April 25, 1994 hearing on the reconsideration motion,
the bankruptcy judge refused to sign the prepared
order. However, the judge reiterated that he originally
denied Harline's discharge as a matter of law on the
basis of Calder.
Barker and Whyte then filed their second motion
for summary judgment in state district court. They
contended that no issues ofmaterial feet remained as
to causation because the bankruptcy court's January
24th oral ruling conclusively resolved any question as
to how the original bankruptcy judge, or any bankruptcy judge, would have ruled on Harline's discharge
even if Harline had submitted an amended statement
ofaffairs and schedules. In response, Harline moved
to strike any reference to the January 24th ruling,

©2011 Thomson Reuters. No

Harline appeals both rulings. In each appeal,
Harline claims that (i) the trial court improperly admitted the January 24,1994 bankruptcy ruling; (ii)the
very issuance ofthe bankruptcy judges January 24th
ruling vio lated rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules ofCivil
Procedure and section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.
was animcoristitutional advisory opinion and, on the
merits, was clearly erroneous; and (iii) disputed issues
offact regarding proximate cause preclude summary
judgment. We decline to address Harline's second set
ofclaims because he has presented no authority for the
proposition that this court could constitutionally review an order emanating from a federal bankruptcy
court. In any event, in light of our holding today, we
need not n^ch these claims.
We first state the applicable standard of review.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." K&
T, Inc, m P.2d at ft2C>27 (citing Utah RCiy.P,
56(c); Higgins. 855 P2d at 235). ''Because entitlement
to summary judgment is a question oflaw, we accord
no deference to the trial court's resolution ofthe legal
issues presented." Id. at 627 fciting Hiaains. 855 P.2d

at 235; Etnas v. Sate 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1989V)." 'We determine only whether the trial court
erred in applying the governing law and whether the
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trial court correctly held that there were no disputed
issues of material fact.' "/d. (quoting Farree. 784P.2d
at 151). In addition, "we may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial
court, even if it is not one relied on below." Higginsr
855P.2dat23S.
*439 As a preliminary matter, we address the
question of whether a judge or a jury should decide
two issues relating to proximate cause in legal malpractice actions. These issues are common to both
appeals before us. Harline first contends that proximate cause issues inevitably raise jury questions and
always preclude summary judgment. Harline further
contends that if he should prevail on these appeals, at
trial a jury should decide whether a reasonable judge
would have granted him a discharge absent the alleged
negligence ofhis attorneys, despite the fact that only a
bankruptcy judge could have made this determination
in the first instance. We disagree with both contentions.
[1] We first address the contention that the presence of a question of proximate cause precludes a
summary judgment. In a legal malpractice action, a
plaintiff must plead and prove (i) an attorney-client
relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client
arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that
duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach of
duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (v)
actual damages. Wlliams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 887.
889 (Utah 1988): 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffiey M.
Smith, Legal Malpractice^ 27.5, at635 (3ded. 1989).
For the purposes of their summary judgment motions,
both Vlahos and Barker and Whyte conceded the
existence of an attorney-client relationship, a duty
owed to Harline, and breach of that duty. Thus, the
question before each trial court was whether the attorneys' breach of duty proximately caused Harline's
denial of discharge.
[2][3] Proximate cause is" 'that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence[ ] (unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred. It is
the efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in
operation the factors that accomplish the injury.' "
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters.. 697 P.2d 240. 245-46

(Utah 1985) (quoting ftate vs Lawson, 688 P.2d 479.
482 & n. 3 (Utah 1984ft. Generally, the question of
proximate cause raises an issue of tact "to be submit-

ted to the jury for its determination." Mitchell, 697
P.2d at 245: see also 2 Mallen & Smith, supra, §
27.10, at 657. However, there are occasions when no
jury question is presented. As Prosser and Keeton
explain, "Two kinds of questions, then, are always to
be decided by the jury if reasonable persons could
differ about them on the evidence received at trial-first, fact questions in the usual sense and, second,
evaluative applications of legal standards (such as the
legal concept of 'foreseeability') to the facts." W.
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 45, at 320 (5th ed. 1984). Accordingly, if
"there could be no reasonable difference of opinion"
on a determination of the facts "in the usual sense" or
on an evaluative application of the legal standard to
the facts, then the decision is one of law for the trial
judge or for an appellate court. Id. at 319-20; cf. g a t e
v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932. 936-39 (Utah 1994) (discussing nature of legal questions). At the other extreme,
when the facts are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently
established that determining causation becomes
"completely speculative," the claim fails as a matter of
law. M/ftftef/. 697 P.2d at 246; see also Seffensen V,
Srith's Management Com.. 820 P.2d 482. 486-87
(Utah Q,App1991), aff'd, 862 P.2ri 1342 (Utah
19931
[4] Contrary to Harline's first contention, then,
proximate cause issues can be decided as a matter of
law when a determination ofthe facts fells on either of
two opposite ends of a factual continuum. Thus,
summary judgment is appropriate (i) when the facts
are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree
about the underlying facts or about the application of a
legal standard to the facts, and (ii) when the proximate
cause of an injury is left to speculation so that the
claim fails as a matter of law. We therefore reject
Harline's first contention that the presence of an issue
ofproximate cause precludes summary judgment.
[5] We now turn to Harline's second contention,
that only a jury sitting in the malpractice action should
decide what a reasonable judge should have done in
the underlying suit. To prove proximate cause in legal
malpractice cases such as Harline's, the plaintiff must
show that absent the attorney's negligence, the underlying suit would have been successful. Thus, the
proximate*440 cause issue is ordinarily handled by
means of a " 'suit within a suit' or 'trial-within-a-trial.' "2 Mallen & Smith, supra, § 27.7,
at 641. "The objective is to establish what the result
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[of the underlying litigation] should have been (an
objective standard), not what a particular judge orjury
would have decided (a subjective standard)." Id. §
27.7, at 641-42.
[6] Seemingly because ofthis objective standard,
a number ofcourts have concluded that "[i]f the underlying suit would have been tried to a jury, or a
judge sitting as a trier of feet, ... the jury in t he malpractice case should decide the disputed factual issues
pertaining to the original suit." Phillipsv. CI ana/. 152
Ari? 415, 1W P2ri 300, 306 (C\ App 1986) .In other
words, the identity ofthe original trier of fact makes
no difference; rather, "the line dividing the respo nsibility of judge and jury runs between questions oflaw
and questions of fact." Chocktoot v. Sn'th. 280 Or
567.571 P.2d 1255. 1259 (1977) (en banc); see also
Hdmbrechtv.a. Paul Ins, Co., 122 Wis 2d 94, 362
N.W2d 118. 134 fl 985). Following this line of reasoning, these courts have concluded that it is appropriate for a malpractice jury to decide how areaso nable administrative law judge should have ruled on an
applicant's eligibility for Social Security disability
benefits had the applicant's attorney filed a timely
appeal, Phillips, 733 P,2d at 307; how a reasonable
judge in a divorce action should have divided marital
assets had the plaintiffs attorney properly established
the value of the assets, Hdmbrecht, 162 N W,2d at
135-37; and how a reasonable probate judge should
have ruled on whether a claimant was a decedent's heir
had the claimant's attorney properly discovered and
presented evidence and filed a timely appeal of the
original adverse decision, Chocktoot. 571 P2d at
1259
While the fact versus law distinction followed by
these courts has some superficial analytic appeal, we
reject its application in this context. Harline seeks to
have a jury determine what only a bankruptcy judge
could have determined in the first instance. We see no
reason why a malpractice plaintiff should be able to
bootstrap his way into having a lay jury decide the
merits ofthe underlying "suit within a suit" when, by
statute or other rule oflaw, only an expert judge could
have made the underlying decision. It is illogical, in
effect, to make a change in the law's allocation of
responsibility between judge and jury in the underl ying action when that action is revisited in legal malpractice actions and thereby distort the "suit with in a
suit" analytic model. Sfee2Mallen & Smith, supra, §
2723, at 693 n. 5. To so proceed ignores and, in some

cases, contradicts the public policy goals which
prompted the initial assignment of decision-making
authority respectively to judges and to juries on specific issues. There is no basis for abrogating those
public policy goals simply because the matter arises in
a legal malpractice context.
Nor do we agree with the implication, not
well-analyzed by those courts applying the simplistic
feet versus law distinction, that a judge sitting in a
malpractice case would be any less objective than a
jury in determining what a reasonable judge should
have done in the underlying case.1*18. We simply do not
see the logical connection between ensuring an objective determination of how the underlying case
should have come out and the identity of the arbiter
who makes that objective determination. Rather, it
makes far more practical sense to apply the rule that if
the underlying case could only have been tried by a
judge, then this aspect of the malpractice claim-the
suit within the suit-must likewise berried by a judge.
FN8. We note that "what a reasonable judge
should have done" is not a different inquiry
than "what the plaintiff should have recovered." These are identical inquiries; we do
not mean to suggest that "there may be characteristics peculiar to a judge in the decision-making process." 2 Ronald E. Mallen &
Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 2723,
ait 693 n.9 (3d ed. 1989). Rather, we use the
"reasonable judge" term to indicate that a
statute or other rule of law permits only a
judge to make the underlying decision.
The next question we address, also common to
both appeals, is whether both trial courts erred in
considering the bankruptcy court's January 24th ruling
regarding the motion to clarify its original order denying
Harline's
bankmptcy
discharge.
"[I]nadmissible*441 evidence cannot be considered in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment." D & L
Supply v. Saurini. 775 P2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989).
Therefore, we must determine whether the two trial
courts properly admitted the bankruptcy court's January 24th oral ruling.
The trial court in the Vlahos case held a pretrial
hearing in May of 1994 on Harline's motion in limine
to exclude the bankruptcy court r u l i n g ^ The transcript indicates that the trial court likened the bank-
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ruptcy judge's ruling to expert testimony. The trial
court appears to have weighed the prejudicial effect of
the ruling against its probativeness, as required by rule
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, noting that the oral
ruling was not "unduly prejudicial" and "no more
prejudicial than probative." mML Thus, the trial court
concluded that the bankruptcy court ruling on the
motion to clarify was relevant and admissible evidence in an objective determination of how a reasonable judge mighthave ruled onHarline's discharge
absent any alleged negligence on the part ofVlahos.
FN9. The record does not indicate how the
trial judge in the Barker and Whyte case
ruled onHarline's motion to strike the January 24th bankruptcy ruling. However, because Barker and Whyte's summary judgment motion relied solely on the January
24th ruling, we must assume that the trial
court in that case implicitly ruled that the
January 24th ruling was admissible.
FN10. Rule 403 provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, contusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." UtahRF.vid, 401
"In reviewing atrial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under mle403Twe will not overturn the court's determination unless it was an 'ab use
of discretion.' " State v. Hamilton. 827 P2d 232.239
(Utah 1992). Thus, we must decide "whether, as a
matter of law, the trial court's decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial potential ofthe evidence outweighs
[or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was beyond
the limits ofreasonability." Id. at 239-40 (alteration in

original) (quoting State v, Ramirez, 817 P,2d 774,
781-82 n. 3 (Utah 1991VI. We conclude that both trial
courts erred in considering the bankruptcy court ruling
in connection with the motionsfor summary judgment
but that the error in each case was harmless.
[71 Because an objective standard applies in legal
malpractice cases, virtually all authorities agree that
subjective opinion testimony from the judge who
presided over the original case as to how that jud^
would have ruled absent the alleged negligence ofthe

attorney is improper and inadmissible. Phillips. 733
P.2d at 303-06: Chocktoot. 571 P.2d at 1258-59:

Hdmbrecht, 362 N.W.2d at, 125-26; see also 2 Mallen
& Smith, supra, § 27.17, at 683. Such testimony is
considered inadmissible because its marginal relevance to an objective inquiry as to what the outcome of
the underlying litigation should have been is substantially outweighed by the possible prejudice created
when a judge, "in effect, sides with one ofthe litigants
in an ongoing proceeding." Phillips. 733 P.2d at 305.
Such testimony also raises ethical and public policy
concerns because it creates an appearance ofpartiality
on behalf of one ofthe current litigants by the judge
who testifies. Id. In addition, permitting such testimony may produce disruption in the courts. For example, if the judge who tried the underlying case is
permitted to testify in the subsequent malpractice
action, the same would seem to apply to jurors when
the underlying case is tried to a jury. "The specter of
such a scene throws a chill down our judicial spine."
Id. at 306; see also! Mallen & Smith, supra, § 27.17,
at 683. We lay it to rest today.
While we express no view on the bankruptcy
court's actions, we note that; the oral ruling was intended to clarify an order entered five and one-half
years earlier, that it was rendered without the presence
of Harline's counsel, apparently withdrawn on the
subsequent objection of Harline's counsel and, in its
final form, contained little ofthe hypothetical speculation to which Harline objects. We fail to see how the
January 24th ruling had much, if any, probative value.
We thus conclude that what little probative value it
may have had was substantially outweighed by prejudice. Therefore, each trial *442 court abused its
discretion in considering the oral ruling.
[8][9] However, we conclude that any error in the
trial courts' admissionofthis evidence was harmless. "
'Harmless' errors are 'errors which, although properly
preserved below and presented on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome ofthe proceedings.' "Hamf/fon. 827 P2d at 240
(quoting State v. Verde 770 P.2d 116. 120 (Utah
1989V>: see also Utah RCiv.P. 61: Utah REvid.
103faV Utah R.Crim.P. 30(a). Put another way, "
'[f]or an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a
different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.' "Id. (quoting Sate
v.Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987U The error here

©2011 Thomson Reuters. NoQaim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 11
912P.2d433
(Cite as:912 P^d 433)
does not undermine our confidence in the summary
judgment granted toVlahos or to Barker and Whyte.
We reach this conclusion because we agree with each
trial court that Harline failed to raise any disputed
issue of material fact indicating that Vlahos or Barker
and Whyte caused his denial of discharge. We examine each case separately.
[10][11] Turning first to Harline's malpractice
claim against Vlahos, we are satisfied that the doctrine
of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, binds Harline to the bankruptcy court's factual determination
that he transferred property with the intent to hin der,
delay, or defraud creditors and that he knowingly and
fraudulently made a false oath, even if Vlahos negligently prepared Harline's statement and bankruptcy
schedules. Issue preclusion prevents therelitigationof
issues that have once been adjudicated even though
the claims for relief in the separate actions may be
different. penrod v, Nu Creation Cram Inc., 669
P.2d 873. 875 (Utah 1983V The doctrine applies only
if fourrequirementsare met:
First, the issue in both cases must be identical.
Second, the judgment must be final with respect to
that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully,
fairly, and competently litigated in the first action.
Fourth, the party who is precluded from litigating
the issue must be either a party to thefirstaction or a
privy ofa party.
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245. 250 (Utah
12S& seealsoNohlevNnhle 761 P2d 1369, 1374
(Utah 1988): Wldev.Mid-Centurv Ins Co.. 635 P2d
417.419 (Utah 1981); 3ar/e Bros, v. 3ar/e 588 P,2d
689,691 (Utah 1978).
Under the first requirement of issue preclusion,
we must examine whether the precise issue decided by
the bankruptcy court is identical to the issue presented
in Harline's malpractice action against Vlahos. The
bankruptcy court had to determine whether, in light of
Vlahos' alleged negligence in omitting assets from
Harline's bankruptcy schedules, Harline (i) intended to
hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or the bankruptcy
trustee by making the four property transfers and by
cashing in the Merrill Lynch account, and (ii) knowingly or fraudulently made a false oath. A brief
review ofthe nature of bankruptcy discharge hearings
and the evidence presented at Harline's hearing helps
to put the precise issue before the bankruptcy court in

focus.
[121[13"1[14][15T When a creditor objects to a
debtor's discharge in bankruptcy, the burden ofpro of
is on the objecting creditor to prove by a preponde rance ofthe evidence that the debtor acted with fraudulent intent. In re Caldwell. 101 BR 728. 732-33
(Bankx.D Utah 1989) (mem.). However, the bankruptcy judge may deduce or infer the requisite intent
from the facts and circumstances ofthe case. Calder.
907 F.2d 953. 956 (10th Cir.1990). A finding of
"reckless indifference to the truth" also suffices to
establish the requisite intent to defraud. Calder. 93
Cir.1987)). The debtor, of course, is then entitled to
explain his actions so as to avoid a finding that he
acted withfraudulentintent. "Generally, a debtor who
acts in reliance on the advice ofhis attorney lacks the
intent required to deny him a discharge of his debts.
However, the debtor's reliance must be in good faith."
First Beverly Bank v.Adeeb (In reAdeeb). 787 F.2d
1339, 1343 (9th Cir 1986) (citations omitted) (noting
availability of defense to § 727(a)(2) fraudulent
transfers); see also *443 Pool'qui'p-McNeme, Inc.
v, Hubbard (In re Hubbard), 96 B.R. 739, 742
(Bankr.W.D.Tex. 1 989) ("Bankruptcy courts have not
imposed strict liability under S 727(a)(4) for omissions from schedules"); Calder, 93 BR at 737 (notingthat liability for false oath should not be imp osed
for mistaken or inadvertent omissions). Accordingly,
Harline's good faith reliance on Vlahos' advice and
preparation of the statement and schedules was a
plausible defense in the bankruptcy discharge hearing.
Harline did in feet raise the defense ofgood feith
reliance at the discharge hearing. He testified that he
told Vlahos about his assets, including the transfers of
property to his children, and that Vlahos feiled to list
this infomiation in Harline's bankruptcy statement and
schedules.•Lm- In his subsequent motion to alter or
amend the judgment denying his bankruptcy discharge, Hjjrline asserted these same facts as well as
additional legal arguments which attempted to justify
the property transfers and the cashing of the Merrill
Lynch account. It thus appears that Harline's sole aim
in the Vlahos malpractice lawsuit is to have a jury
reconsider the very issue that was decided by the
bankruptcy court in 1988: namely, whether Harline
acted with fraudulent intent or innocently relied on
incompetent attorneys.
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FN!1. Harline testified as follows: He
"wasn't familiar at all" with bankruptcy rules
and Sam Herscovitz of the Vlahos firm instructed him with regard to bankruptcy; he
tried to give Herscovitz "the information as
to my practice and my ownership ofproperty" which Harline considered to be accurate,
but Herscovitz "didn't go through everything"; Harline told Herscovitz (who had
died by the time of trial) about the property
transfers to his children; Herscovitz or
someone from the Vlahos firm prepared the
statement and schedules; Vlahos' signature
was on the schedules, but Harline did not
know that Vlahos was his attorney; Harline
had the opportunity to look through the resulting document "but didn't look through it"
and only "glanced through it" because he was
"working so long and so hard in his practice";
he intended to give complete and full disclosure to his creditors; and he had no reason
to believe at the time he signed the document
that it contained inaccurate information.
Harline also explained that he was residing at
the address listed on his statement and
schedules when he first met with Herscovitz.
In this regard, we note that even if all the facts
surrounding Vlahos' failure to list assets were not
brought out in the bankruptcy proceedings, the issue
before the bankruptcy court and the issue in Harlin e's
malpractice case against Vlahos are nonetheless the
same. "The mnirrumroach of issue preclusion beyond
precise repetition of the first action is to prevent relitigation by mere introduction of cumulative evidence
bearing on a simple historical tact that has once been
decided." 18 Charles A. Wright. Arthur R Miller &

Edward i i Cooper. Fed^al l^^ice

and Procedure §

4417. at 157 (198H (emphasis added). Further,
"[b]road definition of the issue precluded is most
appropriate as to efforts to advance new arguments as
to facts that had been fixed by the time of the first
litigation." Id. at 158. We are thus satisfied that the
first requirement of issue preclusion is metbecaus e the
issue Harline seeks to litigate in the Vlahos malpractice suit is identical to the issue Harline previously
litigated in the bankruptcy trial.
We are equally satisfied that the remaining requirements of issue preclusion-that the judgment was
final, that the issue was fully, fairly, and competently

litigated in thefirstaction, and that Harline was a party
to the first action-are met here. It is undisputed that the
bankruptcy court judgment is final, because it was
affirmed by the linked States District Court, and
Harline took no further appeal. We are also convinced,
pursuant to our discussion above, that the issue was
fully, fairly, and competently litigated
and that a
determination of Harline's intent in light of Vlahos'
negligence was essential to the bankruptcy court's
judgment. Finally, under the last requirement of is sue
preclusion, there is no question that Harline was a
party to the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, because all
four requirements of issue preclusion are met here,
Harline is bound by the bankruptcy court's factual
finding that he acted with the requisite state of mind to
support a denial of discharge despite Vlahos' negligent
preparation of the statement of affairs and schedules.
FN12. We note that in his malpractice complaint against Barker and Whyte, Harline did
not allege negligent representation at the
bankruptcy discharge hearing or in the handling ofhis appeal of the judgment denying
him discharge.
*444Thus, Harline has tailed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused
the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's
sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial
failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm
caused Harline's denial of discharge. However,
"[demonstrating material issues of fact with respect
to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to prec hide
summary judgment if there is no evidence that estab lishes a direct causal connection between that alleged
negligence and the injury." Mitchell, 697 P 2d at 245
Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, the bankruptcy
court's finding that Harline acted with fraudulent intent despite his reliance on Vlahos is binding. That
finding defeats the causation element of Harline's
negligence claim against Vlahos, thereby defeating
the malpractice claim. 5tee Lane v. Skjllivan. 900 F 2d
1247. 1250-51 &n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier
judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer
precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of
transfer), corf, denied, 498 U.S. 847. 111 S.CL 134.
112 T.Frt?.d 101 (1990* Falconer v. Meehan. 804
F2d 72. 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court
finding that attorney advised client of contents of
dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue
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in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg &
Wlk. P.C.. 177 Ariz. 221. 866 P.2d 889. 895-96
fQ App 1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling
that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice
by railing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same
claim in state court against different attorneys). Because Harline is precluded from relitigating Vlahos'
failure to list Harline's assets, Harline has not presented a genuine issue of material fact that would
enable him to prove in a malpractice trial that he
would have won the underlying "suit within a suit."
SBeLana 900 E2d at 1250 n. 5: Standage 866 P.2d at
896. Even though the trial court came to this conclusion from a different route, we affinn its grant of
summary judgment in favor of Vlahos.
[16] Turning to Harline's malpractice claim
against Barker and Whyte, we conclude that the evidence which Harline submitted in response to Barker
and Whyte's motion for summary judgment not only
fails to raise an issue of material fact, but leaves no
room for reasonable minds to conclude that Barker
and Whyte could have proximately caused the denial
ofHarline's bankruptcy discharge.
Harline's sole claim against Barker and Whyte is
that they negligently railed to amend his statement of
affairs and schedules. Barker and Whyte's defense in
their motion for summary judgment was that no
amendment could have cured Harline's original fraudulent transfers and false statement and schedules.
Barker and Whyte submitted the bankruptcy court's
January 24th ruling as the only evidence supporting
their defense. First, we reject any implicit argument
that the bankruptcy court's original findings regarding
Harline's fraudulent intent are binding on Harline in
his suit against Barker and Whyte under the doctrine
of issue preclusion. There is no evidence that Barker
and Whyte's failure to amend Harline's statement and
schedules was raised in Harline's discharge hearing
before the bankruptcy court. Further, Whyte
represented Harline at the discharge hearing. Under
these circumstances, issue preclusion does not apply.
See generally Bucd v.Rustin. 227 ril APP3H 779 169
lll.Dec. 810. 592N.E.2d 297(1992V
Second, we reject Barker and Whyte's express
argument, based on the bankruptcy court's January
24th ruling, that amendments could not have cured
Harline's false statement of affairs and schedules. We,
like the court of appeals, cannot say as a matter of law

that timely amendments would not have prevented the
denial ofHarline's discharge. 5&? Harline v. Barker.
854 P 2d at 602. However, we disapprove ofthe court
of appeals' assertion that "[cjertainly an amendment
would have removed the section 727(ay4YA) ground
for denial of discharge as the schedules would no
longer be false." Id. This assertion is simply untrue.
Amendments do not negate the original false statement or schedules. Rather, they help negate afinding
that the debtor filed the false documents with the intent to defraud. Sse Nsw VfarldMktg. Corp, v. Garcia
(In re Garcia). 88 B.R 695. 705 n. 19
(Bankr.ED.Pa. 19 88) *445 ('The existence of sanctions for failure to disclose assets would serve no
purpose if deficiencies could simply be remedied any
time parties in interest call attention to them."). In
short, the fact that a debtor files amendments is only
one of many factors a bankruptcy court considers in
determining whether the debtor initially acted with
fraudulent intent.
Consequently, under this same analysis, even if
the bankruptcy court's January 24th ruling was admissible, it could not have established as a matter of
law that jamendments would have had no effect on
Harline's bankruptcy discharge. As discussed earlier
in this opinion, bankruptcy courts do not impose strict
liability on debtors who file false statements and
schedules; rather, they make a determination based on
the facts and circumstances ofthe case. The failure to
file timely amendments is simply one fact which indicates fraudulent intent. Caldwell. 101 BR at 739
Accordingly, even if the bankruptcy court's January
24th ruling was admissible, that evidence could not
have eliminated the factual question of whether a
reasonable bankruptcy judge would have denied Harline's discharge had he submitted timely amendments.
Because we cannot decide as a matter of law that
timely amendments would have had no effect on the
outcome of Harline's discharge trial and because we
hold today that the bankruptcy court's January 24th
ruling is inadmissible, we ordinarily would remand on
the grounds that Barker and Whyte, as the moving
parties, have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that there are no disputed issues of material
fact regarding proximate cause. m± V\alker Drug Co.
V.La Sal Oil Co.. 902 P2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1995);*
& T. Inc.. 888P.2d at 628. Unless the moving party
meets its initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, "the
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party opposing the motion is under no obligation to
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." K&
TlnGn 888 P,2d at, 628; a s a/so Utah R.QYP, 56(e);
cf. Ihame v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120. 124
(Utah 1994). On the other hand, we cannot rum a blind
eye to the nonmoving party's evidence when that party
chooses to respond to the summary judgment motion.
In this case, Harline's own evidence compels us to
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. In
light of that evidence, we conclude that no reasona ble
person could find that Barker and Whyte proximately
caused Harline's injury.
FN13 Barker and Whyte argue that even if
the bankruptcy court's January 24th ruling
was improperly admitted, under the reasoning o f ^ ^ © L ^ f f i i J i ^ £ ^ L i 2 I i l S t J l L
106 SO. 2548, 91 I, Ed 2d 265 (1986). the
burden is on Harline to produce some evidence showing that Barker and Whyte
proximately caused the denial of Harline's
discharge. See ft/, at 323-24 106 S.Ct. at
2552-53. This court has not previously
adopted the reasoning ofthe majority opinion
in Celotex, which is not binding on us as a
matter of law, and declines to do so today.
Both in response to Barker and Whyte's motion
for summary judgment and on appeal to this court,
Harline relied on Whyte's answer to an interrogatory
to undercut Barker and Whyte's assertion that
amendments would have made no difference to the
outcome of Harline's discharge hearing. Whyte's answer contained the following:
[I]n the summer of 1988, defendant Whyte determined that Dr. Harline's statement of affairs and
schedules were inadequate as to their content, which
determination defendant Whyterelatedto [Harline].
Further, the risk involved in going ahead with the
[discharge] trial without amending the schedules
was specifically related to [Harline].... [Subsequent
to May, 1988,... Dr. Harline specifically instructed
Mr. Wiyte not to file amended statements or schedules.
(Emphasis added.) Both at the trial court and on
appeal, Harline has not denied instructing Whyte not
to amend the schedules, nor have we found any record
evidence supporting a denial even if one had been
made. j m * 44 6 As a result, we must conclude that it is

undisputed that Harline directed Whyte not to amend
the statement of affairs and schedules. This conclusion
should come as no surprise to Harline, because Barker
and Whyte in their brief specifically discussed Harline's instruction to Whyte not to amend the statement
of affairs and schedules, and Harline in his reply brief
did not mention the evidence, let alone dispute it.
FN 14. We note that Harline filed a supplemental affidavit in response to Barker and
Whyte's first motion for summary judgment
in which he said, "Whyte ... repeatedly advised [Harline] that amended schedules and
statement of affairs had to be prepared and
filed, but Mr. Whyte never undertook to
prepare or file such schedules or statement of
affairs." When asked in a deposition whether
he instructed Barker and Whyte to fix his
statement and schedules, Harline replied, "I
don't recall whether I did or not" In Harline's
response to Barker and Whyte's supplement
to their first motion for summary judgment,
Harline denied that Whyte advised him of the
need to file amended schedules, but he filed
no affidavit and pointed to no evidence to
support the denial.
This evidence demonstrates that Harline chose
not to pursue his available legal remedy of amendin g
his statement of affairs and schedules prior to his
bankruptcy discharge hearing in August of 1988. "
'We do not believe it would be wise judicial policy to
allow one party to create legal liability in another by a
voluntary exercise of the complaining party's own
personal business judgment not to seek to protect his
rights in the legal forums provided him.' " Horn v.
Mobera 68 Wash.App. 551! 844 P.2d 452. 456 (1993)
(holding client's independent, voluntary decision to
dismiss products liability suit precluded finding that
attorney's alleged negligent preparation of case
proximately caused client's injury) (quoting King v.
Seattle. 84 Wash 2d 239 525 P2rf 228 236 (1974)).
Admittedly, late-filed amendments may not have been
as effective as earlier-filed amendments in demonstrating Harline's lack of intent to defraud, but we
cannot say that they would have been useless. In short,
Harline's refusal to amend his statement and schedules
precludes a finding that Barker and Whyte proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy
discharge. Accordingly, the trial court correctly
granted Barker and Whyte's motion for summary
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judgment.
In sum, we affirm summary judgment in the
Vlahos action because Harline is precluded from relitigating Vlahos' failure to list assets in Harline's
original statement of affairs and schedules. Without
the ability to relitigate this issue, Harline cannot prove
that Vlahos'negligence proximately caused the denial
of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. We also affirm
summary judgment in the Barker and Whyte action
because Harline's evidence that he instructed his attorneys not to amend his statement and schedules
precludes a finding that Barker and Whyte's negligence proximately caused the denial ofHarline's discharge.
STEWART. Associate C.J., and HOWE. DURHAM
and RUSSON, J J., concur in Chief Justice ZIMMERMAN'S opinion.
Utah,1996.
Harline v. Barker
912P.2d433
END OF DOCUMENT

©2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jan 05 OS 03:44p

neil breton

4356497893

'\

Subj:
Date:
From:
To:
CC:

,

p. 1

Page! of 1

trust
1/4V2005 2:37:57 P.M. Mountain Standard Time
MBreton909
Neilbreton
Berto n@n6t vision.net 1L

Hi Neil,
Here Is a summary of my conversation with Rhonda Jan 3, 05.
Willie: Rhonda, I am going home tomorrow and wanted to know whafs happening with the letter you received?
Rhonda:The kids aren't signing.
W. Did they read the letter?
R: I read them the letter and since I'm not sighing off, and the letter states "all or nothing1"' then the kids decided
not to sign either. I don't trust Neil and I think he's covering up where the money went. I've never seen a trust tax
return and in addition the letter only gave me about a week to sign off. I don't want to rush into this.
W: You're making a big mistake. This is an opportunity to release mark and get the kids a lot of money this week.
J
R:The whole thing is erroneous.
W. Rhonda, you're saying opposite things. If this was an issue of time, then you should have consulted a lawyer
and ask your questions (like why we insist that also Rhonda signs off in addtion to her kids). At that point you
could have catted me or had your lawyer write Neil's lawyer and ask for a couple of extra days. But you never
even consulted a lawyer. This is a big mistake and if s a shame.
R: I've made lots of mistakes before and the kids have all suffered plenty.
W: This is about going forward and making a deal worth lots of money to your whole family. There have problems
in the past but its possible to start getting back on the right track.
R: I see it very differently. Have a safe trip back home.

^

hoku m^

Vi**"*»-

CttuUfiM

* Tuesday, January M, 2005 America Online: Neilbreton
I

•

Hi fc<J* jc^Mp
I

~

DEPOSITION EXHIBIT
t

23

1*5 J*m J-~>*~

A

CSS 000038

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I tl££C 1 U l

Sub]:
Date:
From:
To:

i

FW: trust letter
1/6/2005 4:39:51 P.M. Mountain Standard Time
formaQQio49@hotmail.com
neilbreton@aol.com

From: Judy Breton <berton@netvision.netil>
To: neil <formaggio49@hotmail.com>
Subject: trust letter
Date: Thu, 06 Jan 2005 11:10:31 +0200

X-SID-PRA: Judy Breton <berton@netvision.net.il>
X-SID-Resutt TempError
X-Message-lnfo: JGTYoYF78jE7aut1 gAZYHnwW+jZZ4Kw3cwif2+l/DZI=
Received: from mxout4.netvision.net.il ([194.90.9.27J) by mc1-f30.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC
(6.0.3790.211);
Thu, 6 Jan 2005 01:11:08-0800
Received: from netvision.net.il ([212.235.116.232]) by mxout4.netvision.net.il
(iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.02 (built Oct 21 2004))
with ESMTPA id <0l9W006NV1HJ5V@mxout4, netvision.net il> for
formaggio49@hotmail.com; Thu, 06 Jan 2005 11:10:36 +0200 (1ST)
Date: Thu, 06 Jan 2005 11:10:31+0200
From: Judy Breton <berton@netvision.net.iI>
Subject: trust letter
To: neil <formaggio49@hotmail.com>
Message-id: <41 DD0087.6010609@netvision.net.il>
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv: 1.0.1) Gecko/20020823
Netscape/7.0 (nscd2)
Return-Path: berton@netvision.net.il
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 06 Jan 2005 09:11:09.0000 (UTC) FIL£TIME~[A8DC3480:01C4F3CF]

Hi Neil,
This is a follow to our conversations yesterday. Let me know if you received Judy's and Aryeh's social for the two
Kobb bank accounts. Please have the bank make a copy and mail to me for my Kobb records. Ask the bank if
there is a way to make a proper pro rata percentage (23.95% and 76.05%) of the beneficiaries or if it is something
that the two of us have to do 'internally' between ourselves.
Also, with regards to Rhonda's letter, you told me that you'd have the lawyer send me a copy of the draft for my
input before mailing it out. I'm thinking that since Rhonda's kids issues will take a bit of time, you'll probably want
to distribute everything to the early signers and leave $75,000.00 for the time being." That way your kids, my kids
and you will get the money without delay as I know you're eager to get repaid by Jana. You were going to get an
accountant to suggest the best tax way to give the gifts, maybe even adding Gail to the account so as to avoid the
gift tax form that you'll need to file for all gifts over $11,000.00 per annum.
With regards to the letter to Rhonda, I think that we need to have M correspondences go directly to Breton,
Jordan and Hayden. Rhonda and Mark are not the address. Besides, they're all over 21 years of age.
Lastly, what did you think of my name suggestions for Har Shalom property?
Take good care.
Love,
Willie
Best regards to Gail and tell the boys to have a safe trip back to Switzerland tomorrow. GO WITH THE RIGHT
FOOT...
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Subj:

checks on the way

Date:
From:
To:

2/6/2005 5:24:34 A.M. Mountain Standard Time
berton@netv1sion.net.ll
Neilbreton@aot.com

Hi Neii
Welcome back from the big game expedition. Gail told me you sacked 20 geese. NO COMMENT. But 1 am
considering reporting you to the save the whale and universe committee...
Fedex says that you'll have the checks by Tuesday afternoon. If you don't have it by then, I'll trace the tracking
number.
Also, Vanguard notified us that the kid's money arrived.
Thanks and regards to the family.
Love,
Willie

NB004637
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30k863 k. InGeneral. Most Cited Cases

p.
Court ofAppeals ofUtah.
Jon and Elizabeth TRIESAULT, Raymon and Stephanie Bori, individuals; Imagination Theaters, Inc., a
corporation; and Imagination Theaters Holdings,
LLC, a limited liability company, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
The GREATER SALT LAKE BUSINESS DISTRICT, a Utah corporation dbaDeseret Certified
Development Company, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20040811-CA.
Nov. 10,2005.
Background: Movie theater owner sued certified
development company (CDC) that originally help him
develop his theater for breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with prospective economic relations, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress after
rival theater opened and owner's theater went into
bankruptcy. The Fourth District Court, Provo Department, Fred P. Howard. J., entered summary
judgment for CDC.
Holdings: Owner appealed The Court of Appeals,
Billings. PJ.. held that:
(Ij owner failed to show that opening ofrival theater
with assistance of CDC caused his loss of revenue,
and
{2} owner failed to show that CDC used improper
means in assisting in opening ofrival theater.
Affirmed.

No deference is given by a reviewing court to the
trial court's resolution ofthe legal issues presented in a
motion for summary judgment.
12] Fraud 184 €==25
I84Fraud
1841 Deception Constituting Fraud, and Liability
Therefor
184k25 k. Injury and Causation. Most Cited
Cases
Movie theater owner failed to demonstrate that
opening ofrival movie theater caused drop ofreven ue
at his theater, as required to maintain claim that assistance to rival movie theater by same certified development company (CDQ that assisted owner in
opening his theater caused owner's loss ofrevenue, in
breach of CDC's fiduciary duty to owner.
[3]Torts379<&^>213
379 Torts
379III Tortious Interference
319]Jl(B) Business or Contractual Relations
379IIKBM In General
379k213 k. Prospective Advantage,
Contract or Relations; Expectancy. Most Cited Cases
To nxxwer for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, plaintiff must show:
(1) that defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for
an improper purpose or by improper means, (3)
causing injury to plaintiff.

West Headnotes
14] Torts 379 € = 2 4 1
£U Appeal and Error 30 <£=?863
2Q Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVT(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k8fc> Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature ofDecision Appealed from

379 Torts
379III Tortious Interference
3791IKB) Business or Contractual Relations
379IIIfB)2 Particular Cases
379k241 k. Business Relations or Economic Advantage, in General. Most Cited Cases
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Failed movie theater owner failed to demonstrate
that certified development company (CDC) that assisted owner in opening his theater used improper
means in assisting rival movie theater's developmen t,
as required element of intentional interference with
prospective economic relations claim against CDC;
there was no evidence that CDC falsified or conceal ed
any information regarding rival theater from the Small
Business Administration (SBA) in assisting rival
theater in obtaining SBA loan, and federal regulation
prohibiting conflict ofinterest by CDC did not prohibit CDC from assisting owner's competitors. 13 C.F.R.
§ 120140(b).
*782 Allen K.Young. Young Kester & Petro, Provo,
and Jonah Orlofsky, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellants.

Lynn S, Paries, Michael P, Zaccheo, and Nathan S,
Morris. Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake
City, and Paul H. VanQyke, Elggren & Van Dyke,
Sandy, for Appellee.
Before BIT I .INGS P T DAVIS and ORMF. J.I.
OPINION
BILLINGS.Presiding Judge:
m
K1 Plaintiffs
appeal from the trial court's grant
of Defendant Greater Salt Lake Business District, dba
Deseret Certified Development Company's (Deseret)
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that
the trial court erred by ruling that the Plaintiffs failed
to raise triable issues of fact on their breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with prospective economic relations claims. We affirm.
FNL The named plaintiffs in this action are
Jon and Elizabeth Triesault and Raymon and
Stephanie Bori as individuals; Imagination
Theaters Inc., a corporation; and Imagination
Theaters Holdings, L.L.C. For ease of reference, we refer to the plaintiffs collectively
as either Triesault or Plaintiffs.
BACKGROUND

m

FN2. Because summary judgment was entered against Plaintiffs, we state the facts in a
light most favorable to them. See Harlinev.
Barter. 912 P.2d 433 415 (Utah 1996\

112 In 1991, Jon and Elizabeth Triesault moved to
Utah seeking a lifestyle change. The Triesaults joined
Raymon and Stephanie *783 Bori to pursue opening a
movie theater in Spanish Fork, Utah (the Spanish Fork
theater). They later formed two corporations, Imagination Theaters, Inc. and Imagination Theaters Holding, L.L.C. Mr. Triesault had a background in the
movie and television industry, but had no prior experience in opening or owning a movie theater.
U 3 Triesault sought financing for the Spanish
Fork theater with various banks. Triesault was unable
to obtain conventional financing, so he hired Deseret,
a certified development company (CDC), to help him
through the process of obtaining a Small Business
Administration (SBA) backed loan. Deseret was the
only CDC the SBA authorized to operate in the area at
that time. Triesault first met Mr. Vanchiere, a
vice-president of Deseret, at Zions Bank in Provo,
Utah. Triesault presented his business plan to bank
officials for the purpose of obtaining advice and ultimately, financing for the theater. Immediately after
the meeting, Vanchiere introduced himself to Triesault and said, "I don't think you're going to get anywhere with the bank. But I like your idea and I ca n
help you get a[n] SBA loan. And I can also help you
get a bank that would also partially fimdyour project."

FN3. Triesault was to apply under the Section 504 loan program, which provides
long-term permanent financing for small
businesses. The financing typically involves
a package with three components: the borrower contributes 10%, a private bank loans
50%, and a CDC loans the remaining 40%.
The CDCs loan is funded by debentures that
are backed by a 100% SBA guarantee. There
is a complex application process involved in
securing the SBA's approval for a Section
504 loan. After submitting the application,
the SBA grants preliminary approval. After
preliminary approval, the applicant must
meet all ofthe conditions for final approval.
After final approval, the applicant must continue to meet all of the SBA's requirements
on an ongoing basis.
H 4 Vanchiere first worked with Triesault on the
business plan for the Spanish Fork theater. Specifi -
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cally, Triesault and Vanchiere discussed that 10,000
people per movie screen was a generally accepted
number used to determine the economic viability of
rural movie theaters. The planned Spanish Fork theater would have eight screens, and the target market
was from southern Provo to south ofNephi, Utah, an
area that included approximately 80,000 people. m
FN4. Deseret contends that "the evidence
does not reflect that Vanchiere and ... Plaintifls ever reached [the] conclusion [that the
target market was from southern Provo to
south of Nephi] together, or that Triesault's
opinion about the geographical market was
accurate."
H 5 Vanchiere provided Triesault with all of the
necessary SBA application documents and provided
assistance in filling them out. Those documents included the loan applications, personal financial
statements, business plans, and individual resumes.
After completing the necessary paperwork, Vanchiere
and Deseret reviewed the application to decide if it
would likely meet the SBA's criteria. Once Deseret
decided the application would likely be acceptable, it
submitted the application to the SBA. From this point
onward, all communications with the SBA were handled for Triesault by Deseret.
K 6 After obtaining the necessary preliminary
approval from the SBA, Vanchiere helped Triesault
with the Spanish Fork theater's construction. At one
point during construction, Triesault exceeded the
theater's budget and Vanchiere advised Triesault on
how to cut costs. Vanchiere continued to monitor the
costs of the theater's construction, and he repeatedly
discussed the construction project and costs with the
builder himself. The Spanish Fork theater opened on
November 26,1997, as a "second-run" theater.
If 7 On or about May 27, 1998, the SBA backed
financing closed. At closing, Vanchiere presented
Triesault with a stack of documents and said that
because Triesault trusted him, he did not need to read
any ofthe documents. Triesault agreed and signed the
documents withoutreviewingthem.
1f 8 Subsequent to the loan closing, Vanchiere visited the Spanish Fork theater an average of two
weekends per month. During his visits, Vanchiere and
Triesault discussed various aspects of the Spanish

Fork theaters business, including what should be
served at the concessions stand, what movies should
be shov/n, and whether the theater should show
first-run rather than second-run movies. *784 Triesault provided Vanchiere with confidential information regarding how the Spanish Fork theater's business
was doing. Although Vanchiere was involved in numerous meetings, he made no specific decisions with
regard to equipment selection, architectural plans, or
construction, and made no specific representation that
he had expertise in the movie theater business.
H 9 After nine months of operating as a
second-run movie theater without any profits, Triesault decided to show onlyfirst-runfilms.By the end
of 1999, the Spanish Fork theater was consistently
turning a profit. Around that same time, Deseret was
working on a possible Section 504 loan package for a
group of investors that sought to open a theater in
Payson (the Payson theater), which is about ten miles
away and within the target market area ofthe Spanish
Fork theater. The Payson theater's appraisal report,
which was part of its business plan, noted that twelve
other movie screens were then located in southern
Utah County, including the Spanish Fork theater and
three older single-screen theaters. The appraisal concluded that with the addition of the Payson theater,
there would be fifteen first-run screens in southern
Utah County, although "[ajccording to various
sources, there [was] one other movie theater development in the pipeline for Utah County. This [was]
located in south Provo [the Cinemark 16 Provo Town
Centre Theater]." Moreover, the appraisal provided:
At first glance it appears that there may not be sufficient demand or population for the proposed
[Payson] theater; however, it should be noticed that
a new project which is superior to existing supply
frequently takes away market share from the existing supply-and in effect, makes the older projects no
longer feasible, rather than the newer project. In the
case of the [Payson theater] subject property, it will
be the only theater in this market with stadium
seating and all THX sound system. Given this fact,
it is reasonable that the [Payson theater] subject
property will be able to attract more than its "fair
share."
110 The Payson theater opened in 2000. After its
opening, the Spanish Fork theater never again showed
a profit. Thefinancialfiguresshow that for the twelve
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months prior to the Pay son theater's opening, the
Spanish Fork theater's revenues were about two million dollars, but for the twelve months after the
opening, revenues fell to 1.4 million dollars. By 2002,
Triesault filed for bankruptcy, and as a result, Triesault lost his 1.5 million dollar personal investment.
If 11 Deseret's theater expert, Tony Rudman,
opined that a variety of market factors contributed to
the Spanish Fork theater's failure, particularly the
opening of the Provo Cinemark 16 Theaters, the
project earlier said to be in the pipeline. Moreover,
Rudman testified that there was no way of knowing
whether the establishment ofthe Payson theater con tributed to the failure of the Spanish Fork theater.
Triesault did not submit any expert testimony tending
to show that the opening of the Payson theater caused
the decline in revenue ofthe Spanish Fork theater.
If 12 Triesault filed suit against Deseret alleging
breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with
prospective economic relations, breach ofthe duty of
good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Ultimately, the lower court
granted Deseret's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed all of Triesault's claims. Triesault now appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[XI 1f 13 Triesault argues that the trial court erred
by granting Deseret's motion for summary judgment
and ruling that Triesault failed to raise a triable issue
of material fact on his breach of fiduciary duty and
intentional interference with prospective economic
relations claims. "In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party." Harlinev. Barker. 912 P.2d
433, 435 (Utah 1996^ (quotations and citations omitted). "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at
42& (quotations and citations omitted). Whether a
party is entitled to summary judgment is a *785
question of law, therefore "we accord no deference to
the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented." Id.
ANALYSIS —
FN5. We do not reach the issue of whether

©2011 Thomson Reuters. No

Deseret owed Triesault a fiduciary duty as
we affirm on the basis ofno causation.
I. Causation
121 Tf 14 The trial court concluded there was no
record evidence from which a reasonable juror could
conclude that the opening ofthe Payson theater caused
Triesault's loss. We agree. Utah courts have held that
summary judgment on the issue of causation is appropriate, "[notwithstanding the general rule" that
causation is a jury issue, when the plaintiff cannot
"show that a jury could conclude, without speculation," that the injury would not have occurred but for
the defendant's breach. Thurston v. \Abrkers Corrp.
Fund. 2003 UT App 438.HH 12-16. 83 P.3d 391: see
also Harlinev. Barker. 912 P2d 433. 439«Jtah 1996^
("[P]roximate cause issues can be decided as a matter
of law ... when the proximate cause of an injury is left
to speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of
law."). Moreover, this court has affirmed summary
judgment when the trial court found "the jurors would
have had to engage in rank speculation to reach a
verdict" regarding causation. Park v. Farmers Ins.
Exch.. 893 P2d 598r 600-01 fUtah QApp.1995^
(quotations omitted).
^| 15 Triesault argues that Deseret's assistance to
the Payson theater caused his loss. However, this
claim is based simply on the timing ofthe opening of
the Payson theater and the coincidental drop in rev enues at the Spanish Fork theater. As a result, Triesault's claim would require ajury to engage in "rank
speculation to reach a verdict" on causation. Id. at 600.
If 16 Deseret submitted expert testimony that the
Spanish Fork theater could have railed due to any
number of factors-including movie selection and the
opening of the Cinemark 16 Provo Town Centre
Theater. Triesault did not present any evidence tending to support his claim that the opening ofthe Payson
theater caused the decline in revenue of the Spanish
Fork theater. Sse Stireiter v. Wasatch Manor. Inc..
871 P2H 570 574 (Utah Q App 1994^ (stating expert
testimony is required to establish causation unless "the
propriety of the defendant's action is within the
common knowledge and experience of the layman"
(quotations and citation omitted)). Whether the
Spanish Fork theater declined due to the Payson
theater's existence is not something "within the
common knowledge and experience of the layman."
Id. Thus, Triesault has not convinced this court that

toOrig.USGov. Works.
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there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether
Deseret's actions caused Triesault's injuries, and we
therefore affirm the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on Triesault's breach of fiduciary duty
claim.
II. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic
Relations
X3J If 17 Triesault next contends that the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment because there
was a triable issue ofmaterial fact as to whether Deseret intentionally interfered with Triesault's prospective economic relations. To recover for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations,
Triesault must show "(1) that [Deseret] intentionally
interfered with [Triesault's] existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by
improper means, (3) causing injury to [Triesault]."
Leah Furniture & Carpet Co. v.lsom 657P.2d 293.
304 (Utah 1982V Triesault argues that Deseret's
promotion of the Payson theater interfered with Triesault's existing and potential economic relations with
its movie patrons. Triesault further alleges this was
intentional because the business plan for the Payson
theater intended to succeed by luring away Triesault's
customers.
J4J U 18 First, Triesault argues that Deseret engaged in improper means by interfering with Triesault's economic relations with the Spanish Fork
theater customers because Deseret engaged in "decei t
or misrepresentation." Id. at 308 (quotations and citation omitted). Triesault contends that Deseret *786
deceived the SBA into providing financing to the
Payson theater that would allegedly cause the destruction ofthe Spanish Fork theater. Triesault argues
that the Payson theater's business plan appraisal report
depended upon taking significant numbers of Triesault's customers and making the Spanish Fork
theater "no longer feasible." Moreover, because the
"SBA's program is designed to foster successful
businesses," Triesault argues that Deseret used improper means by seeking SBA approval when it had an
alleged conflict ofinterest. However, there was simply
no evidence before the trial court that Deseret falsified
or concealed information from the SBA. Thus, the trial
court properly concluded that the appraisal was insufficient to create an issue ofmaterial fact that could
justify afindingofdeceit or misrepresenta tion.

improper means because it "violated] an establishe d
standard ofa trade orprofession." Id. (quotations and
citation omitted). Triesault cites to the Code ofFederal
Regulations which states that a CDC may not "[h]ave
a real or apparent conflict of interest with a small
business with which it is dealing (including any of its
Associates or an Associate's Close Relatives) or
SBA." 13C.F.R S 120.140(b) (2005). However, the
Code does not define what a conflict is, and the broad
reading argued by Triesault is unrealistic under the
process provided by the SBA for a Section 504 loan.
Thus, we agree with the trial court's determination that
Deseret did not engage in improper means as a matter
oflaw.
CONCLUSION
f 20 Triesault has tailed to convince this court
that the trial court erred by granting Deseret's motion
for summary judgment. We determine, as a matter of
law, that there are no triable issues ofmaterial tact and
that the trial court did not err in so ruling. Accordingly, we affirm.
1 21 WE CONCUR: JAMES 7 DAVIS and GREGORY K. ORME. Judges.
Utah App.,2005.
Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Business Dist.
126 P.3d 781, 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 69,2005 UT App
489
ENDOFEK3CUMENT

If 19 Triesault next argues that Deseret engaged in

©2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Z.VJ \£.)

UCIIIIIC U C I U C I

- U I Q l i\ v . i u i i i i u i v i

Wfestlawt
Page 1
893 P.2d 598
(Cite as: 893 P2d 598)

Cases
(Fonnerly 272kl)
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Bradley M. CLARK, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE; Darin G.
Woolstenhulme; Donald S. Colovich; and Jennifer
MacArthur, Defendants and Appellees.

Prima facie case ofnegligence requires showing
of (1) duty ofreasonable care extending to plaint iff;
(2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and actual causation of injury; and (4) damages suffered by plaintiff.
131 Damages 115 <€=>185(1)

No. 940446-CA.
March 28, 1995.
Passenger injured in complex multivehicle accident brought action against various drivers involved in
accident. The Fourth District Court, Utah County,
Lynn W.Davis, J., granted summary judgment to all
drivers, and passenger appealed. The Court of Appeals, DavisT Associate PJ., held that no evidence
established that passenger's injuries were proximately
caused by conduct of any drivers sued.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
HJ Appeal and Error 30 €=842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XYT Review
3QXWA^ Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
20k83&Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
2QkM20)k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
As question of law, entitlement to summary
judgment is reviewed for correctness. Rules Civ.Proa.
Rule 56(c).
[21 Negligence 272 C*=?202
222 Negligence
2221 In General
222k2Q2 k. Elements in General. Most Cited

115 Damages
115IX Evidence
115k183 Weight and Sufficiency
115k 185 Personal Injuries and Physical
Suffering
115W185(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Evidence 157 <Cs»571 (9)
157 Evidence
157X11 Opinion Evidence
157XTVR Effect of Opinion Evidence
157k569 Testimony of Experts
H M Z 1 Nature of Subject
157k57U9>)k. Cause and Effect. Most
Cited Cases
In personal injury action arising out of complex
multivehicle accident, no evidence established that
one passenger's injuries were caused by conduct of
any driver named as defendant; passenger himself did
not recall how he was injured, and passenger's own
expert testified at deposition that he would be unable
to determine mechanism of passenger's injuries
without speculating or guessing.
*599 Tames G Clark T Provo. for appellant.
Richard K. Spratlev . Salt Lake City, for appellee Colovich.
Michel P Zarehen. Salt Lake City, for appellee
Woolstenhulme.
Robert L Jeffs Provo. for appellees Farmers Ins. and
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MacArthur.
Before DAVIS. JACKSON. and WILKINS. JJ.
OPINION
DAYIS., Associate Presiding Judge:
Bradley M.Clark appeals from the district court's
grant of summary judgment to defendants Darin G.
Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich, Fanners Insurance Exchange,— and Jennifer MacArthur. — The
trial court ruled that because the proximate cause of
Clark's injuries was unknown and purely speculative,
Clark's negligence claim failed as a matter of law. We
affirm.
£NL Farmers Insurance Exchange is named
as a defendant based upon Jennifer MacArthur's insurance policy covering the acts of
uninsured motorists. As defined by statute,
John Doe # 1 was an uninsured motorist. See

Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305 (Supp.1994).
FN2. Defendants William H. King, Gordon
V. Holbrook, Marcus Gilbert, William T.
Hopkins, David Adamson, Rita M. Kennedy,
and the U.S. Forest Service settled or were
dismissed from the lawsuit in earlier stages
oflitigation.
FACTS
Clark was injured on December 10, 1989 as a
result of a complex multi-vehicle accident occurring
on the southbound Highway 89 overpass at its junction with 1-15 in Farmington City, Utah. It was approximately 8:40 p.m., and it had been snowing earlier
that day.
The series of accidents began when defendant
Marcus Gilbert hit black ice on the overpass, lost
control ofhis vehicle, and came to a halt, stalled in the
right lane oftraffic. Defendant Rita M. Kennedy next
approached the accident scene, swerved to the left to
avoid Gilbert's car, and also lostcontrol ofher vehicle.
Her vehicle struck the guardrail several times and
finally stopped in the roadway. Kennedy exited her
vehicle and jumped over the guardrail to the east to
avoid oncoming traffic.
The next vehicle to come upon the scene was an
unidentified semi-truck (John Doe # 1) approaching in

©2011 Thomson Reuters. No

the right lane oftraffic. John Doe # 1 veered quickly
from the right lane to the left lane to avoid striking the
stalled vehicles and proceeded down the road without
stopping When John Doe # 1 changed lanes precipitously, he or she cut off the vehicle driven by MacArthur, which was travelling in the left lane of traffic.
Clark was a passenger in the MacArthur vehicle.
MacArthur employed braking and turning maneuvers
to avoid impact with the semi-*600 truck, and in so
doing lost control of her car. The car came to rest
against the lefthand (east) guardrail feeing north toward oncoming traffic. At that point, no one in the
MacArthur vehicle was injured.
Gilbert crossed the road toward the MacArthur
vehicle, apologized, and said that his car was stalled
and he could not move it. Clark opened the door ofthe
MacArthur vehicle (on the oncoming traffic side, not
the guardrail side) to assist Gilbert in moving his car.
Shortly after Clark opened the rear passenger
door, another series of collisions occurred. First, defendant Woolstenhulme drove into the accident scene,
struck Gilbert, and struck the MacArthur and Kennedy
vehicles. Next, defendant Hopkins came to a stop in
the left lane just behind the stopped vehicles, but was
then bumped from the rear by defendant Adamson.
Adamson went on to strike the side of Woolstenhulme's track. Hopkins was next struck from the rear
by defendant Colovich, causing his vehicle to colli de
with the front ofMacArthur's vehicle.
At some point during this concatenation of
events, Clark "came flying over the guardrail" in
Kennedy's direction. Clark's knee and right hand were
injured, resulting in over $21,000 in medical expenses
and lost wages. No one saw Clark struck by any vehicle, nor is there any evidence explaining how he got
over the guardrail and down the embankment. Clark
has no memory ofthe accident after exiting the MacArthur vehicle.
Clark filed a complaint on April 17, 1991
sounding in negligence. In April of 1993, the trial
court granted summary judgment to defendants State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Farmers Insurance Exchange,2^ MacArthur, Colovich,
and Woolstenhulme. For the purpose of its ruling, the
court assumed these defendants were negligent.
However, title court determined that "no direct evidence exists on the issue of causation as to [these

toOrig. USGov. Works.
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defendants]." As a result, the court found that the
jurors would have to "engage in rank speculation to
reach a verdict" and that the "result would not be fair,
nor just, nor appropriate for any ofthe parties." Clark
appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the negligence of MacArthur, John Doe #
1, Woolstenhulme, and Colovich could not be proximately connected to his injuries.mL
FN3. Appellant contends that the trial court
granted summary judgment to Farmers Insurance Exchange "sua sponte." Farmers
Insurance Exchange joined defendant State
Farm Insurance's motion for summary
judgment at oral argument; thus the court's
order was not sua sponte.
FN4. Clark also appears to challenge the
appellees' and trial court's reliance on unpublished deposition testimony. However,
Clark has not argued that he made a contemporaneous objection to this reliance, nor
does the record reveal an objection. In the
absence of such an objection, we will not
reach Clark's challenge. See Brobera v. Hess.
782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App.1989) C
' [Cjontemporaneo us obj ection or some form
of specific preservation of claims of error
must be made apart of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such
claim on appeal.' ") (citation omitted).
Moreover, we note that this error appears to
have been invited in that Clark himself made
extensive reference to unpublished depositions in his objections to appellees' motions
for summary j udgment and even in the briefs
submitted to this court. "A party who leads a
court into error cannot later complain ofthat
error to obtain reversal." Merriam v. Merriam 799 P.2d 1172, 1175-76 (Utah
App,199Q).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate only when
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). As a question of law, entitlement to summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. K & T.lnc. v.Koroulis. 888 P2d 623. 627
(Utah 1994V " 'We determine only whether the trial
court erred in applying the governing law and whether

the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material feet.' " Id. (quoting F&TGe V.
Sate 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted)).
ANALYSIS
[21| 3] A prima facie case of negligence requires a
showing of: (1) a duty ofreasonable care extending to
plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and
actual causation of the injury; and (4) damages suffered by *601 plaintiff. Sflrgfy y. W?$atcn Manor,

foe, 871P,2d570, 573 (Utah App.) (citing Wdiamsv.
Mdbv. 699 P.2d 723. 726 (Utah 1985^. cert, denied,
879 P2d 266 (Utah 1994V Defendants concede, for
the limited purpose of summary judgment, that duty,
breach of that duty, and damages have been shown.
Thus, the issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs al legations can support a finding ofproximate causation as
to each defendant.
Proximate cause is generally defined as " 'that
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces
the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. It is the efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the
injury.' " Mitchell v. Pearson Enters. 697 P.2d 240.
246-47 (Utah 1985> (quoting gfle y Lawsqp 688
P.2d 479. 482 n. 3 (Utah 1984»: aooord Steffensen v.
Smith'sManagement Corp. 87.0 P3d 482 486 (Utah
App.l99n. affd, 862P,2d 1342 (Utah 1993).
The question of proximate causation "is generally
reserved for the jury." Seffensen. 820 P.2d at 486
(citing Godesky v. Prow City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541.
544 (Utah 1984^. Consequently, the trial court may
rule as a matter of law on this issue only if: "(1) there
is no evidence to establish a causal connection, thus
leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2) where
reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences
to be derived from the evidence on proximate causation." Steffensen. 820 P.2d at 487 (citing Ftobertsonv.
Sixpence Inns of Am. Inc.. 163 Ariz. 539 546. 789
P,2d 1040.1047(1990) (en banc)).
The trial court granted summary judgment to all
the defendants party to this appeal because "no direct
evidence exists on the issue of causation." ^ No one
saw how Clark was injured, and Clark does not know
how he was injured. Clark argues that the trial court's
conclusion is in error, citing the affidavits and depo-
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sition testimony of his accident reconstructionists.
However, as the trial court noted, "plaintiffs own
expert, Mr. Duvall, was asked in his deposition
whether he would be able to detennine the mechanism
of plaintiffs injury without speculating or guessing.
His response was 'no.' "When the other expert witness, David C. Stephens, was pressed to identify the
vehicle that may have struck Clark, he responded, "I'm
not certain. I can't say for sure." Moreover, Steph ens
testified in his deposition that "the tacts of this total
accident are so vague and unidentifiable that it is really hard to be precise in coming to any conclusion
because there's nothing to be precise-these's no precise
data on which to draw those conclusions."

Due to Clark's failure to make a prima facie
showing of facts demonstrating the existence of
proximate causation, his case fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment.
JACKSON and W1LKINS . JJ., concur.
Utah App.,1995.
Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
893 P.2d 598
END OF DOCUMENT

FN5. The trial court recognized that "[i]f
reasonable inferences can be drawn from the
evidence, then the matter should be put to the
factfinder." See Lindsay v. Gibbons and
fag/, 497 P,2d 28, 31 (Utah 1972) (noting
that jurors may "make justifiable inferences
from circumstantial evidence to find negligence or proximate cause"). However, the
court concluded that any evidence of causation would necessarily be the product of
speculation, and thejury would have no basis
for drawing inferences as to what occurred.
In light of the complete absence of evidence on
causation, the trial court correctly granted defendants'
motions for summary judgment. Clark has not met his
burden to establish a prima facie case of negligence.JMmii 'When the proximate cause of an injury is
left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law.' "
Mitchell. 697 P.2d at 246 (quoting StaheJi v. Farmers'
Co-op ofS Utah 655 P3ri 680 684 (Utah 1982))FN6. Plaintiff has neither raised nor briefed
the issue of the propriety of shifting the
burden ofproof to defendants, either before
the trial court or this court. See Summers v.
TIPS 33 Cai.2d 80. 199 P.2d 1 (1948): Vahev
V.StQQ, 126Cd,App,3d 171 178 Cal.Rptr.
559. 564 (App.l98U: Restatement (Second)
Torts § 433B (1965). Accordingly, we also
decline to address it. See Ret herford v. AT &
T Communications. 844 P2ri 949 965 n 8
(Utah 1992): Sokes v. Board of Review. 832
P.2d56.60n .2 (Utah App 19921
CONCLUSION
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW

July 29, 2011

Honorable Anthony Quinn
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1860
Re:

Breton v. Clyde, Snow & Sessions
Case No. 090919546

Dear Judge Quinn:
This is my response to defense counsel's submittal of various citations to my client Neil
Breton's deposition transcript, with attached exhibits and three cases. I have no complamt about
the cases, nor do I have any complaint about the three attached deposition exhibits. I do think the
deposition citations not only go far beyond what Mr. Wheeler offered to provide to the court at
Wednesday's hearing. In addition, contrary to what is stated in Mr. Call's Wednesday July 27
letter to you, I do not believe the cited transcript sections support the defense claim that Mr.
Breton "was skeptical that the Slater Brothers would sign releases at the time he and his two
siblings released funds to the 12 grandchildren."
As is so often the case, when deposition transcript citations are cited, context is key. So,
like when one party wants to use some deposition testimony at trial and the other party reviews
the proposed citations and adds additional citations, I would like the court to read the following
cited sections, to give context and clarity to those sections cited by the defense. I have attached
to this email letter those transcript sections.
The defense has seven cited sections, I will respond seriatim:
1. Please read also p.121 1. 20- p.1221. 13
2. Please read also p.123 1. 14- p.1261. 25 (the "futility" the defense references Mr.
Breton describing refers to an overall resolution of the family schism, not the releases)
3. Please read also p. 1871. 12 - p. 1881. 18
4. Please read also p. 222 L 11 - p. 223 1. 11
5. ok
6. ok
7. Please read also p. 2691. 3 - p. 270 1. 15 (defendants' failure to advise Neil NOT to
distribute until all grandchildren signed)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In addition, please read the following:
p. 2511. 22 - p. 252 1. 3 (Neil was prepared to hold the Slater Brothers' dollars
indefinitely while Willie kept talking to them)
p. 258 1. 9 - p. 2591. 6 (as to why Neil did not accept the Slater Brothers' counteroffer, or
make a different counteroffer of more than $24,000)
Thank you for your consideration of these additional transcript citations, attached.

Very truly yours,
Q&ENBEIJG ^GILCHRIST

JRO/cm
cc:
Keith Call(via email)
Marianad@email.utcourts.gov
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Page 121

i
I
I
I
I
i

1

lawyer, and I said, "Well/I know somebody in Utah,

2

and since you both don't live in this country, let me

3
4
5

talk to Hal and see" ~ "explain to him the situation
and see if he can put together a document that you
can present to Rhonda and her children, and if they

6

accept it, we'll reach a settlement If they don't,

7

then we'll have spent money on a document that wont

8

go anywhere."

9
10
11
12

Q I think you said "at the insistence of your
brother and sisters."
A Right
Q Plural.

13

A

14

Q Was Rhonda insisting -

15
16

17
18

Thafs correct.

A No, no. I meant brother and sister.
Jana -

Q Sister?
A

Yeah. Rhonda had nothing to do with this.

19
20
21
22

It was Willie and Jana.
Q And you said there was a family dispute
that was kind of the catalyst for this decision.
What was that dispute?

23
24
25

A Well, party - a few things. One, my
mother - you know, my mother, who we were all very
close to, was really being torn apart by the fact

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

that her family was not speaking for years, and my
nephews and I - my sister had accumulated eight
years of birthday presents that we'd mailed them and
sent them all back. It was just - it was just a
real family mess that wasn't going anywhere. We
weren't going to resolve anything.
Jana had a relationship with Rhonda, but it
was strained. Willie occasionally spoke to Rhonda.
I didn't speak to anybody in the Slater family, nor
were they allowed to speak to me or any of my kids.
They disowned all my kids. My daughters, who were
very close to their aunt, were basically, you know,
removed from any family communications.
And so it was probably partly my mother
requesting we try to make a settlement. I know I had
a meeting at my - with my mom and my aunt, with
Rhonda actually there, sometime years earlier, and
she was crying about, "Why can't we all get this
worked out?" And I, of course, explained that her
husband is a problem that we can't resolve and work
around. And then, of course, my mother was never
allowed back In her house, and it just became a
really ongoing ugly and uglier family issue that this was an attempt - 1 thought it was futile, but
Jana and Willie offered to try to negotiate, once

1
2

again, after severalfelledattempts at global
settlement, and I said, 'look, you two trustees -

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

I'm only one vote. If the two of you can negotiate a
deal that satisfies everybody, I'm willing to give up
the judgment," which is a huge gift. That's a
quarter million dollars more than anybody else got or
was entitled to, and the judgment was still valid. I
said, "That's what I'll give up, but I'm not engaging
in any communications or writing any letters, talking
to anybody. You negotiate it, you make the deal, and
if you make a deal, Til go to a lawyer and have it
papered," and that's what I did, given the assurance
that they had made a deal.
Q Okay. So, as I understand what you're
saying, is that this is a general good faith attempt

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

by you to settle the family feud that has been going
on for years, correct?
A It was an attempt by all - yes, all of us,
to - all the parties,
Q And who was it that came up with the idea
that, "Well, let's pay each of the grandchildren some
money and see if that takes care of the problem"?

23
24

A Jana. Jana was aware that I put money
aside in a personal account - in this account,

25

actually. It was my money. It was about -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
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MR.ORITT: "This account," you're
referring to Exhibit 11?
TOE
WITNESS: This account, the Exhibit 11
account. I had put money in this account It was
strictly collecting interest and taking care of some
legal bills and tax returns that had to be filed when
they were filed on behalf of Breton before it finally
closed, and this was money that was - that I
intended, personally, to give to the grandchildren to
honor my father's request, even though it wasnt a
million dollars. It was about - a little over a
quarter million dollars, and if you include the
judgment, it was over a half a million dollars. It
was close to 600,000 if the judgment had been paid,
so, again, even though it wasn't the full million
dollars, it was my attempt to try to honor my
father's wishes.
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18

19
20
21

Q

(BY MR. WHEELER) So it was Jana that

suggested that, "Why dont you take that money and
give" — "divide it up among the grandchildren"?
A

Right. Yes.

22
23
24

Q And so did you agree with her that that was
something you would do?
A I actually didn't agree with her. I told

25

her that, "I have no obligation to do anything until
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THE WITNESS: It was before the Clyde Snow.
Then 1 met with Hal and specifically discussed with
Hal, and maybe even showed him - 1 don't recall if I
showed him some of the letters that had been sent
back and forth about what Willie was attempting to

6

do, and 3ana was trying to make family peace, and

Page 125

1 the youngest child is 25 years old." At the time,
2 the youngest child was eight or nine, or even
3 younger, maybe five or six, so I had no incentive 4 I had less than zero incentive, actually, to do
5 anything. I had no obligation to do anything.
6
But Jana was in financial difficulties and,
7 as a favor, asked if I would consider this. She
8 spoke to Willie, who agreed, although Willie was
9 financially very comfortable, didn't need the - did
10 not, nor did his children, need the money, nor did my
11 children need the money, and, as far as I knew, the
12 Slater children had inherited a lot of money from
13 their grandparents, didnt need the money.
14
But 3ana needed some money to buy a home or
15 a down payment on a home and asked if I'd help her,
16 and I said I would personally loan her the money,
17 rather than get into this, because I thought this was
18 a serious problem to try to resolve, and, of course,
19 I made a mistake of accepting Willie's and her
20 opinion, and tried to protect myself in terms of
21 having an agreement that I was insisting, as best I
22 could, in any way I could, that I would be protected,
23 as well as the other trustees, and thafs really the
24 genesis of this lawsuit, that I was not protected.
25
Q Okay. Who came up with the $24,000 number?

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

those things were all ongoing, and, really, the fight
was really with Mark and me. It really wasnt about
the grandkids or anybody else. It was really Mark
Slater, almost from day one.
And so I reluctantly agreed that if we can
get a document that everybody signs and everybody
agrees to, that we would move forward and all of us
can go on with our lives.
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) And that was the only
impetus to do something, was to try to solve the
family dispute?
A The only reason.
Q Let me show you the next exhibit, 3719,
Exhibit 12.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 12 was
marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) You have in front of you
Exhibit 12 to your deposition, which purports to be a
letter from Breton Slater dated May 18,1998,
Page 128
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1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

A That was the amount of money divided by 15
grandchildren. It was $360,000, more or less, and if
you multiply it times 15, you'll get 360.
Q And so Willie and 3ana were pressing you to
go along with this arrangement, correct?
A They were negotiating with Rhonda and
getting assurances, verbal, that Rhonda wanted this
behind her and demanded that the judgment - at first

9

Rhonda wanted only us to sign releases but that she

9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

did not want to sigh a mutual release to release any
of us, which, of course, was absurd and typical of
her, even though I offered the judgment.
So it stalled for months while Willie and
3ana kept trying to resurrect it, and I just stood
back and watched documents flying back and forth
between the three of them. And finally when MR. ORTTT: Let me interrupt just to
clarify. Time frame-wise, are you talking about
before going to Clyde Snow or after, when you say THE WITNESS: Well, no. This was before I
went to Clyde Snow, and then I went to Clyde Snow
when we MR. ORITT: Well, stop, then. You can go

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

24

back to where you were. As long as it's before Clyde

25

Snow.

2

addressed to both you and Willie and Jana.
A Yes.

3
4
5
6
7

Q And it's signed by Bret. Do you remember
receiving this?
A Yes.
Q Now, this was received prior to your
decision to pay any money to the grandchildren,

8

correct?

21

22
23
24
25

A

Yes.

Q And he is essentially asking if you will
advance money from the trust to help him with his
education?
A That's correct.
Q And you respond, in the next exhibit, 3718.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 13 was
marked for identificationO
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Do you remember writing
that letter?
A Yes.
Q Was this sent by fax to him?
A Yes,

Q And it is in response to the prior exhibit
that we looked at, correct?
A That is correct.
MR. CALL: This is Exhibit 13. I don't
33 (Pages 125 to 128)
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1
2

A Orally.
Q And -

1

times at a family function.

2

Q Did you t e l l -

3

A

3

As I recall, it was orally, but I don't

4
5

recall the documents that were written.
Q Tell me, as best as you can recall, what

6

you told Mr. Swenson you wanted in the letter.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5
.6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16

A Initially I think it was Mr. Swenson, and
then I think at one point it became Mr. Wiese, but I
think - if I - and I'm assuming this is to
Mr. Swenson - that I brought him up to speed with
the family history, I brought him up to speed, I
think in great detail, because he explained that in
his own deposition, that he understood there was —
he hated my guts, or some term, I think, some phrase
that Hal referred to, that there was serious - he
understood, Hal did, that there was serious problems
between Mark Slater and myself and that Willie and
Jana had been negotiating, for the umpteenth time, to
try to find a global settlement, and in Jana's case,
as I spoke to you and answered your question earlier,
she specifically needed the money, so when she said
everybody needed it, she was being a little generous
with the fads. She was specifically the only one
that needed money.
I tried to accommodate her. As I said,
Page 186
offered her - to loan her the money, but she thought
if we just distributed the money and ended all of
this, she got indication from Rhonda that's what they
all wanted, was a global settlement, and I was very
leery, but when I met with Hal, I was very dear
about, "I have no obligation to do this. I'm not
even sure that it will get settled, but if we do it,
it's got to be something that all of the trustees are
protected. There are no repercussions."
Hal acknowledged that, understood that, and
referred to it as "the all or nothing clause," which
was critical, totally critical for me to be involved
in any of this transaction. And, unfortunately,
whatever Hal's best efforts were, he didnt
accomplish that goal, and I ended up in a lawsuit.

Q Okay. Tell me exactly how you transmitted

17

the information concerning your family feud to

18

Mr. Swenson or Mr. Wiese.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A Just that there had been years of threats
of litigation/1 think I maybe even produced some
documents. I don't know if I did or I didn't. Some
of the letters that I'd seen or gotten. But I made
it crystal clear, to use an old expression, that
there was about as bad of blood between our families
as there could be. Mark threatened to kill me three

A

I told my lawyers. Yeah, of course, I told

4
5
6
7
8

my lawyers. And they said, "What? Are you going to
sue him about that?" I also had him - my mother, in
a written request, asked him not to be at the
funeral, and he came with his own lawyer. Carrie to
her funeral and made a big scene in front of 400

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

people.
Q And this is all information you've
transmitted to the - A No, no. I'm just - no. I'm just sharing
this with you right now. The information I told Hal
was that there was bad blood and there was a lot of
bad blood, and some before this lawsuit and some
after, but the majority of it, 90 percent of it,
happened before their letters and their lawsuit, and
Hal was abundantly aware that this had to be an
agreement that was bulletproof, airtight, and that
everybody was protected.
That was the only charge I asked him.
However he figured out how to do it, he would do it.
I don't know who he conferred with, didn't confer
with, but he and I had a very clear understanding,
both of us, and he admitted that in his testimony,

1
2
3

4
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that that was his responsibility, did not advise me
to go talk to somebody else, that he would take care
of it, and that is why we're sitting here today.

Q But the question that I asked you is, what

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

was the format by which this information was
transmitted?
A I just told you. I said I told him
verbally that whatever document he drafted would be a
global agreement, a global settlement, that Rhonda
and Mark had a special situation that they were going
to get released of a judgment, which nobody else got
the benefit of. That was okay with me. That was
going to be in writing. And that everybody would be
sent this agreement and that everybody would either
sign it or there would be no agreement, as far as I
was concerned, and that I had no obligation to do
anything further till sometime in the year 2024,

18
19
20
21

so Q Can you identify with specificity any
document that you gave to anybody at Clyde Snow &
Sessions that portrayed this family feud that you're

22
23
24
25

describing to us?
A I dont know if I could - Hal already
testified that he knew about it, and so did Matt,
and -

I
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A Yeah. I j u s t Q — the Clyde Snow lawyers gave you by draft
form?
A Yeah. I just don't think we would have
drafted this, but that?s all right. We signed it.
Q I'm not suggesting you drafted it. I'm
suggesting that the lawyers prepared it for your
signature.
A Yes.
Q That's your recollection?
A Yes.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 36 was
marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) But the letter that you
did sign, that you and Willie did sign in the last
exhibit, was prepared only after several drafts were
exchanged with you and Willie and the lawyers
received your comments, correct?
A That's what it appears to be, yes.
Q Exhibit 36 appears to be a letter from Matt
Wiese at Clyde Snow & Sessions, dated January the
4th, which, again, is a letter telling Rhonda that if
they don't sign and return the releases, that you're
going to proceed with giving the gifts to the other
grandchildren and leave out the Slaters; isn't that

Page 223

1
2
3
4
5

writing letters to Rhonda, saying, "Let's bury the
hatchet" — my words, not his — "and lets solve
this family dispute and sign off, and the money is
sitting in the account for you," and this goes on for
a long time, right?

6

A

7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

Yes, that's correct.

Q So these letters continue, and efforts by
Willie, in particular, continue to try to convince
Rhonda to get her kids to sign off? I s that fair?
.

A That's fair.

Q Thirty-eight, CSS.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 37 was
marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Exhibit 37 to your
deposition appears to be an e-mail — may have
been —
A It was a fax, maybe.
Q It may have been a fax. It's addressed to
you, correct?
A

Yes.

Q Is it from Willie?
A No. It's actually - well, It is from
Willie, but it's from - this says "MBreton," that he
was in town at my mom's.
Q I see. That's why the "MBreton" Page 224

Page 222

1

right?

1

A Yeah. He sent it from her machine.

c

2
Q Okay. So he's at your mom's place ~
3
A Right He's in the California ~3
Q Was this letter sent at your request?
4
Q
- which is the "MBreton909" address?
4
A This letter was probably the result of
5
A That's correct.
5 Matt, at this point, not receiving all the other 6
Q And he's sending it to you, and it says,
6 the three signed agreements and letting me know that
7 "Subject matter, the trust," and he's summarizing for
7 he hadn't received them, and I think we probably
8 you a conversation that he had with Rhonda the day
8 developed this letter together, just to let her know
9 before, correct?
9 that we hadn't received it yet, and that Matt drafted
10
A Yeah.
10 it and sent it out
11
Q And, in fact, it appears to be a verbatim
11
Q But the other letters that we've talked
12 transcript of the conversation? Is that what you
12 about earlier set a deadline at the end of December,
13 and obviously you had not received anything from the 13 understand?
14
A Well, I see the "R" and--yes. Again,
14 Slaters at that point, correct?
15 I - yes, that's what it looks like. Something to
15
A That is correct.
16 that effect
16
Q And so this is an extension of the
17
Q And, again, he apparently has recorded
17 deadline?
18 this, because he says, "Willie:" quote, "Rhonda, I am
18
A Yes.
19 going home tomorrow and wanted to know what's
19
Q Is that right?
20
happening with the letter you received." Rhonda
20
A Yes.
21
says,
"The kids aren't signing."
21
Q And so would it be fair to say that you and
A Right.
22 Willie are trying to persuade Rhonda to have her kids 22
23
Q "Willie: Did they read the letter?
23 sign off so this could be done?
24
"Rhpnda: I read them the letter, and since
24
A That's - 1 think that's fair to say, yes.
25 I am not signing off and the letter states 'all or
25
Q In fact, Willie became heavily involved in
2

A Yes.

J

57 (Pages 221 to 224)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
tr\r\*

\

»»""\rt

<i •* r»r»

Page 251

Page 249
A

Oh, okay.

MR. ORTTT: Which was the preceding
exhibit.
THE WITNESS: O h , okay. Oh,' oh. Right.
Okay. Yes, yes. Okay.
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) - "and have decided to
sign them. Please allow a few weeks till everything
falls in place."
A Yes.
Q So he's asking for paperwork?
MR. ORITT: Just so the record is clear,
that - what you just read is the - this is
Exhibit - we're looking at Exhibit 51, but what you
just read is also Exhibit 50.
MR. WHEELER: They're - it's overlapped.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. ORITT: S o - y e a h . Fifty-one is
showing the response.
MR. WHEELER: Oh, you're right. I read the
wrong part. If s the top part that's new.
THE WITNESS: Right.
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Yeah. And then he's
responding, saying, "Thanks for getting back to me."
A Right.
Q And basically agreeing to give him the
Page 250
documents.
A Exactly. That is correct.
Q 6643 BRE.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 52 was
marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Again, did you see this
correspondence that was taking place between Willie
and Bret?
A Yeah, I actually did, because - 1 was a
tittle frustrated. First of all, Rhonda said she
read it to ail the boys. Now they don't know
anything about the documents. Now they've got to
look at the documents. Then - you may have got the
letter that says they never got the documents; can we
resend them.

Q Yeah. We'll get to those later.
A Okay. Good. Good. Yeah, I see this one.
I remember this one.
Q Do you know if the papers they were
agreeing to sign were the papers prepared by Clyde
Snow?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Not the ones Willie's lawyer had
prepared?
: A As far as I know - well, Willie's lawyers

1

didn't have them signing. It had Rhonda and Mark,

2

only, signing.

3

Q 6642.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

19

(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 53 was
marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Do you recognize this?
It's not a very good copy, but it appears to be an
e-mail that was probably crinkled when it was copied.
A Yeah. I kind of remember seeing this one,
actually, as well.
Q Looks like Willie is getting a little
perturbed at this point
A Yes.
Q Is that your handwriting at the bottom?
A No. That's Willie's.
Q And he is basically saying, "Why are you
not signing? You've got everything."
A Right
Q And you agreed to sign?
A Yes.

Q 6641 ERE.
A He also gave me another extension to
September.
Q Yes. I'm assuming you agreed that you
would hold that money when he was giving these
Page 252
extensions?
A I was prepared to hold the money for indefinitely.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 54 was
marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Exhibit 54 is a receipt
and release, consent. Do you know if this document
is the same one prepared by Clyde Snow, the one he's
sending to Bret?
A It looks ~ yeah. Just - on the face of
it, it looks like the language and the format.
Q It's been retyped, it appears?
A Yeah. So I'd have to look at - if you
want me to look at the -

1

Q No, you don't need to do that
A But it's n o t - I don't t h i n k - I don't
think he created a new document I think he just
took the language and retyped it.

Q Let's go to 6638.

20
21

(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 55 was
marked for identification.)

22
23
24

Q (BY MR. WHEELER) This appears to be an
e-mail sent to both you and Willie.
A Yes.

25

i

Q

Do you know why suddenly you are included
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they waited till the day before to send this letter
out. I mean, they had months to make this request
and didn't.
I became fairly convinced that this was
just not going to happen. They were not - they had
some other scheme in mind. I told Willie, you know,
"The 24,000 is sitting there. It is theirs if
they'll agree to those terms that we've offered," but
I don't know what - under what guideline; I think .
they'd be entitled to a dollar more. They didn't do
anything more. They're not - there weren't any
favored children. They were the same one of 15. My
dad didnt even know nine of his grandkids, because
they were all born after he died, so I - 1 just
didn't - this wasn't going to satisfy them, either.
Q So you were convinced that this was an
unreasonable offer, to settle for $66,000?
A Well, at the time.
Q Uh-huh.
A I mean, you look back at, you know, what I
spent.
Q Of course, you were going to give them
24,000 each, so if you subtract what you were willing
to give them from what they offered to settle for, it
was not a lot of money, 126,000, if my —

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
.15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
; 23
; 24
' 25
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A Well, if you want to - 1 mean, no. Its a
lot of money for no reason, and - 1 mean, given what
I know today, after spending over a million dollars
in legal fees, they didn't get - they got 75 - they
got, you know, hardly even more than this.
Q But they did get 75, so they got more than
they offered to settle for?
A Yeah. They sued me for 4 million.
Q But, in any event, you didn't make a
counteroffer or —
A Yeah, we did. The 24. We told them the 24
was still on the table.
Q Okay. All you did was reiterate the first
offer and never —
A That was MR.ORITT: You've got to Q (BY MR. WHEELER) You never countered with
any halfway measure or something like that to see if
they'd take 50, for example, or something like that?
A No, because when Willie called them, their
last comments to them were, "We've decided we don't
want any of this blood money," not the 66, not the
24, not any of it, and they referred to it
specifically as "blood money," "and we want nothing
that Uncle Neil has his hands on," and so that kind

Page 259
1
2
3
4
5

of closed that door after a year of Q Now, is this a conversation that Willie
recounted?
A Willie recounted. They told this to
Willie, and they called it blood money, and they

6

don't want any money from anybody.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q 6637.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 56 was
marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Again, this appears to be
an e-mail to you — a cc to you.
A Right.
Q With Willie also on the address.
A Uh-huh.
Q Asking if you'd received his e-mail.
A Yes.
Q So apparently — this is the 21st of
September. The e-mail he sent was the —
A ' 14th.
Q -- 14th, so you had not communicated with
him or Willie had not communicated with him between
that period, correct?
A That's correct.
Q Lets go to 6756.
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 57 was
Page 260

1 marked for identification.)
2
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) I assume you remember
3 this letter.
4
A I do. Very well.
5
Q This is a letter from the Slater children's
6 lawyers.
7
A Uh-huh.
3
Q Essentially accusing you and the other
9 trustees of incompetence in handling the trust, and
10 worse, correct?
11
A Yes.
12
Q And so at this point, you knew that - your
13 suspicions were confirmed that they'd been talking to
14 lawyers about their cause of action against you?
15
A That's correct.
16
Q Did you retain California counsel once you
17 received this?
18
A Yes.
19
Q In fact, you talked to the lawyers at Clyde
20 Snow, who advised you that it would be better to get
21 California counsel?
22
A That's correct.
23
Q And, in fact, they gave you the names of
24 some lawyers, right?
25
A Matt, I recall specifically, looked up on
66 (Pages 257 to 260)
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Page 271 |
1
Maybe even your firm. So yeah, I was - 1 was b
2
(2
Well,
you
previously
testified
that
you
and
|
2
knew where to find them.
3
Willie
made
a
decision
to
distribute
the
money,
not
|
3
Q Earlier you said that the lawyers at Clyde
4
the
lawyers,
but
your
complaint
is
they
didn't
tell
j
4
Snow did not warn you, I think is the word you used.
5
you not to do it; is that right?
|
5
A Uh-huh.
6
A My complaint is they never said that, "By
|
I 6
Q Or did not properly advise you with respect
7
doing anything other than the all or nothing, you
|
7
to what was happening with the attempts to get the
leave yourself exposed to potentially a very" I
8
releases. Can you tell me what advice you think they 8
9
well, they didn't know how large the lawsuit would
1
9
should have given you?
10
be. Neither did I. But you left yourself exposed,
|
10
MR. ORITT: Object to the extent it calls
11
and that was - again, this was - I had no reason to
|
11 for a legal conclus on. You can go ahead.
12 do any of this consent, release, distribute money,
|
12
THE WITNESS: That, to the extent that they
13
any of that There was no time frame that - no gun
|
13 understood or knew the exposure that they were
14
to
my
head.
There
was
12
more
years
ahead
of
me,
and
1
14 putting me under by even suggesting to distribute any
15
so yeah, I'm a little upset
J
15 of the money when all the - when everything was 16
Q
Well,
let
me
ask
you
this:
At
the
time
you
1
16 everything spoke to an all-or-nothing arrangement,
17
and
Willie
decided
to
distribute
money
to
the
signing
J
17 and then when they were both deposed and neither one
18
grandchildren, you knew, did you not, that the
I
18 of them felt that, you know, they had any obligation
Slaters had not signed releases?
|
19 to tell me or to contact the California lawyer to see
i 19
20
A At that time, I knew they had not signed
|
20
if maybe they should have gotten other advice
21 the releases.
|
21 concerned me greatly, because I wasn't - obviously I
22
Q And you knew that, without them signing
|
22 wasn't protected, and I was sued, and so the one
23
those releases, that they were free to sue you?
|
23 thing I asked of them didn't turn out the way that I
24
A I didnt focus on that at the time, but I
1 24 was led to believe it was going to turn out.
25
yes, apparently they would be free to sue me, as they
J
25
And they could have easily said, 'You cant
Page 269

1

have to return those funds, but, at the moment, we

b
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
i 8
9
10
Ill
12
113
14
J15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

distribute any money to anybody until everybody
11
2
signs," and that would have been the end of the
3
story. I'd have been a million dollars richer, w e
4
wouldn't all be sitting here, and thaf s not what
5
happened.
6
Q Okay. So one piece of advice that they
didn't give you that you think they should have is 7
8
that they should have told you not to make any
9
distributions unless everybody signed?
10
A Absolutely.
11
Q A n y other advice you think they failed to
12
give you?
13
A Well, that was a pretty critical piece of
14
advice I could have used, because, without
15
everybody's signature, I guess there would have been
16
no basis for a lawsuit, so I think that - that might
17
be the most critical component There may be - you
18
know, I had a relationship with Hal. I didn't really
19
have much of a relationship with Matt I just met
20
him during the - you know, when this turned over 21
was turned over to him, and came later to find out,
22
you know, that neither one of them had a lot o f
23
experience in litigation law, which it would have
24
been helpful If they'd have consulted with somebody
25
that actually did have experience in that area.

Page 272 |

did.

I

Q Well, common sense tells you that if they
haven't signed a release, there's nothing to stop
them from suing you, correct?
A If that's their intention, yes.
Q And so at the time you made the
distribution, you had to know, from your experience,
that you still had exposure from the Slaters?

I
i
i
|
|
|
[|

A There's a couple of attorney-client things
that I'd l i k e MR. ORITT: Which you're not going to speak

|
i
|

to.

1

THE WITNESS: Which I'm not going to speak
to about that, so Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Well, common sense tells
you that if you don't have a release — and with your
business background, you knew that without a release,
you were not protected from suit from the Slaters,
correct?
A Not entirely. I think there was a couple
other provisions in the will that prevented them from
suing me, but that didnt come up in litigation at
the time.
Q But you did know there were no releases
signed by the Slaters, and you knew, at the time you

1
1
1
j
j
]
|
1
|j
1
t
1
[
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July 27,2011

Honorable Anthony Quinn
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1860
Re:

Breton v, Clyde, Snow & Sessions
Case No. 090919546

Dear Judge Quinn:
I just received an e-mail copy of the letter Defendants' counsel in the above-referenced
case sent you along with the three cases they promised you at the hearing this afternoon, the
transcript from my client's deposition for the cited pages and their letter, and three additional
exhibits. It seems to me this is far more than Mr. Wheeler suggested he would be sending you.
Indeed, other than the citations from my client's deposition, which I believe exceed what Mr.
Wheeler promised you at the hearing this afternoon, the additional exhibits that counsel attached
should either have been included as part of their initial memorandum or reply memorandum. In
effect, I believe this is supplemental briefing.
Unfortunately, because of a hearing I have in Summit County on July 28,2011 and a
lengthy meeting Friday, July 29,201131 will not be able to check the citations until mid-day
Friday, July 29. At that time I will send another e-mail if I believe the citations do not represent
what they are cited for.
Very truly yours,
QSENBERQ & QLCHRIST ...

JRO/cm
cc:
Keith Call
Marianad@,email,utcourts. gov
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RECEIPT AND RELEASE, AND CONSENT
TO TERMINATION OF TRUST BY SWORN STATEMENT
The undersigned, NICHOLAS QUINN BRETON, as a beneficiary of the
testamentary trust for Sau! Breton's grandchildren created under paragraph 8 of the
Last WiB of Saul Breton, signed in May, 1981 (hereafter the "Grandchildren's Trust*),
hereby:
1.
Acknowledges receipt of a letter dated December 10, 2004 from Neil
Breton and Wiffam Breton.
2.
Acknowledges reading the letter referred to in the above paragraph 1 and
understanding the* contents thereof.
3.
Acknowledges that the current trust assets of the Grandchildren's Trust
are of little or no value.
4.
Acknowledges that the proposed payment of $24,000 from Neil Breton will
be in be in full payment and satisfaction of the undersigned's interest in the
Grandchildren's Trust.
5.
Acknowledges that in disbursing payment referred to in the above
paragraph 4, Neil Breton is acting individually and not in his capacity as a Trustee of the
Grandchildren's Trust
6.
Acknowledges that the payment referred to in the above paragraph 4 is
from an individual account owned by Neil Breton and that such amount is being paid as
an alternative means to honor the intent of the Grandchildren's Trust, which otherwise
would be frustrated.
7.
Releases Neil Breton, Jana Breton, and William Breton, as Trustees of
the Grandchildren's Trust, from any and all liability in ponnecBon with the undersigned's
interest in the Grandchildren's Trust
8.
Releases Rhonda Slater, as a former Trustee of the Grandchildren's
Trust from*any and all liability in connection with the undersigned's interest in the
Grandchildren's Trust
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9.

Consents to the termination of the Grandchildren's Trust.

DATED: December / 0 . 2 0 0 4

NEIL BRETON, as guardian for
NICHOLAS QUINN BRETON
STATE OF

/>4^

COUNTY OFjurmf/fe"

)
)ss.
>

Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by Neil Breton, as guardian
for Nicholas Quinn Breton, this l&&-ten of December, 2D04.
Ndtary Public

taimaA»faM«M«aw»i.«»riii.» >•.« in in. n-ii-M.^
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